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1

Dissertation Overview
The interbank market is important for banks to obtain liquidity. From the recent financial
crisis it is now clear that access to liquidity is vital for a bank’s business. There are two
main components of the interbank market: the unsecured and the secured market. The
latter is commonly called repo market; repo is short for repurchase agreement. In a
repurchase agreement, a security is sold at a fixed price with a promise to buy it back
at this price at the end of the contract including the repo rate, the interest rate applied
to this transaction. The security serves as collateral, if the cash taker defaults. There
are two types of repo transactions, general collateral (GC) and special. The motive for
trading GC repo is liquidity, whereas for trading special repo the specific security. All
three papers included in this dissertation use data provided by Eurex Repo, who offers
a platform for electronic repo trading. The first paper, joint with Kjell G. Nyborg, links
rates in the unsecured and the repo market, and develops a theory on their relationship,
which is supported by empirical tests. In the second paper, the drivers of the special
repo market are analyzed, so that the reaction of this market to external influences can
be understood better. The third paper shows that there are allocational inefficiencies
in the distribution of liquidity in the interbank market (unsecured and GC repo) due to
institutional factors and frictions, which strengthen during the crisis, and do not disappear
despite the provision of excess liquidity by the Eurosystem. Each paper forms one chapter
of my dissertation, and are now introduced in more detail.
The first chapter Repo Rates and the Collateral Spread Puzzle: Theory and Evidence,
which is written in collaboration with Kjell G. Nyborg, develops a theory on the collateral
spread, unsecured interbank rate – repo rate. The puzzle is that this is frequently negative.
We develop a theory of repos motivated by the need to generate liquidity. Players are
risk averse (but risk neutrality is also covered). Trading in the security cash market is
an alternative to repo. Unsecured borrowing constraints generate a constrained-arbitrage
relation between the repo rate, the illiquidity and risk-adjusted cash market rate of return,
and the unsecured rate. The repo rate may rise above the unsecured rate if the cash
market adjusted rate does so too. Thus, negative collateral spreads may be a symptom of
especially low unsecured rates or depressed securities prices. Collateral spreads increase in
haircuts and decrease in volatility. The theory is tested using data from Eurex repo. The
findings are supportive. Finally, we use the theory to provide a narrative of the evolution
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of collateral spreads in the euro area over time.
In the second chapter The German Electronic Special Repo Market: Activity and
Prices, I analyze the drivers of the electronic special repo market in Germany, Eurex
Repo. Volumes, i.e. activity, in the special repo market are captured by the number
of trades per trading day and traded volume. Prices are given by the special repo rate
and specialness. The lower the special repo rate, and the higher the specialness, the
more expensive is the security in the special repo market. I find that one important
determinant for a bond trading special is its issue size. The larger the issue size is,
the larger the number of trades per trading day and the respective traded volume. The
bond itself is cheaper, i.e. specialness is lower. Furthermore, trading in the special repo
market is strongly impacted by the European Central Bank’s policy measures and financial
market uncertainty. The latter, measured by the VSTOXX, leads to lower activity, and
higher specialness, indicating a higher premium of trading in the special repo market.
ECB excess liquidity and asset purchase programmes tend to decrease activity in special
repo. The cost of trading special repo usually falls under the asset purchase programmes,
which can be due to restored market conditions and/or market segmentation. The ECB’s
switch to a negative policy rate, the reference rate in repo, impacts special repo trades,
as negative rates provide a disadvantage to the cash provider/security borrower in the
transaction. He obtains a lower cash balance at the end of the transaction as compared
to the initially provided cash loan. This reduces the attractiveness of special repo.
In the third chapter Frictions in the Interbank Market: Evidence from Volumes, I
study the impact of frictions and institutional factors on the (optimal) liquidity alloca-
tion in the interbank market. The frictions identified (squeezing, credit risk, uncertainty
and link to other financial markets) affect each segment of the interbank market differ-
ently. In addition to calendar day effects in interbank market volumes due to institutional
requirements, these frictions amplify the segmentation of the interbank market, thus in-
hibiting the efficient redistribution of liquidity within this market. The analysis combines
data on the overnight unsecured and repo market with data on the use of the standing
facilities at the Eurosystem. Before Lehman, I find evidence for allocational inefficiencies
in the interbank market due to frictions. During the crisis, credit risk is the main fac-
tor that changes trading activity in the interbank market. Moreover, there is a link to
other asset markets impacting the distribution of liquidity. Higher expected stock market
volatility leads to precautionary liquidity hoarding and a higher demand for repo transac-
tions. Finally, the results suggest that frictions persist in the course of the crisis despite
the extensive measures taken by the Eurosystem.
My dissertation adds to the understanding of how the interbank market functions, in
particular the repo market. An analysis of the impact of frictions on both the unsecured
5and secured interbank market in Europe has not been done before. Bindseil, Nyborg, and
Strebulaev (2009) show the existence of allocational inefficiencies before the start of the
financial crisis, but not in the presence of high credit risk and Eurosystem strong liquidity
supply. Thus, I add to Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer (2016)’s analysis of the
repo market in Europe by exploring in detail the impact of frictions and development of
allocational inefficiencies. The building stone for special repo is Duffie (1996)’s model,
which was confirmed by Jordan and Jordan (1997)’s empirical analysis. Nevertheless,
there are no studies that analyze, how external factors, such as Eurosystem unconventional
monetary policies, impact supply and demand in the special repo market, as reflected in
volumes. My analysis contributes to a better knowledge of how those policies affect
specialness, adding to Corradin and Maddaloni (2015)’s and Dufour, Marra, Sangiorgi,
and Skinner (2017)’s studies. A theory on GC repo rates does not exist so far, so Prof.
Kjell Nyborg and me are the first ones to offer a model on repo rates and the collateral
spread. We also indicate those instances, when the repo rate can exceed the unsecured
rate. Thus, my dissertation provides many new findings and improves the understanding
of the interbank market.
The structure of the dissertation is as follows: My three papers are found in Part II.
Part III contains the bibliography and Part IV presents my curriculum vitae.
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1 Repo Rates and the Collateral Spread Puz-
zle: Theory and Evidence
Joint with Kjell G. Nyborg
1.1 Introduction
Repurchase agreements (repos) are often characterised as being, in effect, a type of col-
lateralised loan (Duffie, 1996). Repo rates would therefore be expected to be lower than
unsecured rates, which indeed they typically are. However, a puzzling feature of the
market for liquidity is that repo rates shoot above unsecured rates from time to time,
sometimes even for extended periods. This is illustrated in Figure 1.1. The figure graphs
what we call the collateral spread, defined as the difference between the unsecured rate
and the repo rate. Thus, a negative value of the collateral spread means that the repo
rate is higher than the unsecured rate. The figure shows that during the financial crisis,
repo rates in the euro area were several basis points above unsecured rates for prolonged
periods of time.1 We can also see that repo rates occasionally went above unsecured rates
even prior to the crisis. Over the sample period in Figure 1.1, the collateral spread is
negative approximately 25% of the time.
A negative collateral spread is puzzling because repos are typically viewed as reducing
credit risk relative to unsecured borrowing. The long periods of negative collateral spreads
shown in Figure 1.1 are all the more surprising because the repo rate that we have used
is from a central counterparty (CCP), which should eliminate credit risk. In this paper,
we seek to understand the puzzle of negative collateral spreads and, more generally, shed
light on the behaviour of repo versus unsecured rates.
Improving our understanding of repo and unsecured rates is important for a number
of reasons. First, the market for liquidity is central to the financial system, e.g., (Bindseil,
Nyborg, and Strebulaev, 2009; Fecht, Nyborg, and Rocholl, 2011; Gorton and Metrick,
2011), among others. Second, the market for liquidity interacts with securities markets,
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009) and frictions in the market for liquidity spill over to
the broader financial markets (Nyborg and Östberg, 2014). Third, interbank rates are used
1While Figure 1.1 uses overnight rates, the same holds true for longer tenors.
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as reference rates in mortgages, various credit agreements, and in derivatives markets. The
significance of these rates to society as a whole is emphasized by the public and regulatory
outrage at the manipulation of Libor by a number of banks.2 In the wake of the Libor
scandal, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in Basel and others have called for Libor to
be replaced by a repo rate benchmark.3 This points to the importance of rates set in the
market for liquidity, especially in the post-crisis landscape, and Figure 1.1 underscores
that we have much to learn about them. In this paper, we first study the relation between
repo rates and unsecured rates theoretically and then proceed to empirically test some of
the implications of our theory.
As discussed by Duffie (1996), repos are often used as vehicles by cash takers to finance
the purchase of the underlying collateral. They can also be driven by the cash provider’s
objective of obtaining a particular security. Duffie’s focus is on such “special repos.”
The theory we develop is most relevant for general collateral (GC) repos. These are
typically thought of as being driven by the cash taker’s want to obtain liquidity. In GC
repos, the cash taker (borrower) may deliver one of several securities to the cash provider
(lender) from a prescribed basket, or list, of eligible collateral. For example, in the popular
GC Pooling ECB basket contract offered by Eurex Repo, which is cleared by a Central
Counterparty (CCP), the list of eligible collateral stood at approximately 7,500 ISINs in
August 2013. It is the feature of a repo that the underlying collateral is made available
to the cash provider that makes a repo different from a plain collateralized loan. This is
also a key ingredient in our theory, but for a different reason than in models of special
repo rates. In particular, in our model, the cash provider needs the underlying collateral
to (partially) finance the reverse repo. To explain this, it is useful to first summarize our
basic theoretical framework.
The perspective we take in this paper is that, apart from borrowing unsecured, the
alternative to raising liquidity by doing repo is to sell the underlying security in the cash
market and buy it back later. We can think of this as a “home-made” repo. This may
involve additional transaction costs, for example due to illiquidity. In addition, in the
cash market home-made repo, the interest cost of raising the liquidity is a function of
the security’s future price, which is stochastic. So the relative attractiveness of doing a
regular or a home-made repo is a function of the repo rate in comparison to the illiquidity
and risk-adjusted cost of engaging in cash market trades.
An important ingredient in our model is that both the cash taker and the cash provider
are constrained in the unsecured market. As our model abstracts from credit risk, the
2Disputes and court investigations continue long time after the detection of the manipulation
(Bloomberg, April 04, 2016, Five Ex-Barclays traders plead not guilty to Libor manipulation).
3See Financial Times, April 25, 2014, US regulators urge quick Libor replacement, retrieved from
FT.com on April 29, 2014.
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absence of borrowing constraints in the unsecured market would imply that the repo
rate would always be equal to the unsecured rate. We abstract from credit risk for both
theoretical and empirical reasons. First, from a theoretical perspective, credit risk cannot
explain negative collateral spreads. Second, from an empirical perspective, as seen in
Figure 1.1, negative collateral spreads are common in overnight CCP repos, where credit
risk should not be a concern. The cash provider and taker may face different borrowing
constraints. While it may seem “natural” to think of the cash taker to be more constrained,
we study both the case that he is and the case that he is not, which adds to the richness
of the predictions of our theory.
One often thinks of cash providers in repos as liquidity rich. In some models, this may
be also be assumed. In our model, however, one may more appropriately think of the
cash provider as an intermediary, or arbitrageur, between players that have liquidity and
those that are short and seek it.
Constraints in the unsecured market and the need to trade in the cash market gives
rise to a constrained-arbitrage relation between the repo rate, the unsecured rate, and
the collateral’s cash market adjusted rate of return. The nature of this relation depends
on a number of parameters such as the potentially different borrowing constraints of the
different players, the haircut in the repo, the players’ risk aversion coefficients and the
volatility and illiquidity of the underlying collateral. The sign of the collateral spread
depends on the relation between the unsecured rate, which we treat as exogenous, and
the illiquidity and risk-adjusted cash market rate of return of the underlying security.
Roughly speaking, the collateral spread is positive if and only if the cash market rate
adjusted rate of return is below that of the unsecured rate.
Thus, collateral spreads can go from the normal positive situation to negative if either
(1) the unsecured rate drops sufficiently, or (2) securities prices fall sufficiently, implying an
increase in the illiquidity and risk-adjusted security cash market rate of return. Scenario
(1) helps explain the spikes seen in Figure 1.1. As is well known, unsecured rates usually
spike either up or down at the end of reserve maintenance periods and up at the end of
calendar months (Fecht, Nyborg, and Rocholl, 2011; Nautz and Offermanns, 2008; Perez-
Quiros and Mendizabal, 2006). This causes a move in the same direction in the collateral
spread, since the securities market is not similarly affected by these calendar effects.
Scenario (2) helps explain the prolonged periods of negative collateral spreads shown in
Figure 1.1 as periods where securities markets were depressed. Further subtleties of the
conditions under which positive and negative collateral spreads obtain are elaborated
further upon in the body of the paper.
One other result relating to negative collateral spreads we want to point out here is
that, as a general rule, negative collateral spreads are only possible if the cash provider
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is less constrained in the unsecured market than the cash taker.4 Thus, the fact that
collateral spreads are often negative may be viewed as empirical confirmation of the
commonly held notion that cash providers are players who have a comparative advantage
in the unsecured market. This result arises because of the basic mechanism of a repo
with constrained players. If the collateral spread is negative, then it is advantageous to
borrow as much as possible in the unsecured market. If the potential cash provider is less
constrained than the player that seeks liquidity, then the latter can, essentially, relax her
unsecured borrowing constraint by raising funds from the former. If the potential cash
provider is more constrained, however, there are no such gains from trade. So in this case,
a negative collateral spread would not be consistent with equilibrium.
We use data provided by Eurex Repo to test three predictions of our theory.5 For all
three tests, we use the GC baskets with the most active overnight trading, namely the
GC Pooling ECB basket and the GC Pooling Extended basket.6
First, we exploit the feature of the unsecured market that it spikes, as discussed above,
for reasons largely relating to the central bank’s operational framework and end-of-month
window-dressing by banks.7 So these spikes are unrelated to what is happening in the
securities markets. Thus, by our arbitrage relation discussed above, the collateral spread
will spike in the same direction. The evidence is strongly in support of our theory.
Second, we use an exogenous change to haircuts to test the prediction of our model
that the collateral spread is decreasing in the haircut (when the collateral spread is pos-
itive). This uses the institutional feature of our data that in the two GC contracts we
look at, Eurex, not the counterparties, determines the haircuts. This corresponds to an
assumption in our model that haircuts are exogenous. Moreover, Eurex uses the same
haircuts as in Eurosystem repos (Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer, 2016; Nyborg,
2017b), which, as shown by Nyborg (2017b) have historically been updated every three
to four years. On September 27, 2013, the ECB announced changes to haircuts in Eu-
rosystem repos as of October 1, 2013. For the most part, haircuts were lowered. We
have obtained actual haircuts from Eurex around this time and show that haircuts for
the securities in the two baskets we are studying fell on October 2, 2013, consistent with
Eurex’ policy of using Eurosystem repo hairucts. Our tests show that collateral spreads
also fell, as predicted by our theory, after this date.
Third, we examine the effect of volatility on collateral spreads. Our theory predicts
that higher volatility should be associated with a lower collateral spread. The intuition
4There is one “trivial” exception. See Theorem 2.
5Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer (2016) also use this data, but focus on volume.
6See Section 1.4 for details on these and other GC contracts trading on Eurex.
7Again, we refer the reader to the body of the paper for further discussion.
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for this result is that the higher cash market volatility feeds into a lower repo rate because
it becomes more “costly” for a risk averse cash provider to (partially) finance the reverse
position through the cash market. To examine this, we study the change in the collateral
spread on governing council meetings by the ECB where the policy rate is subject to
change (as it is on every second governing council meeting). The securities in the two
baskets we study are all bonds of various kinds. As bond return volatility is closely
linked to changes in interest rates, the uncertainty before a governing council meeting, in
which they decide on a change in the interest rate, is higher than on the day itself, when
the decision is announced. Thus, we predict that the change in the collateral spread is
negative, which is also what we find in the data.
These findings lend support to our theory and thus to the explanation for negative
collateral spreads that emerge from it. Thus, in Section 1.5, we use our theory to provide
a commentary on the development of the collateral spread in the euro area, as shown in
Figure 1.1, over time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 we lay out the theoretical
framework. Section 1.2 provides analysis of positive and negative collateral spreads and
empirical predictions. The empirical tests are in Section 1.4. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical framework
This section provides the theoretical framework that we will use to study variations in
the collateral spread, the difference between unsecured and repo rates. We are especially
interested in understanding under what conditions negative collateral spreads can arise
and what are the other empirical implications of a model that is capable of yielding
this. Important features in our setup include liquidity constrained players and collateral
“pricing errors” (as discussed in the Introduction and further described below). To provide
context for the model, we start by reviewing a generic repo.
1.2.1 Generic repurchase agreement
A generic repurchase agreement between two counterparties, a cash taker (borrower)
and a cash provider (lender), has five main ingredients; the underlying collateral (e.g. a
security), the price of the underlying collateral, the haircut that is applied to this price,
the repo rate, and the maturity (tenor) of the repo agreement. For example, if the price
(for the purpose of a repo) of the collateral is P , the haircut is h, and the repo rate is
r, then the cash taker delivers the underlying collateral to the cash provider and receives
cash of P (1 − h). At maturity, the cash taker buys back the underlying collateral at a
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Table 1: Basic cash flows in a repo/reverse repo∗
Date 0 Date 1 (maturity)
Repo (cash taker) 1− h −(1− h)(1 + r)
Reverse (cash provider) −(1− h) (1− h)(1 + r)
∗ The price, P , of the collateral is normalized to 1 and the probability of default is assumed to be 0.
price equal to P plus the accumulated interest at the repo rate. The cash taker is said to
be doing a repo while the cash provider is said to be doing a reverse repo.
In addition, the cash provider typically obtains the use of the collateral until maturity.8
If we ignore this feature as well as the possibility of default, the cash flows arising from
a repo that starts at date 0 and runs until date 1 are described in Table 1. These flows
make the repo look like a simple (collateralized) loan of 1−h at the repo rate, r. However,
this ignores that the cash provider has use of the collateral until maturity. In our model,
this feature will play an important role.
1.2.2 Further structure and assumptions
We consider a setup where one agent, that we think of as a bank and refer to as “the
short”, is short one unit of liquidity. The shortage may arise from a need to fulfill re-
serve requirements, satisfy regulatory liquidity constraints, buy securities, or fulfill some
obligation. The need to obtain the liquidity is modelled as a hard constraint. The short
is assumed to be endowed with one unit of a security that can be used as collateral in a
repo. She can obtain liquidity by selling the security in the cash market, doing a repo, or
borrowing in the unsecured market. In the case the short does a repo, we refer to her as
the cash taker, in line with standard terminology. Her potential counterparty is referred
to as the cash provider.
We think of the cash provider as an intermediary between the short and banks with
excess liquidity, alternatively as an arbitrageur in the market for liquidity. As a normal-
ization, the cash provider is assumed to have no cash on hand at the start of date 0. Both
the short and the cash provider are constrained in the unsecured market so that the total
unsecured sum they can raise is less than the unit the short needs. This means that it
is not feasible for the cash provider to finance a reverse repo that will provide the short
with the liquidity she needs in the unsecured market. A fraction of the collateral held by
the short will have to be sold in the cash market, either by the short herself or, in the
8For some CCP repos the cash provider may face constraints with respect to how to use the collateral.
For example, in Eurex’ GC Pooling contracts, the collateral can only be reused within Eurex’ system or
in repos with the Eurosystem. However, Eurex also provides settlement for other repo contracts where
the collateral can taken outside Eurex’ system (e.g. its Euro Repo baskets).
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case she engages in a repo, by the cash provider. Constraints in the unsecured market
are necessary to generate nonzero collateral spreads. This assumption will also lead to a
link between the unsecured rate, the repo rate, and the cash market rate of return of the
underlying collateral. We refer to a repo rate as an equilibrium repo rate if the short and
the cash provider are willing to undertake a repo at that rate.
Assumption 1. The maximum combined amount the short and the potential cash provider
can obtain in the unsecured market is strictly less than one (i.e., the quantity of liquidity
the short needs).
The assumption of constraints in the unsecured market is consistent with anecdotal
evidence that banks face interbank credit limits. It is also consistent with the findings
of Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2009) that the interbank market is not perfectly
allocationally efficient, even during times of normalcy. The unsecured rate is denoted by
u and is assumed to be the same for the short and the potential cash provider.
To put further structure on the analysis, we make several additional assumptions as
listed below.
Assumption 2. There is no default risk.
This is assumed in part because we wish to keep the theoretical analysis as simple as
possible. It is also difficult to see how default, or credit, risk can lead to negative collateral
spreads. The assumption of no default risk means that the theoretical analysis in this
paper should perhaps best be viewed as representing one of overnight transactions, where
default risk is arguably minimal.
Assumption 3. Haircuts are exogenous to the repo itself. That is, the haircut, h ∈ [0, 1),
is not subject to negotiation between the counterparties.
This reflects the factual situation in many repo agreements that haircuts are set in
advance and often by a third party. For example, in the case of Eurex’ repo contracts, a
list of haircuts for each day is made available (weekly) on the Eurex website and (daily) in
their system, Xemac. This is not updated during the day, except in special circumstances.
As also noted by Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer (2016) and Nyborg (2017b),
haircuts in Eurex’ GC Pooling contracts (that we use in our empirical analysis) are based
on those set by the ECB for Eurosystem repos. These are updated only every three to
four years (Nyborg, 2017b).9 For US triparty repo agreements, Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and
Orlov (2014) have observed that haircuts are not managed actively either and, according
to Copeland, Martin, and Walker (2010), “ ...haircuts are not negotiated at the trade
9Nyborg (2017b) also documents that Eurex deviates from the ECB haircuts in about 10% of cases.
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level but are instead written into the appendix of the tri-party repo custodial agreement
between the cash investor, the collateral provider, and the clearing bank. While it is
possible to change the appendix containing the haircuts, the change may not apply until
the next day. Such changes are only made occasionally.”10 In Europe, Clearstream and
Euroclear, two triparty repo agents, ask banks to set their own haircuts according to
certain security criteria (e.g. type of security, maturity, rating etc.) before they start
trading repo in their systems. This list of haircuts can be amended and banks can apply
additional margins in individual contracts. However, haircuts are not normally updated
on a daily basis. Thus, we study repo rates and collateral spreads as a function of haircuts.
Assumption 4. The date 0 price, for the purpose of the repo, of the underlying security
(collateral) is normalized to 1. The actual (security) cash market price that a seller could
obtain is 1 − ε0, where ε0 ∈ [0, 1) is a constant. At date 1, the cash market price of the
underlying security is 1 + x˜− ε1, where x˜ is a random variable.11
The parameter εt is the collateral pricing error arising from a lack of perfect liquidity
or, at date 0, because the price used in the repo is based on a model. Even if a market
price were used in a repo agreement, in practice, it is not clear that if additional securities
were sold into the market, that the cash taker could actually achieve that price. The less
liquid the underlying security is, the larger would the price discrepancy be expected to
be. Because the ε’s reflect illiquidity, we think of εt ≥ 0. For simplicity, we assume that
settlement in the cash market is immediate.12
Let 1 + x¯ denote the expected date 1 price of the underlying collateral in a perfectly
liquid market without pricing errors. Since the date 0 price is normalized to 1, x¯ is the
expected rate of return in these perfect conditions. In contrast, the actual expected rate
of return to an agent that buys in the cash market at date 0 and sells at date 1 is
y¯ = 1 + x¯− ε11− ε0 − 1 =
x¯− (ε1 − ε0)
1− ε0 . (1.1)
Similarly, we define the random variable
y˜ ≡ x˜− (ε1 − ε0)1− ε0 . (1.2)
10It is possible that haircuts in the bilateral repo market may be updated more frequently than for
other repos, see e.g., (Gorton and Metrick, 2011).
11 We also think of ε1 being a constant so that we have an additive pricing error specification. However,
the formulation also allows for a multiplicative pricing error. For a multiplicative specification, simply
set ε1 = ε∗1(1 + x˜), where ε∗1 is a constant. At date 0, the price is normalized to 1 so that the pricing
error specification in Assumption 4 can be viewed equally as additive or multiplicative.
12If settlement is instead the next day, for example, we could think of the repo studied here as a
tomorrow/next transaction.
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This represents the (security) cash market rate of return.
The short’s objective is to raise one unit of liquidity at date 0 in the way that yields
the maximum date 1 utility. The cash provider in a repo seeks to provide 1− h units of
liquidity while also maximizing date 1 utility.
Assumption 5. The short and the potential cash provider have CARA utility with risk
aversion parameter ρ, and x˜ is normally distributed with mean x¯ and variance σ2x.
The cash market rate of return, y˜, is, therefore, also normally distributed with mean y¯
and variance σ2y = σ2x/(1 − ε0)2. As shown by Grossman (1976), Assumption 5 leads
to mean-variance preferences. For the analysis in the next section, it is useful to make
some observations regarding the certainty equivalents of the returns obtained from various
positions or trades of the security held by the short.
Position certainty equivalents
Using Grossman’s (1976) arguments, we can establish that the certainty equivalent of
receiving ωx˜, ω ∈ [0, 1], is ωx¯− ρ2σ2xω2, while the certainty equivalent of an outflow of ωx˜
is 13
xˆ(ω) ≡ x¯ω + ρ2σ
2
xω
2. (1.3)
That is to say, an agent who has to pay ωx˜ would be indifferent between paying this ran-
dom sum or the fixed sum xˆ(ω). In general, given Assumption 5, the certainty equivalent
of an outflow of ωx˜+ a, where a is a constant, is xˆ(ω) + a.
Cash market certainty equivalents
The alternative to raising one unit of liquidity by doing a repo and borrowing h in the
unsecured market is to sell ω units of the security in the cash market, borrow 1−ω(1−ε0)
in the unsecured market, and then buying back ω units of the security at date 1. An agent
that follows this strategy, has a net outflow of ω [x˜− (ε1 − ε0)] from the two cash market
trades. The certainty equivalent of this is xˆ(ω)− ω(ε1 − ε0). In other words, per unit of
cash raised at date 0, the certainty equivalent of the net cash outflow from selling fraction
13Let z˜ = ωx˜. Thus, z˜ is normally distributed with mean z¯ = ωx¯ and variance σ2z = ω2σ2z . The
expected utility of receiving ωx˜ is given by,
E[U(ωx˜)] = E[U(z˜)] = −1√
2piσz
∫ ∞
−∞
exp (−ρz) exp
(−(z − z¯)2
2σ2z
)
dz = − exp
(
−ρ(z¯ − ρ2σ
2
z)
)
,
where E[·] is the expectation operator, U(·) denotes the negative exponential (CARA) utility function,
i.e. U(z) = − exp(−ρz), and exp(z) ≡ ez. Thus the certainty equivalent of receiving ωx˜ is ωx¯ − ρ2ω2σ2x.
Similarly, E[U(−ωx˜)] = − exp (−ρ(ωx¯+ ρ2ω2σ2x)), implying that the certainty equivalent of an outflow
of ωx˜ is xˆ(ω) as defined in (1.3).
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ω of the security at date 0 and buying this back at date 1 is14
yˆ(ω) ≡ xˆ(ω)− ω(ε1 − ε0)
ω(1− ε0) =
x¯− (ε1 − ε0)
1− ε0 +
ρ
2
ωσ2x
1− ε0 = y¯ +
ρ
2ωσ
2
y(1− ε0). (1.4)
We refer to yˆ(ω) as the “adjusted rate of return,” or “cost,” from selling the fraction
ω of the security at date 0 and buying it back at date 1. This terminology reflects that
yˆ(ω) is adjusted relative to the fundamental expected rate of return of the security, x˜.
As seen, yˆ(ω), is increasing in the fraction traded, ω. The additional adjustments are, in
part, due to risk aversion and volatility and, in part, to illiquidity. In particular, the cash
market adjusted rate of return from selling ω shares at date 0 and buying this back at
date 1 is also increasing in risk aversion (ρ), volatility (σ2x), and illiquidity (ε0). As seen
in (1.4), yˆ(ω) is also increasing in x¯.
1.3 Analysis
In our model, constraints in the unsecured market mean that at least a fraction of the
security held by the short will have to be sold in the cash market. This may be done
by the short herself or, in the case that she raises liquidity through a repo, by the cash
provider in that repo. Recall that the cash provider is also constrained in the unsecured
market and does not have excess liquidity. Thus, the cash provider needs to finance the
reverse position by selling securities at date 0. In particular, we study unhedged reverse
repos where the cash provider needs to sell at least a fraction of the underlying repoed
collateral to finance his position. The existence of constraints in the unsecured market
for both players and the need to trade in the cash market creates a link between the repo
rate, the unsecured rate, and the collateral’s cash market adjusted rate of return.
Before proceeding, we need to make Assumption 1 more precise. In particular, denote
the maximum quantity the cash provider can obtain from the unsecured market by κ ∈
[|h− ε0|, 1). This ensures that the cash provider is able to finance a reverse repo. Denote
the maximum quantity that the short can borrow by η . By Assumption 1, η < 1 − κ.
We assume η ≥ max{h, ε0} so that it is feasible for the short to raise the unit of liquidity
she needs through either doing repo or trading in the cash market.
Given her constraints and her need to obtain one unit of liquidity, the short has
two alternative sets of trades. She can either combine unsecured borrowing with a repo
(Alternative 1) or with direct cash market trades (Alternative 2).15 In Alternative 1,
14The second step in (1.4) uses (1.3) and the final step uses (1.1) and the expression for σ2y above.
15We do not consider mixtures of repo and cash market sales by the short. Our focus is on these two
as alternative approaches to raising liquidity, or, put differently, on the implications of viewing the cash
market as a venue for creating a “home-made” repo where the “interest rate” is uncertain.
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Table 2: Cash flows from alternatives for raising one unit of liquidity
Date 0 Date 1
Alternative 1 (when r ≤ u)
Repo 1− h −(1− h)(1 + r)
Borrow unsecured h −h(1 + u)
Sum 1 −[1 + (1− h)r + hu]
Alternative 2
Sell ω(1− ε0) –
Buy – −ω(1 + x˜− ε1)
Borrow unsecured 1− ω(1− ε0) −(1− ω(1− ε0))(1 + u)
Sum 1 −ω(1 + x˜− ε1)− (1− ω(1− ε0))(1 + u)
the short prefers minimizing her unsecured borrowings if r ≤ u and maximizing them if
r > u.16 In Alternative 2, the optimal cash market trade and unsecured borrowings will
have to be determined.
By way of illustration, the cash flows from the short’s two alternatives are laid out
in Table 2. For now, we assume that r ≤ u. Thus, in the repo alternative, the short
borrows the minimum amount, h, in the unsecured market and raises 1 − h by repoing
her security. In Alternative 2, the short sells ω units in the cash market, yielding a cash
inflow of ω(1− ε0), and borrows 1− ω(1− ε0) at the unsecured rate. At date 1, she buys
back ω shares of the security and repays her loan, to yield the cash flows shown. In order
to compare the two alternatives, it is necessary to first derive the optimal ω, subject to
constraints, which we turn to next.
1.3.1 Alternative 2: Raising liquidity in the cash market
As seen in Table 2, the outflow at date 1 from the short’s Alternative 2 is
ω(1 + x˜− ε1) + (1− ω(1− ε0))(1 + u).
Using (1.3), the certainty equivalent of this is
1 + xˆ(ω)− ω(ε1 − ε0) + (1− ω(1− ε0))u. (1.5)
Using (1.4), this can be written as 1 + c(ω), where
c(ω) ≡ ω(1− ε0)yˆ(ω) + (1− ω(1− ε0))u. (1.6)
16If r = u, the short is indifferent between raising liquidity through a repo or unsecured borrowing.
In the anlaysis, we assume that the short borrows as little as possible in the unsecured market if r = u.
Thus, we have two scenarios: r ≤ u and r > u.
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c(ω) has the intuitive interpretation as the (adjusted) weighted average cost of liquidity
under Alternative 2 when ω shares are sold in the cash market at date 0 and the remaining
liquidity of 1− ω(1− ε0) is obtained in the unsecured market.
Thus, under Alternative 2, maximizing date 1 utility for the short is equivalent to
choosing ω so as to minimize the weighted average cost of liquidity. In doing so, the short
faces two constraints. First, it is not feasible for her to sell more of the security than the
one unit she is endowed with. Second, since she cannot borrow more than η unsecured,
she must sell at least (1 − η)/(1 − ε0) units. Hence, the short’s problem is to solve the
following constrained minimization problem:
minω c(ω) subject to
Feasibility: ω ≤ 1
Unsecured borrowing: ω ≥ 1−η1−ε0 .
(1.7)
The first-order condition of the unconstrained problem is17
ω∗yˆ′(ω∗) + yˆ(ω∗)− u = 0. (1.8)
Thus, using (1.4), the unconstrained optimal cash market trade is
ω∗ = u− y¯
ρσ2y(1− ε0)
. (1.9)
Hence, with respect to feasibility, ω∗ ≤ 1 if and only if
u− y¯ ≤ ρσ2y(1− ε0). (1.10)
With respect to the unsecured borrowing constraint, ω∗ ≥ (1− η)/(1− ε0) if and only if
u− y¯ ≥ ρσ2y(1− η). (1.11)
The “upper bound” on u− y¯ (for an unconstrained solution) in (1.10) is larger than the
“lower bound” in (1.11) since η ≥ ε0. Thus, the constrained optimal cash market trade is
Ω =

1 if u− y¯ ≥ ρσ2y(1− ε0)
ω∗ if ρσ2y(1− η) ≤ u− y¯ < ρσ2y(1− ε0)
1−η
1−ε0 if u− y¯ < ρσ2y(1− η).
(1.12)
17From (1.4), it is straightforward that c′′(ω∗) > 0. So the second order condition for a minimum is
satisfied.
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This says that if the unsecured rate is “very large” relative to the cost of cash market
trades, the short optimally trades her whole unit. On the other hand, if the unsecured
rate is “very low,” the short trades as little as possible, preferring instead to borrow as
much as she can in the unsecured market. Between these extremes, the unconstrained
optimum obtains. In the limiting case that ρ = 0, Ω = 1 if and only if y¯ ≤ u, which is
intuitive.
1.3.2 Positive collateral spread
In this subsection, we consider the case of positive collateral spreads. Negative spreads
are considered in the next subsection.
We start by assuming that r ≤ u. Our first objective is to derive necessary conditions
for this to hold. Sufficient conditions are considered subsequently (in Theorem 1). Given
that r ≤ u, the short’s two alternative trades are as laid out in Table 2, with ω = Ω as
given by (1.12). Using the analysis in Subsection 1.3.1, it follows from Table 2 that for
the short to engage in a repo, we must have,
(1− h)r + hu ≤ Ω(1− ε0)yˆ(Ω) + (1− Ω(1− ε0))u. (1.13)
This is intuitive. It says that the interest cost of doing a repo (in combination with
unsecured borrowing) must be no larger than the cost of trading in the cash market (in
combination with unsecured borrowing). In turn, this implies that we have an upper
bound on the repo rate as follows:
r ≤ r = Ω(1− ε0)yˆ(Ω) + (1− Ω(1− ε0))u− hu1− h . (1.14)
This expression is derived under the assumption that r ≤ u. Thus, if the right hand side
of (1.14) exceeds u, the actual upper bound is u itself. This situation would indicate that
the short would be willing to pay a larger rate in a repo than the rate she actually pays.
This can occur if the short is more constrained in the unsecured market than the cash
provider (see Theorem 1 and its proof).
Turning now to the cash provider, recall that he needs to finance the reverse repo by
selling collateral at date 0. This may be combined with a loan in the unsecured market.
In order to be able to deliver the collateral back to the short at date 1, the cash provider
has to buy it back in the market at that time. At date 0, it is possible that the cash
provider generates excess liquidity through the sale of the security in the cash market. If
so, this is placed in the unsecured market at u. The cash provider, therefore, faces cash
flows shown in Table 3, where α denotes the fraction of the underlying security he sells
in the cash market to generate liquidity and finance the reverse repo.
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Table 3: Cash flows to the cash provider (when r ≤ u)
Date 0 Date 1
Reverse −(1− h) (1− h)(1 + r)
Sell security α(1− ε0) –
Unsecured loan 1− h− α(1− ε0) −(1− h− α(1− ε0))(1 + u)
Buy back security – −α(1 + x˜− ε1)
Sum 0 (1− h)(1 + r)− (1− h− α(1− ε0))(1 + u)
−α(1 + x˜− ε1)
The cash flows in Table 3 imply that for the (potential) cash provider to be willing to
enter into the reverse repo, we must have (using (1.3) and (1.4)),
(1− h)r + hu ≥ α(1− ε0)yˆ(α) + (1− α(1− ε0))u. (1.15)
This is the reverse of the condition for which the short is willing to enter a repurchase
agreement, but with α substituting for Ω. To derive the optimal fraction to sell in the cash
market for the cash provider, note that the problem he faces is identical to the problem
faced by the cash taker under her Alternative 2, except that the cash provider’s unsecured
borrowing cap is κ rather than η. Thus, using the same argument as in Subsection 1.3.1,
the cash provider’s constrained optimal cash market trade is
A =

1 if u− y¯ ≥ ρσ2y(1− ε0)
ω∗ if ρσ2y(1− κ) ≤ u− y¯ < ρσ2y(1− ε0)
1−κ
1−ε0 if u− y¯ < ρσ2y(1− κ).
(1.16)
Equation (1.15) now implies that there is a lower bound on the repo rate which is
given by
r ≥ r = A(1− ε0)yˆ(A) + (1− A(1− ε0))u− hu1− h . (1.17)
The expressions for the upper and lower bounds of r show that, in equilibrium, there
is a constrained arbitrage relation between the repo rate, r, the unsecured rate, u, and
the cash market rate of return of the underlying security. If u − y¯ is larger than the
maximum of ρσ2y(1−κ) and ρσ2y(1− η) then the upper and lower bounds coincide. These
are given by the right hand side of (1.14). In other words, there is a unique equilibrium
repo rate when the unsecured rate is so high that neither player’s unsecured borrowing
constraint is binding. When the constraint is binding for either player, the repo rate is
indeterminate within the upper and lower bounds, or there is no equilibrium repo rate.
In general, a positive collateral spread places an upper bound on the cash market rate,
yˆ(·). These implications are stated more precisely in the theorem below.
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Theorem 1. If η ≤ κ (the short is more constrained in the unsecured market than the
cash provider) then a necessary condition for r ≤ u is
yˆ
( 1− κ
1− ε0
)
= y¯ + ρ2σ
2
y(1− κ) ≤ u, (1.18)
and a sufficient condition is
yˆ
( 1− η
1− ε0
)
= y¯ + ρ2σ
2
y(1− η) ≤ u. (1.19)
If η > κ (the short is less constrained in the unsecured market than the cash provider),
r ≤ u if and only if
yˆ
( 1− κ
1− ε0
)
+ ρ2σ
2
y(1− κ) = y¯ + ρσ2y(1− κ) ≤ u. (1.20)
Furthermore, if r ≤ u, we have
1. If u− y¯ ≥ ρσ2y(1− ε0) then there is a unique equilibrium repo rate given by
r = (1− ε0)yˆ(1) + ε0u− hu1− h . (1.21)
2. If ρσ2y max{1 − η, 1 − κ} ≤ u − y¯ < ρσ2y(1 − ε0) then there is a unique equilibrium
repo rate given by
r = ω
∗(1− ε0)yˆ(ω∗) + (1− ω∗(1− ε0))u− hu
1− h = u−
1
2
(u− y¯)2
ρσ2y(1− h)
. (1.22)
3. If η ≤ κ and u − y¯ < ρσ2y(1 − η) then r may take on any value in the interval
[r,min{u, r}], where
r =
(1− η)yˆ
(
1−η
1−ε0
)
+ (η − h)u
1− h =
(1− η)
(
y¯ + 12ρσ
2
y(1− η)
)
+ (η − h)u
1− h , (1.23)
and
r =

u− 12 (u−y¯)
2
ρσ2y(1−h) if u− y¯ ≥ ρσ
2
y(1− κ)
(1−κ)yˆ
(
1−κ
1−ε0
)
+(κ−h)u
1−h =
(1−κ)(y¯+ 12ρσ2y(1−κ))+(κ−h)u
1−h if u− y¯ < ρσ2y(1− κ).
(1.24)
Proof: See the appendix.
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The theorem establishes that for the repo rate to be less than the unsecured rate, the
cash market adjusted rate of return cannot be “too high.” The exact bound depends on
which player is more constrained in the unsecured market. However, in either case, it is
always true that a repo rate below the unsecured rate involves the cash market expected
rate of return of the underlying security also being less than the unsecured rate, that is,
y¯ ≤ u. Without risk aversion, the conditions in the theorem collapse to r ≤ u if and only
if y¯ ≤ u. With risk aversion, the unsecured rate must carry a premium over y¯, with the
lower bound of the premium depending the players’ unsecured borrowing caps.
The link between the repo rate, the unsecured rate, and the cash market rate of
return arises because, for the short, the alternative to a repo is a “home-made” repo
through transacting in the cash market. Furthermore, for the cash provider, unsecured
borrowing constraints imply that it is necessary to transact in the cash market of the
underlying security in order to finance the reverse position. If neither players’ unsecured
borrowing constraint is binding in their respective cash market problems, the theorem
establishes that there is a unique equilibrium repo rate which is, as is intuitive in this
case, independent of the unsecured borrowing constraints.
However, if either of the borrowing constraints bind, the maximum repo rate the short
is willing to pay, r, and the minimum rate the cash provider requires, r diverge. When
the short is more constrained, that is, η ≤ κ, the short’s constraint binds first and, in
this case, we have r > r. The short is essentially willing to pay a premium over what
the cash provider requires because his borrowing demand is unsatisfied (the constraint
is binding) in the cash market alternative and the cash provider can funnel additional
unsecured borrowings to the short through the device of the repo. In other words, the
“home-made” repo is inferior to the market solution of an actual repo.
Raising liquidity by transacting in the cash market leads to more volatile realized
financing costs than borrowing unsecured at a fixed rate. Thus, borrowing constraints
can bind even though y¯ < u because of risk aversion. This also explains the attraction
of an actual repo as compared with the home-made version. When the cash provider is
less constrained than the short, the repo alternative allows liquidity to be raised at a less
volatile rate, thus lowering the risk-adjusted cost.
This helps explain why the sufficient and necessary bounds on yˆ(·) for r ≤ u diverge
when the cash provider is less constrained. In this case, the sufficient condition is de-
termined by the short’s constraint, while the necessary condition is determined by the
cash provider’s more generous constraint. The short’s constraint sets r which in this
case exceeds r. In turn, this makes the sufficient condition stronger than the necessary
condition.
When the short is less constrained than the cash provider, an actual, market-based
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repo does not offer any advantage over the home-made alternative. As a result, there is
always a unique repo rate and the necessary and sufficient conditions for r ≤ u coincide.
Our analysis provides constrained arbitrage relations between unsecured, cash market,
and repo rates. It is predicated on the idea that two of these rates may diverge, for reasons
outside of the model. As they diverge, this then has implications for the third rate. We
think of the unsecured market and the cash market as the fundamental markets, with the
repo market being derived from those. Our analysis reflects that the two fundamental
markets have different participants and are subject to different shocks. The participants in
the unsecured markets are banks trading reserves (central bank money). The participants
in the security cash market is much broader. As is well known, the unsecured market is
subject to up and down spikes that relate to the shift from an outgoing to a new reserve
maintenance period (see, e.g., Hamilton (1996), for the US, or Nautz and Offermanns
(2008), for the euro area) or particular calendar dates, e.g., (Fecht, Nyborg, and Rocholl,
2008; Perez-Quiros and Mendizabal, 2006). Securities markets do not experience the same
extreme movements around the same dates and are subject to a different set of issues such
as investors’ rebalancing portfolios, information flows, market uncertainty, etc. Given that
the unsecured rate does not move in lock-step with the cash market, the expressions for
the repo rate in Theorem 1 will give rise to testable empirical predictions. However, we
first need to study the case of negative collateral spreads.
1.3.3 Negative collateral spread
In this subsection, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the collateral
spread is negative. We assume r > u and ask whether this is consistent with equilibrium
(willingness to trade by both sides at that rate).
When r > u, the short optimally borrows her maximum of η in the unsecured market
under Alternative 1 (repo) and repos the fraction
φ = 1− η1− h (1.25)
of her security.
Since the short faces the same situation in the cash market as before, her optimal
transaction under Alternative 2 is still Ω as given in (1.12). By the conditions for r ≤ u
in Theorem 1, we can restrict the values of u− y¯ we need to consider when studying r > u.
The theorem implies that r > u is only possible if u− y¯ is “small,” where what this means
exactly depends on whether the short is less or more constrained in the unsecured market
than the cash provider.
In the discussion that follows, we assume that the short is more constrained than the
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cash provider, that is, η ≤ κ. However, the case that η > κ is also covered in the theorem
below. Given η ≤ κ, if r > u is equilibrium, (1.19) in Theorem 1 implies
yˆ
( 1− η
1− ε0
)
= y¯ + ρ2σ
2
y(1− η) > u. (1.26)
Likewise, by (1.18) in Theorem 1, if
yˆ
( 1− κ
1− ε0
)
= y¯ + ρ2σ
2
y(1− κ) > u (1.27)
then either r > u or an equilibrium repo rate does not exist. To establish these as
necessary and sufficient conditions, respectively, for r > u when η ≤ κ, we need to check
whether the highest rate at which the cash taker is willing to do a reverse repo is larger
than or equal to the lowest rate at which the cash provider is willing to take up the reverse
position, given that parameter values obey (1.26) or (1.27).
Given η ≤ κ, both (1.26) and (1.27) imply that a negative collateral spread is associ-
ated with the short’s unsecured borrowing constraint being binding under Alternative 2.
Thus, under this alternative, the short transacts Ω = (1 − η)/(1 − ε0) and borrows η at
the unsecured rate. Therefore, along the same lines as in the derivation of (1.13), for the
short to be willing to do a repo, we must have
(1− η)r + ηu ≤ (1− η)yˆ
( 1− η
1− ε0
)
+ ηu (1.28)
which reduces to
r ≤ rneg = yˆ
( 1− η
1− ε0
)
= y¯ + ρ2σ
2
y(1− η). (1.29)
More generally, this is the maximum the short is willing to pay whenever u−y¯ ≤ ρσ2y(1−η).
The cash provider’s problem is essentially the same as when r ≤ u, except that he now
needs to finance φ < 1 units. This changes the feasibility constraint in his optimization
problem, but the unconstrained problem and the borrowing constraint remain the same.
Thus, the cash provider’s optimal trade is now
A =

φ if u− y¯ ≥ ρσ2y(1− ε0)φ
ω∗ if ρσ2y(1− κ) ≤ u− y¯ ≤ ρσ2y(1− ε0)φ
1−κ
1−ε0 if u− y¯ ≤ ρσ2y(1− κ).
(1.30)
If (1−ε0)φ ≤ 1−κ, the feasibility constraint will always bind so that, trivially, A = φ.
However, a binding feasibility constraint is not necessarily consistent with a negative
collateral spread. For example, if h ≥ ε0 then A = φ is incompatible with r > u because
Chapter 1 27
the necessary condition (1.26) would be violated.18 We will come back to the feasibility
of A = φ below.
Since the cash provider extends η in liquidity to the short in the repo (rather than h
as when r ≤ u), the condition for him to be willing to do a repo becomes
(1− η)r + ηu ≥ A(1− ε0)yˆ(A) + (1− A(1− ε0))u. (1.31)
Thus, the lowest acceptable repo rate to the cash provider is
r ≥ rneg =
A(1− ε0)yˆ(A) + (1− A(1− ε0))u− ηu
1− η . (1.32)
Thus, to verify whether r > u is possible, we need to compare this lower bound on r with
the upper bound derived above. Similar considerations apply if κ < η.
Theorem 2. If η ≤ κ (the short is more constrained in the unsecured market than the
cash provider) then necessary and sufficient conditions for a negative collateral spread,
r > u, are given by (1.26) and (1.27), respectively.
Furthermore, if η < κ and r > u then r may take on any value in the interval (rneg, rneg],
where rneg is given by (1.29) and
rneg =

1−η
1−h (1−ε0)yˆ( 1−η1−h)+(1− 1−η1−h (1−ε0)u)−ηu
1−η if u− y¯ ≥ ρσ2y(1− ε0)φ
u− 12 (u−y¯)
2
ρσ2y(1−η) if ρσ
2
y(1− κ) ≤ u− y¯ ≤ ρσ2y(1− ε0)φ
(1−κ)yˆ
(
1−κ
1−ε0
)
+(κ−η)u
1−η if u− y¯ ≤ ρσ2y(1− κ).
(1.33)
If η = κ and r > u then there is a unique repo rate given by
r = yˆ
( 1− η
1− ε0
)
. (1.34)
If η > κ (the short is less constrained in the unsecured market than the cash provider),
a negative collateral spread is not possible unless the feasibility constraint trivially binds,
that is, (1− ε0)φ ≤ 1− κ. In this case, (1.26) is a necessary and sufficient condition for
a negative collateral spread and the repo rate is given by the upper expression in (1.33).
Proof: See the appendix.
18To see this, if A = φ, then u − y¯ ≥ ρσ2y 1−ε01−h (1− η) ≥ ρσ2y(1− η) if h ≥ ε0. This is not compatible
with (1.26), which states that u− y¯ < ρ2σ2y(1− η).
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The theorem establishes that if the short is more constrained in the unsecured market
than the cash provider, then the necessary and sufficient conditions for a negative collat-
eral spread are just the reverse of the conditions for a positive collateral spread. However,
if cash takers are less constrained than cash providers, a negative collateral spread is not
consistent with equilibrium. One may therefore interpret the fact that negative collateral
spreads are common as being consistent with the intuitive idea that cash providers are
less constrained, or put differently, have "easier" access to liquidity, than cash takers.
The reason a negative collateral spread is not possible when η > κ relates to the
fact that a negative collateral spread implies that the potential cash provider’s unsecured
borrowing constraint is binding (by Theorem 1) – except when the feasibility constraint
trivially binds. As discussed after that theorem, when the cash provider faces tighter
borrowing constraints and these are binding, the short can do better through a home-
made repo than going through the repo market. The maximum rate the short is willing
to do a repo at falls below the minimum rate that is acceptable to the constrained cash
provider.
We motivated our paper with reference to the puzzle of negative collateral spreads.
Our theory says (roughly) that this may occur when the unsecured rate drops below the
adjusted rate of return in the securities market. This may occur as a result of conditions
in the unsecured market. It may also occur if securities prices drop so that their adjusted
rate of return rise. Thus, negative collateral spreads may be a function of depressed
securities prices.
1.3.4 Remark: Role of constraints
In our model, there are potentially two riskfree rates, the repo and the unsecured rates,
since the setup excludes credit risk by Assumption 2. This does not give rise to arbitrage
because of the assumption that both the short (cash taker) and the cash provider are
constrained in the unsecured market. If we dropped Assumption 1 then an alternative
to the short is to borrow the unit of liquidity she needs at a rate of u, implying that r
cannot exceed u. From a cash provider’s perspective, it is clear that r cannot be less
than u. Thus, with no constraints in the unsecured market, we must have r = u. The
fact that these rates are rarely equivalent in practice suggests that there are constraints
in the unsecured market.19 This makes sense since there is a limited quantity of reserves
in the economy. The expressions for the repo rate in Theorems 1 and 2 also show that
variations in these constraints can contribute to volatility in the collateral spread.
Our results bear some relation to those in Duffie (1996), although his focus is on special
19Repo and unsecured rates could also differ due to differential trading costs.
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repo rates. In particular, he finds that the special repo rate R ≤ i, the riskfree rate. His
result is driven by trading asymmetries whereby one needs to hold the specific collateral
in order to short it. In our model, it is also not possible to sell more than what is owned.
However, in Duffie’s model, unlike in ours, a player can always borrow at the riskfree rate.
This makes the specific security more expensive relative to the bond, resulting in a special
repo rate lower than the riskfree rate. Our result is analogous in that r ≤ u as long as
the unsecured rate is above the cash market adjusted rate of return of the security, which
one can think of as the underlying security being relatively “expensive.” However, in our
model, the reverse is also possible when the underlying security is relatively “cheap.”
1.3.5 Empirical predictions
In this subsection, we develop several predictions resulting from the analysis of the collat-
eral spread. The various scenarios we have considered above yield different expressions for
the repo rate and, therefore, for the collateral spread. Here, we highlight three formulas
for the collateral spread, if it is positive, and one, if it is negative.
If the complete security is sold, so that the feasibility constraint is hit, the collateral
spread, using (1.21), is equal to
u− r = 1− ε01− h (u− yˆ (1)) . (1.35)
If the collateral spread is positive and the short and cash provider are unconstrained, the
collateral spread using (1.22) is equal to
u− r = ω
∗(1− ε0)(u− yˆ(ω∗))
1− h =
1
2
(u− y¯)2
ρσ2y(1− h)
. (1.36)
In addition, if the repo rate is determined by (1.19), in which case the short is constrained,
the collateral spread, using the upper bound r, is equal to
u− r = 1− η1− h
(
u− yˆ
( 1− η
1− ε0
))
. (1.37)
There is one formula for the collateral spread if it is negative and both are constrained,
using (1.27)
u− r = 1− κ1− η
(
u− yˆ
( 1− κ
1− ε0
))
. (1.38)
From these formulas, we can derive a set of testable predictions.
Prediction 1. We identify six predictions:
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1. If there is an exogenous positive (negative) shock to u, the collateral spread rises
(falls).
2. The collateral spread is increasing in haircuts (h), if u > r.
3. The collateral spread is decreasing in volatility (σ2y).
4. The collateral spread is decreasing in risk aversion (ρ).
5. The collateral spread is decreasing in the illiquidity of the underlying repoed security
(ε0).
6. Call (u − y¯)/ρσ2y the “unsecured rate premium.” The more constrained the players
are in the unsecured market, that is, the smaller are the borrowing caps, η and κ,
the “more often” is the collateral spread negative (that is, the higher are the values
of the unsecured rate premium associated with a negative collateral spread).
It can be seen from the formulas of the collateral spread that a shock to u, but not
to the risk-adjusted return yˆ(·), similarly affects the collateral spread. This is due to the
relationship between the unsecured rate u, the risk-adjusted return yˆ(·) and the repo rate
r, as given by equations (1.13) and (1.15) (in case of a negative collateral spread by (1.28)
and (1.31)).
From the formulas of the collateral spread, it is obvious that the collateral spread
depends positively on the haircut in absolute terms. A larger haircut forces the short
and cash provider to seek more funding in the unsecured market in the repo alternative
if u > r, decreasing the attractiveness of repo.
From (1.4) we know that yˆ(·) relates positively to volatility (σ2y). A larger yˆ(·) due to
higher volatility makes the cash market alternative, the home-made repo transaction, less
attractive for the short, thus she is willing to pay a higher repo rate. The same argument
holds for risk aversion. Thus, the collateral spread is decreasing in both arguments.
Given (1.4), yˆ(·) is also decreasing in ε0, the pricing error of the repo security. This
implies, if its liquidity decreases, the collateral spread will increase. This also implies that
baskets that contain less liquid securities should on average have a lower collateral spread.
Bartolini, Hilton, Sundaresan, and Tonetti (2011) observe this empirical fact for the US
data.
The smaller η and κ are, the larger are yˆ
(
1−η
1−ε0
)
and yˆ
(
1−κ
1−ε0
)
, the necessary and
sufficient bounds for the negative collateral spread. If those bounds rise, there is a higher
“chance” for the collateral spread to be negative, and should lead to more instances of a
negative collateral spread.
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1.4 Empirical analysis
In order to test predictions of our model of the collateral spread, we use data on unsecured
and repo rates. As unsecured rate we take the Eonia, which is a volume-weighted average
of overnight unsecured transactions by European reporting banks. Abbassi, Bräuning,
Fecht, and Peydró (2014) provide evidence that trading in the unsecured market is still
very active after the start of the financial crisis and the collapse of Lehman Brothers
(September 15, 2008). On the repo rate, we have complete data for the period January
01, 2007 to June 30, 2015, which was obtained from Eurex Repo, who offers a trading
platform for anonymous repo transactions. The data consists of transactions on a large
number of repo contracts. Because our model focuses on the possibility of raising liquidity,
we look at general collateral contracts (GC).20 According to Duffie (1996), the GC market
is the typical financing market, whereas the special repo market is driven by the demand
for specific securities. Among GC contracts, we focus on two particular ones, namely
GC Pooling ECB and GC Pooling ECB Extended baskets.21 These two GC Pooling
contracts are by far the most active baskets and they have the largest volume in overnight
transactions, and thus can be easily matched to the Eonia. Other contracts have much
smaller volume and are mainly traded tomorrow/next, which makes a clean matching to
the Eonia difficult. The tests in this section are therefore based on these GC Pooling
contracts. For these two contracts, we calculate the volume-weighted average repo rate
per day, yielding a time series for each collateral spread. We will implement three tests
on these collateral spreads, as outlined in the following sections.
1.4.1 Data on GC repo contracts
The transaction data consists of 261,663 GC transactions in the period January 01, 2007
to June 30, 2015. There are two GC markets operated by Eurex Repo: GC Pooling and
Euro Repo. GC Pooling (GCP) includes the ECB and ECB Extended basket, as well
as a basket containing equities. GCP ECB and ECB Extended baskets are subsets of
the securities eligible at the Eurosystem (30,000-40,000 securities). GCP ECB basket
contains about 7,000 securities, and GCP ECB Extended basket about 20,000. In Euro
Repo, the counterpart to the GC Pooling market, baskets are constrained to one type of
security, e.g. French covered bonds. The minimum rating allowed in Euro Repo and in
GCP ECB basket is A-. The lowest rating in the GCP ECB Extended basket is BBB-
. There are two important differences between GC Pooling and Euro Repo. The first
main difference is that in GC Pooling transactions the cash taker pledges securities on
20For an analysis of special repo transactions based on the same data, please look in Chapter 2.
21Baskets are defined as a list of securities that can be used as collateral.
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his collateral account, whereas in Euro Repo he transfers these securities physically to
the counterparty’s account. That is, re-use in Euro Repo has no limitations. Collateral
obtained in a GC Pooling transaction can only be used for other GC Pooling transactions,
or in the case of the ECB basket, as collateral at the CCP (e.g. futures contracts), and
for obtaining liquidity from the Eurosystem. The second main difference is that securities
haircuts in the GC Pooling basket are derived from haircuts in Eurosystem operations
(Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer, 2016).22 Nyborg (2017b) provides evidence that
they are identical in around 90% of cases. Eurex may increase haircuts for paper where it
deems risk to be especially large. In contrast, Euro Repo haircuts are set by the Clearing
Counterparty (CCP) Eurex Clearing without reference to Eurosystem haircuts. Trading
in both GC Pooling and Euro Repo is open to credit institutions and investment firms. All
trades are anonymous, cleared by the CCP Eurex Clearing, and settled by Clearstream.
Participants can choose between different terms: overnight, tomorrow/next, spot/next,
longer-term and variable terms.
[insert Table 1.1 about here]
Table 1.1 reports volume and rate statistics for GC baskets in both the GC Pooling
and the Euro Repo markets. There are in total 28 baskets (GC Pooling and Euro Repo),
which are ranked by transaction volume by trading day in the time period January 01,
2007 to June 30, 2015. The most transactions in the sample period take place in the
GCP ECB and ECB Extended baskets (84% of all GC trades). For these two baskets,
the majority of trades is overnight, whereas for Euro Repo baskets the most common
term is tomorrow/next, with the percentage exceeding 50% for 13 baskets. The collateral
spread is calculated as the difference between the Eonia and the volume-weighted average
repo rate for the same contract period. The repo rate used for GC Pooling ECB and
ECB Extended basket is overnight, and tomorrow/next for all other baskets. The largest
collateral spread belongs to Germany 10 Year GC basket, which contains only sovereign
bonds, with 15 basis points (bps), whereas the lowest bond collateral spread pertains to
Euro Covered bonds with -6.14 bps. This indicates that the collateral spread, as we state
in our theory, depends on the liquidity of securities in the basket.
The largest total volumes occur in the GCP ECB and ECB Extended basket, EUR 87
and 31 trillion, respectively. They also display the largest volume by trading day, EUR
40.3 billion and EUR 18.3 billion. So clearly, GCP ECB and ECB Extended baskets are
the most actively traded baskets. Thus, in our tests below, we use the collateral spreads,
Eonia – GCP ECB rate and Eonia – GCP ECB Ext. rate (The ECB basket exists for the
22The Eurosystem refers to the group of national central banks of the 19 Eurozone members led by the
European Central Bank (ECB).
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whole sample period, whereas the first trade in GC Pooling Extended basket can only be
observed on November 24, 2008.).
[insert Table 1.2 about here]
A first impression of the time series of collateral spreads can be gained from Figure 1.1.
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.2. The collateral spreads are on average
positive, the Eonia – GCP ECB rate has a mean of 3.77 bps, and the Eonia – GCP ECB
Ext. rate has a mean of 1.36 bps, both significant at the 1% level. The median is also
positive for both, 4.11 bps and 2.37 bps, respectively. The collateral spread of the ECB
Extended basket is lower than the collateral spread of the ECB rate in 97.5% out of its
1,604 observations. The list of securities in the ECB Extended basket include a wider
range of securities, in particular less liquid securities, increasing the average pricing error
ε0, which lowers the collateral spread according to our theory. This is also reflected in the
percentage of negative days that we observe. The collateral spread Eonia – GCP ECB
rate has 22.89% negative days, whereas the collateral spread of the ECB Extended basket
has 28.74% negative days. This observation is coherent with our prediction above that
a larger pricing error leads to a lower collateral spread. It is also in line with the results
by Bartolini, Hilton, Sundaresan, and Tonetti (2011) who show that different types of
securities differ in their collateral values, and those with the highest have the lowest repo
rate.
1.4.2 Empirical test – Spikes
In this section we focus on spikes of the unsecured rate and the effect on the collateral
spread, in order to test the relationship between the unsecured rate u, the risk-adjusted
return yˆ(·), and the repo rate r. The repo rate is bound by u and yˆ(·), as determined by
equations (1.13) and (1.15) (in case of a negative collateral spread by (1.28) and (1.31)).
Roughly speaking, if the collateral spread is positive, r and yˆ(·) are smaller than u. If
there is an exogenous shock to u, so that the risk-adjusted return yˆ(·) is unaffected, the
repo rate moves into the same direction as the unsecured rate, but less due to its other link
to yˆ(·). So if u jumps up, the collateral spread increases; if it jumps down, the collateral
spread turns negative.
This is based on the unsecured rate and the risk-adjusted return being determined in
two different markets: the unsecured rate in the interbank market, and the risk-adjusted
return in the cash market. Both markets have different players. In the unsecured market
one can only find banks, whereas the securities cash market is populated by all types of
investors. Since banks depend on the liquidity supply by the Eurosystem, their liquidity
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demand is affected by the Eurosystem’s institutional framework. This gives rise to cal-
endar day effects in the unsecured rate, as documented by several papers, as for example
Perez-Quiros and Mendizabal (2006) and Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2009).23 In
addition, there is an end-of-month effect due to balance sheet reporting and liquidity
management (Bindseil, Weller, and Wuertz, 2003; Fecht, Nyborg, and Rocholl, 2008). We
are not aware of calendar day effects in the securities cash market. So this is the ideal
environment to test the relationship between the unsecured rate, the risk-adjusted return
and the repo rate.
Originally, the Eurosystem follows a liquidity neutral policy before the collapse of
Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 (Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev, 2002), in
order to keep short-term interest rates close to its policy rate. A liquidity neutral policy
means that the Eurosystem aims to inject only as much liquidity as needed into the
financial market, so that banks are able to fulfill on average their reserve requirements
over the maintenance period (between four and six weeks long). The Eurosystem conducts
weekly auctions for liquidity with a term of one week, which banks access to satisfy their
liquidity needs.24 However, the Eurosystem cannot perfectly predict the amount needed,
and even though short banks bid more aggressively for liquidity in the last auction of
the maintenance period (Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev, 2009), liquidity will not be
distributed optimally according to needs. So there will be banks that are long and other
banks that are short in cash in the last week of the maintenance period, potentially even if
total liquidity supply exceeds liquidity needs. This imperfect allocation of liquidity leads
to jumps in the unsecured rate at the end of the maintenance period. Our theory predicts
that the repo rate changes less than the unsecured rate, due to its arbitrage link to yˆ(·).
Thus, the collateral spread moves into the same direction as the unsecured rate.
Before we turn to the reaction of the collateral spread, we demonstrate the existence
of spikes in the unsecured rate based on the extant work cited above. We analyze the
spikes of the unsecured rate in the last week of the maintenance period and on the last
day of the month. Since we focus on the period, when the liquidity neutral policy by the
Eurosystem is in place, our spikes tests focus on the period January 01, 2007 to August
30, 2008. In order to detect spikes, we calculate the mean and the standard deviation of
the Eonia for each maintenance period excluding the last five days and the last trading
day of the month. For those last five days of the maintenance period and the last day of
23Such calendar effects also exist in the Fed funds market in the US, see, e.g. Hamilton (1996).
24For a description of the standard Eurosystem monetary policy framework please refer to European
Central Bank (2002).
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the month we compute the standardized Eonia, which is defined as:
stand. Eoniat =
ut,m − um
σm
, (1.39)
where the subscript m denotes the maintenance period, and t refers to the day within
the maintenance period. um (σm) is defined as the average (standard deviation) of the
unsecured rate during the maintenance period, excluding the last five days of the mainte-
nance period and the last day of the month. The last five days of the maintenance period
are denoted endmp to endmp − 4, with endmp being the last day. monthend refers to
the last day of the month. The standardized Eonia is thus calculated as the difference
between the Eonia on the last day of the month, endmp, and the average, um, divided
by the standard deviation, σm. The same procedure is repeated for the other days of the
last week of the maintenance period, endmp − 1 to endmp − 4, and the last day of the
month, monthend.
We have two tables, which show the values of the standardized Eonia on the days we
are interested in, to detect and measure the size of spikes. The first table (Table 1.3)
ranks all values of the standardized Eonia within each maintenance period and displays
the ranks for the last five days of each maintenance period, endmp to endmp− 4, and the
end of the month, monthend.
The order of ranking in Table 1.3 is determined by the sign of the standardized Eonia
on the last day of the maintenance period, endmp. If it is negative, all values in the
maintenance period are ranked in ascending order, starting with the lowest negative value.
If the sign of the standardized Eonia on the last day of the maintenance period is positive,
the ranking is in descending order. The same ranking is done for the last day of the month,
but uncoupled from the ranking for the last days of the maintenance period, e.g. in case it
has the largest positive value, it obtains the first rank. That is, if e.g. the last day of the
maintenance period has the lowest negative value, and the last day of the month the largest
positive value, both days will get the first rank. In 15 out of 20 maintenance periods, the
last five days of the maintenance period contain the first rank, i.e. the day with the largest
standardized Eonia (either positive or negative). In two periods the standardized Eonia
exceeds 100 in absolute value, i.e. the Eonia is 100 standard deviations away from the
mean. In the other periods, its absolute value (first rank) is between 1.93 and 24.85. This
illustrates end-of-maintenance period and end-of-month spikes in the unsecured rate, in
line with the findings by the extant literature (Bindseil, Weller, and Wuertz, 2003; Fecht,
Nyborg, and Rocholl, 2008; Nautz and Offermanns, 2008).
[insert Table 1.3 about here]
The second table (Table 1.4) aggregates this information and provides consolidated
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statistics of the standardized Eonia on the last five days of the maintenance period and
the end of the month. It presents the average as well absolute values of the standardized
Eonia for the last five days of the maintenance period and the last day of the month across
the 20 maintenance periods, during which the ECB operates with liquidity neutral policy.
The lowest average value of -7.68 (including up- and down spikes) occurs on the last
day of the maintenance period, indicating that negative jumps are more sizeable. When
splitting the average value into averages of positive and negative values, the negative
values of the standardized Eonia are more than twice the value of the positive jumps in
absolute terms. In absolute terms the standardized Eonia is 16.31 on that day, i.e. it
is 16 standard deviations away from the mean. The absolute value is decreasing in the
lags of the last day, the lowest value on endmp − 4 being 2.42. Still, the standardized
Eonia is two standard deviations away from the mean on this day. At month-end, the
standardized Eonia spikes upwards exceeding two standard deviations on 65% of those
days. This further demonstrates that the Eonia rate jumps at the end of the maintenance
period and the end of the month.
[insert Table 1.4 about here]
After analyzing the Eonia spikes we now turn to analyze their effects on the collateral
spread. Thus, we conduct two time series regressions. In the first specification we calcu-
late the 10% and 90% percentile of the unsecured rate, Eonia, in each maintenance period
to identify its spikes. Then we regress the collateral spread, Eonia – GCP ECB rate, on
two dummies capturing the 10th and 90th percentiles of the Eonia (perc10, perc90 ), a
dummy for the last day of the month (monthend), and a dummy for the crisis period
(fincrisis). The variables perc10 and perc90 represent the days with lowest and highest
Eonia, respectively, within the maintenance period. In our second specification we condi-
tion those two percentile dummies on the last five days of the maintenance period and the
other days. That is, we include two dummies for the 10th and 90th percentiles outside the
last five days of the maintenance period (perc10|nonendres,perc90|nonendres), and two
dummy variables for the 10th and 90th percentile within the last five days of the mainte-
nance period (perc10|endres, perc90|endres). The last day of the month is not included
when determining perc10 and perc90. Standard errors are corrected by using Newey-West
with five lags (Greene, 2008). The second specification, thus, looks as follows:
yt =β0 + β1perc10|nonendrest + β2perc90|nonendrest (1.40)
+ β3perc10|endrest + β4perc90|endrest + β5fincrisist + β6monthendt + εt.
Table 1.5 displays the results. In the first column, perc10 and perc90 are not split
into the end and the other days of the maintenance period. The coefficient of perc10 is
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significant at the 5% level and the coefficient of perc90 at the 10% level. If the Eonia is
in the 10th percentile, so that perc10 is equal to one, the collateral spread spikes down
by 3.20 bps. It shoots up by 2.14 bps, when the Eonia is above the 90th percentile. This
indicates that the jump in the unsecured rate is in general not matched by a similar jump
in the repo rate. Downspikes in the unsecured rate thus tend to lead to negative collateral
spreads.
[insert Table 1.5 about here]
The second column of Table 1.5 presents the results, when the observations of spikes
are conditioned on the last five days of the maintenance period and the other days. This
differentiation shows that the effect concentrates on the days within the last week of
the maintenance period. The coefficients on perc10|nonendres and perc90|nonendres
are insignificant. The coefficients on the percentiles conditioned on the last five days
are significant at the 1% level and larger in absolute value than the coefficients without
conditioning. If the Eonia is in the 10th (90th) percentile, the collateral spread decreases
(increases) by 5.2 (6.16) bps. As the constant is close to zero (-3 bps in the financial crisis
period), the collateral spread is positive if Eonia jumps upwards and negative, if it jumps
downwards, confirming our prediction. This is especially strong evidence for our theory,
because it is at the end of the maintenance period that the unsecured rate starts to "live
its own life" as end-of-maintenance period considerations start to dominate.
The reaction of the collateral spread to Eonia spikes shows that the Eonia moves more
than the repo rate, as we expected. The spikes at the end of the maintenance period
occur due to factors outside the securities cash market, the operational framework by the
Eurosystem. So the risk-adjusted return is not affected, and thus restrains the repo rate
from jumping as much as the unsecured rate.
1.4.3 Empirical test – Change in haircuts
In this section we build a test around an exogenous change to haircuts. Our model
predicts that the collateral spread is increasing in absolute terms in haircuts (Section
1.3.5). If the collateral spread is positive, u − r, a larger haircut implies that the short
has to borrow more in the unsecured market, lowering her willingness to use repo instead
of the cash market. Thus, the repo rate is lower, and the collateral spread is higher.
The positive collateral spread is given by (1.35), (1.36), or (1.37), depending on the
borrowing and feasibility constraints. Haircuts in GC Pooling follow those determined
by the Eurosystem (Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer, 2016), i.e. they are equal in
about 90% (shown by Nyborg (2017b), Table 5.6). As Nyborg (2017b) emphasizes, the
Eurosystem has adjusted its haircuts on average only every three to four years. Thus, GC
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Pooling haircuts are truly exogenous.25 Since haircuts, which serve as a risk management
tool, are only updated infrequently, they are not set in response to developments in money
markets. Thus, a change to haircuts provides a natural experiment for the effect on the
collateral spread.
During our sample period the Eurosystem changes its haircuts four times. We use
the third haircut adjustment in our test, which is announced on September 27, 2013 and
implemented on October 01, 2013, as it occurs during a calm period and involves a wide-
ranging adjustment of haircuts. For a large amount of securities, the ECB lowers haircuts.
So haircuts in the GC Pooling baskets fall as well (Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer,
2016; Nyborg, 2017b).
According to the ECB collateral framework, securities are given a haircut based on
their type of security and time to maturity, as well as rating.26 Securities are classified into
five categories: I) government securities, II) local and regional government securities as
well Jumbo-style supranational/agency bonds, III) corporate, non-Jumbo and financial
securities, IV) unsecured bank bonds, V) asset-backed securities. The change in ECB
haircuts is displayed in Table 1.6 (computed from Tables 5.3 and Tables 5.4 in Nyborg
(2017b)). For the securities rated A- to AAA, the largest changes occur in Category III
(apart from Category V, which is not eligible in Eurex Repo). Haircuts of securities rated
A- to AAA decrease in Categories I to III. For securities rated BBB-to BBB+, haircuts
increase in the first two categories and decrease for the last three categories. In general,
less liquid and lower quality securities receive a lower haircut than before (except for
Categories I and II, BBB+ to BBB-).
[insert Table 1.6 about here]
Tables 1.7 and 1.8 show the distribution of securities in GC Pooling baskets across
categories on September 26, 2013. The GC Pooling baskets only contain securities from
Category I to Category IV. The lowest rating in the ECB basket is A-, whereas the
Extended basket also includes securities rated BBB- to BBB+. The largest category in
the ECB basket is Category III (48% of no. securities). In the ECB Extended basket,
Category IV with 58% is the largest. In addition, the majority of securities (94%) in the
Extended ECB basket is rated with a minimum of A-. In general, banks will use securities
in repo that are the cheapest to deliver. As we have data on GC Pooling haircuts from
September 16 to October 15, 2013, we can calculate on each day the average haircut
for each basket across securities. The average haircut for both baskets can be seen in
25GC Pooling haircuts are published daily in the Eurex Repo trading system.
26An exact description of this framework can be found in Nyborg’s book Collateral Frameworks - The
Open Secret of Central Banks, Tables 5.1 to 5.4.
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Figure 1.4, in which the change in haircuts is evident. Average haircuts in the GCP ECB
basket fall by 84 bps, whereas in GCP ECB Extended basket by 49 bps. The development
of the GC Pooling rates can be seen in Figure 1.5 and the spreads in Figure 1.6. These
figures suggest that repo rates and collateral spreads move as predicted following the
change in haircuts.
[insert Figure 1.4 and Tables 1.7, 1.8 about here]
The effect of the change in haircuts on the collateral spread is now tested formally. We
study periods of two weeks, three weeks and four weeks around the announcement day.
These narrow time windows allow us a good identification of this effect. The following
days are removed from the sample: the announcement day, September 27, 2013, was taken
out. The last day of the month has been removed due to the large spikes that occur on
these days in the testing period. In addition, we eliminate the first day of October, as
Eurex Repo only adapts its haircuts one day after the ECB. Thus, we run the following
regression:
yt = β0 + β1newhaircutst + β2endmp1t + β3endmp2t + εt, (1.41)
where y denotes the collateral spread, i.e. the Eonia-GCP ECB rate or Eonia-GCP ECB
Ext. rate. newhaircuts, the variable of interest, is a dummy variable that is equal to one
starting on October 2, when the new haircuts are applied by Eurex Repo. We control for
the last day of the maintenance period, endmp1 and endmp2.27
[insert Table 1.9 about here]
Table 1.9 shows the results. The left column displays the results for the two spreads
directly affected by the change in haircuts, and the second column those whose liquidity
is potentially impacted by the change in ECB haircuts. As hypothesized, the collateral
spread for the GCP ECB basket falls by 1.46 bps. For the GCP Extended basket it falls
by 1.29 bps. Both effects are significant at the 5% level. Over time this effect weakens, as
other factors impacting the collateral spread may change and therefore also the spread.
In the period of four weeks around the change in haircuts, the coefficient on newhaircuts
in the ECB basket regression is -1.00, and in the Extended basket regression it is -1.10.
Both coefficients stay highly significant.
The effect on the collateral spreads is in line with our theory. That is a compelling
result, which confirms our prediction that the collateral spread is a function of haircuts.
This is intuitive. In our model, as haircuts fall, the cash provider has to give more cash
27In this period, we do not observe strong maintenance calendar day effects, so we only control for the
last day of the maintenance period.
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than before for the same security, so that he needs to raise more cash himself in the
unsecured and cash market, raising his costs. Thus, repo rates increase relative to the
unsecured rate, yielding a lower collateral spread.28
1.4.4 Empirical test – Volatility
In our model the collateral spread depends negatively on the volatility of the risk-adjusted
return of the underlying repo security, σ2y. A higher volatility translates into a larger
risk-adjusted return yˆ(·), which makes trading in the cash market, the home-made repo
transaction, less attractive for the short, so that she is willing to accept a higher repo
rate, which decreases the collateral spread. Stated in reverse, if volatility decreases, the
collateral spread increases.
The return of the underlying security and its volatility are tied to the current interest
rate level, which is decided upon by the ECB. Decisions on monetary policy are made by
the governing council, whose members meet twice within a maintenance period. In the
last meeting they decide on changes in monetary policy stance, such as the level of interest
rates.29 Before this meeting the uncertainty about changes in monetary policy is naturally
higher than on the day of the governing council, when this uncertainty resolves. This
uncertainty translates into a higher volatility of returns on the day before the meeting
than on the day of the meeting itself. This is shown by Brenner, Pasquariello, and
Subrahmanyam (2009), who find that return volatility increases before the announcement
of macroeconomic news. Our test builds on this presumption. The dependent variable is
the change in the collateral spread from the previous day to today, i.e. Eonia–GCP ECBt–
Eonia–GCP ECBt−1. In our regression we differentiate between the meeting days where
the policy rate is subject to changes and those where it is not. Thus, we run four tests
based on the following regression model:
∆yt =β0 + β1govcouncil_mpt + β2govcouncil_nonmpt + β3vstoxxt−1 (1.42)
+ β4excessliqt−1 +Xtγ + εt,
where ∆yt denotes the change in the collateral spread, Eonia–GCP ECB rate (∆collspread1 ),
and Eonia–GCP ECB Extended rate (∆collspread2 ). The dummy variable govcouncil_mp
28In longer-term repos, a lower collateral spread might also be due to a risk adjustment. Haircuts
provide a protection against movements in collateral values. Ideally, movements in collateral value never
exceed the haircut. However, if haircuts fall, ceteris paribus, there is a higher chance that the haircut
cannot fully absorb movements in collateral value. Thus repo rates rise, yielding a lower collateral spread,
in order to adjust for this higher risk. This is not relevant in our scenario, as we deal with overnight repo
transactions, which are cleared by a CCP.
29The dates of those meetings are determined by the ECB one year in advance.
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is equal to one, when the governing council meeting involves a potential interest rate
change. The dummy variable govcouncil_nonmp captures the effect, if there is no poten-
tial interest change discussed in the governing council meeting. vstoxx is the VSTOXX
lagged by one day. excessliq is the excess liquidity measured as the sum of volumes at
the ECB deposit facility plus current accounts minus volumes at the lending facility, and
minus reserve requirements, lagged by one day. As further control variables, which are not
shown, we include perc10|endres and perc90|endres, as defined in Section 1.4.2 above,
the first and last day of each month, and a dummy variable for the financial crisis (equal
to one starting on August 07, 2007).
Since there are strong reactions in unsecured and repo rates due to ECB unconven-
tional policies according to Szczerbowicz (2015), we add further variables in our second
test to control for the impact of these announcements and implementations. Following
her approach, we control for settlement days of the first one-year LTRO (oneyearltro) on
June 25, 2009, and both three-year LTROs (3yearltros) on December 22, 2011 and March
01, 2012, the introduction of a zero deposit facility rate (zerorate) on July 11, 2012, the
introduction of full allotment on October 09, 2008 (fullallot), and the announcement days
of ECB unconventional monetary policies.30
In our third test we isolate the volatility from the yield effect (y¯). A change of the
interest rate, if unanticipated, shifts y¯, impacting our dependent variable, the change in
the collateral spread. Brand, Buncic, and Turunen (2010) show that short-term news by
the ECB, such as interest rate decisions, have a significant impact on the yield curve,
especially at the short end. So in order to single out the volatility effect, we therefore
eliminate the days, when a change of the key policy rate is actually decided.31 The reason
for removing these observations rather than using an additional variable is that on several
of these days, in addition to a change in the interest rate, other unconventional monetary
policy decisions are announced, e.g. the first covered bond purchase programme (May 07,
2009), for which we already control in our regression.
As monetary policy decisions by the governing council are announced at noon, we take
this timing into account in our fourth test. We have intraday repo transactions data, so
that we can split observations on days of meetings on monetary policy into the period
30The announcement days, which are not reported, involve news on EFSF/ESM, i.e. May 10, 2010,
March 14, 2011, and March 26, 2011. Further, they include announcement of covered bond purchase
programmes, on May 07, 2009, October 06, 2011 and September 04, 2014. The implementation of very
long-term LTROs, one-year and three-year, is made public on May 07, 2009, and December 08, 2012.
The announcement of Quantitative Easing involves the days September 04, 2014, and January 22, 2015.
For a detailed description of these ECB unconventional monetary policies, please refer to Szczerbowicz
(2015).
31The key policy rate is the Minimum Bid Rate, even though the effective policy rate after full allotment
is the deposit facility rate.
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before and after the announcement. The collateral spread should only be affected after
the announcement at 13:45 CET (press release on ECB webpage). So when we calculate
the volume weighted average repo rate, we only use transactions concluded after 13:45
CET, when these governing council meetings on monetary policy occur.
[insert Table 1.10 about here]
Table 1.10 shows the results. Our main variable of interest, govcouncil_mp, clearly
impacts the collateral spread, Eonia–GCP ECB rate, at the 5% significance level. It rises
by 0.64 bps on the day of governing council meetings, in which they decide on monetary
policy, as uncertainty resolves and volatility of bond returns decreases. This effect remains
present at a similar magnitude, when including the controls for unconventional monetary
policies, and also when removing days with an announcement of interest rate changes.
Thus, the GCP ECB collateral spread generally increases. When we restrict data to
transactions occurring after 13:45 CET on days including potential changes in monetary
policy, the effect of govcouncil_mp on Eonia–GCP ECB rates shoots up, to 2.17 bps,
nearly three times as large as the effect estimated in the other tests.32 We also carry out
this test, to check for the importance of timing, with the sample of transactions that occur
before 13:45. Indeed, then the effect is not statistically from zero. So, this provides strong
evidence that lower uncertainty and volatility in bond returns after this announcement are
the reason for an increase in the collateral spread. As we have removed days that include
a decision for an actual interest rate change, the risk-adjusted mean return y¯ should be
unaffected in this test.
Interestingly, the collateral spread of the GCP ECB Extended basket is never statis-
tically different from zero, in spite of resilient results for the collateral spread of the GCP
ECB basket. A potential explanation can be obtained from our formulas of the collateral
spread, (1.35), (1.36), (1.37), or (1.38). We can see in these formulas that the effect of
a change in σ2y also depends on the size of the other parameters. For example, in (1.35)
the volatility is multiplied by (1 − ε0), which is presumably smaller for the GCP ECB
Extended basket due to its larger average pricing error (ε0) than the pricing error of the
GCP ECB basket. Thus, the effect on the GCP ECB Extended is potentially lower, if
the change in the volatility of returns is similar for both baskets. The impact on the GCP
ECB basket clearly exists, in line with our prediction.
Overall we find solid support for our prediction that the collateral spread rises, if
the volatility of returns decreases. This result is robust for the collateral spread of the
more liquid basket, GCP ECB basket, but not present in the other basket, which can be
explained by using our theory.
32The number of observations drops, as there are some governing council meeting days on monetary
policy, in which no trades occur after 13:45 CET.
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1.5 Development of the collateral spread
Having established that our theory holds up to empirical tests, we next employ it to
analyze the development of the collateral spreads (in Figure 1.1) over time, i.e. from
January 01, 2007 to June 30, 2015. Since there are several events that affect these
collateral spreads in this time period, as can be seen in Figure 1.1, the analysis of their
development provides important insights. We use the events, which are linked to the
financial crisis and ECB monetary policy, to split the time period into eight subperiods,
for which we individually provide descriptive statistics (reported in Table 1.11).33 Our
subperiods are defined as follows:
• pre-crisis (Jan 01, 2007 – Jul 31, 2007),
• early crisis (Aug 01, 2007 – Oct 08, 2008),
• start of full allotment (Oct 09, 2008 – Jun 24 2009),
• first one-year LTRO by the ECB (Jun 25, 2009 – Jul 01, 2010),
• start of sovereign problems (Jul 07, 2010 – Dec 21, 2011),
• three-year LTROs (Dec 22, 2011 – Jun 30, 2013),
• one-third of LTROs repaid early (Jul 01, 2013 – Jan 21, 2015) and
• the period after the announcement of the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP)
by the ECB (Jan 22, 2015 – Jun 30, 2015), which constitutes the largest programme
within its Quantitative Easing programme.34
The development of the collateral spreads depends strongly on the Eurosystem mon-
etary policy. Four subperiods are the most interesting ones, as they display key changes
in the collateral spreads: the first stage of the crisis, full allotment, and the introduction
of the one-year and three-year LTROs. In the early period of the crisis, during which the
ECB still operates with a liquidity neutral policy, the average collateral spread Eonia–
GCP ECB rate drops to -3 bps, and the spread is primarily negative. The liquidity
neutral policy stops with the introduction of the full allotment policy, when the ECB in-
jects as much liquidity to banks as they demand, which has a strong positive effect on the
collateral spread Eonia–GCP ECB, its mean rising to 11.7 bps. However, the collateral
spread of the GCP ECB Extended basket trades primarily negative with 57% negative
days. This is the period with the largest volatility in both collateral spreads (standard
33The GCP ECB Extended basket can only be observed starting in our third subperiod.
34LTRO is short for long-term refinancing operation by the ECB, and has originally a term of three
months. During the course of the financial crisis, the Eurosystem allocates funding with longer terms,
the most important ones being one year and three years.
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deviation of 8.86 and 9.41 bps). The liquidity injected in the first one-year LTRO, which
settles on June 25, 2009, strongly impacts the spread Eonia–GCP ECB Extended rate,
lifting the mean to 2.9 bps.35 Similarly to the one-year LTRO, liquidity allocated in both
three-year LTROs raises also both collateral spreads.36 There are nearly no negative days
in the collateral spread of the GCP ECB basket, and the lowest percentage of 3.88% for
the spread of the GCP ECB Extended basket.
As we can see, there are primarily two periods, in which the collateral spread is
negative, the first stage of the crisis, and, in the case of the GCP ECB Extended basket,
the period of full allotment before the first one-year LTRO. In the first stage of the crisis,
the negative collateral spread implies that banks short of liquidity face their constraints
of borrowing, η and κ, in the unsecured market. This can have two reasons: either they
have higher demand for interbank market liquidity, thus hitting their constraint, or, which
is more likely, borrowing limits in the unsecured market are reduced as a reaction to the
uncertainty about the financial standing of counterparties. Lower η and κ raises the
necessary and sufficient conditions (1.26) and (1.27) for observing a negative collateral
spread (Theorem 2). The policy of full allotment helps to alleviate the constraints due
to these borrowing limits for banks trading in the GCP ECB basket (which is a subset
of eligible securities at the Eurosystem), by giving them an additional alternative to
borrow liquidity. So the borrowing limits in the unsecured market, η and κ, do not
bind anymore. Banks can obtain as much liquidity as they need from the Eurosystem
against their collateral. This means, yˆ(·) supposedly falls, as risk aversion and volatility
drop substantially. This reduces necessary conditions (1.18) and (1.20) for a positive
collateral spread (Theorem 1). In short, securities prices rise, and risk-adjusted returns
fall. Surprisingly, the other collateral spread, Eonia–GCP ECB Extended rate, stays
negative (even though these securities are also eligible), indicating that banks trading in
this basket are still constrained by their limits in the unsecured market. Given the fact
that the collateral spread of the GCP ECB Extended basket is lower, it indicates that
banks use securities as collateral, which are not eligible in the GCP ECB basket, and who
are considered to be riskier, resulting in lower borrowing limits in the unsecured market.
The implementation of the one-year LTRO, however, leads to positive collateral spreads
in both baskets.
Developments in the collateral spread, which at first may seem counterintuitive, now
make sense when using our theory. We motivated our paper with reference to the puzzle
of negative collateral spreads. Our theory says (roughly) that this may occur when the
35This is the first LTRO that provides banks with central bank funding of one year. Banks receive
EUR 442 billion in this LTRO.
36The ECB implemented two three-year LTROs on December 22, 2011 and March 1, 2012. Banks
obtain credit of about EUR 1 trillion.
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unsecured rate drops below the adjusted rate of return in the securities market. This may
happen as a result of conditions in the unsecured market. It may also occur if securities
prices drop so that their adjusted rate of return rise. Thus, negative collateral spreads
may be a function of depressed securities prices. As for full allotment, this explanation
can be applied to the liquidity supplied in the LTROs. Woschitz (2017) shows that due
to the implementation of the three-year LTROs, securities prices strongly increased and
yields fell. Thus, according to our theory the adjusted rate of return in the cash market
fell and so repo rates followed suit (fell) (as can be seen in Figure 1.1).
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper we offer a theory on the determinants of the repo rate and the collateral
spread. Moreover, we give an explanation to the puzzle of the negative collateral spread.
The collateral spread can turn negative in two main scenarios. The first one is that the
unsecured rate falls to a large extent, which occurs at the end of the maintenance period,
as we have shown in our spikes test. The second scenario is that securities prices fall, so
that risk-adjusted cash market returns increase. The condition for these two scenarios to
be possible is that the cash provider is more constrained than the short in the unsecured
market.
Our model, while explaining the possibility of a negative collateral spread, offers several
additional insights. The basis for this model is the conjecture that the short has two
options, the combination of repo trade and unsecured borrowing, and the combination
of securities cash market trades and unsecured borrowing, where the latter alternative
is a home-made repo. In addition, we abstract from credit risk, thus showing that the
relationship between the unsecured rate, repo rate, and risk-adjusted return is driven by
other factors. We discover that the collateral spread is a function of haircuts, bond return
volatility, pricing errors, and potentially of the borrowing limits of the short and the cash
provider. Two tests, which we run ourselves by using data on the European unsecured
overnight rate, Eonia, and repo transactions data, confirm the positive relationship of
the collateral spread to haircuts (if the collateral spread is positive), and the inverse
relationship to volatility. This support for our theory by empirical tests thus enables us
to provide explanations for the development of the collateral spread over time.
This is the first model to the best of our knowledge that uncovers the determinants
of the collateral spread. One of its main insights is that repo and unsecured rates as well
as risk-adjusted cash market returns are coupled to each other. This model provides the
foundation for further tests on the collateral spread, thus yielding a better understanding
of the behavior of interbank market rates.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof starts by considering the upper and lower bounds on r as given by (1.14) and
(1.17), respectively. As seen, these are functions of Ω and A, respectively. The expression
(1.12) for Ω and the expression (1.16) for A show that these depend on the magnitude
of u − y¯. There are four cases to consider, as listed below. The proof proceeds by going
through these four cases in order. In doing this, the bounds on yˆ(·), (1.18) and (1.20), as
necessary conditions for r ≤ u, and the formulas for r in items 1–3 in the statement of
the theorem will be established. The proof ends by establishing sufficient conditions for
r ≤ u when η ≤ κ and η > κ.
Case 1, u− y¯ ≥ ρσ2y(1− ε0):
The expression for r, (1.21), follows directly from (1.12), (1.14), (1.16), and (1.17). All
that remains is to verify that r ≤ u. Now, (1.21), implies that r ≤ u if and only if
(1 − ε0)yˆ(1) + ε0u ≤ u, which, in turn, holds if and only if yˆ(1) ≤ u (since ε0 ∈ [0, 1)).
Thus, using (1.4), we have that r ≤ u if and only if y¯ + ρσ2y(1 − ε0)/2 ≤ u, which holds
by assumption (Case 1).
Case 2, ρσ2y max{1− η, 1− κ} ≤ u− y¯ < ρσ2y(1− ε0):
The first equality in (1.22) follows from (1.12), (1.14), (1.16), and (1.17). The second
equality follows by substituting in the expression in (1.9) for ω∗. From the final expression
in (1.22), it is immediate that r ≤ u holds.
Case 3, η ≤ κ and u− y¯ < ρσ2y(1− η):
We will start with the upper bound of r. Since u − y¯ < ρσ2y(1 − η), (1.12) implies that
Ω = (1 − η)/(1 − ε0). Substituting this into the upper bound for r, as given by (1.14),
we have the first expression in (1.23). The second expression follows by substituting in
the expression for yˆ((1− η)/(1− ε0)) using (1.4) with ω = (1− η)/(1− ε0). Next, we ask
whether r ≤ u. From (1.23), this is true if and only if yˆ((1 − η)/(1 − ε0)) ≤ u. This is
equivalent to saying y¯ + ρσ2y(1 − η)/2 ≤ u. Thus, if this is not met, the maximum r is
given by u, so that, in general, the upper bound on r is min{u, r}. In particular,
min{u, r} =
 r if ρσ
2
y(1− η) > u− y¯ ≥ ρσ2y(1− η)/2
u if u− y¯ < ρσ2y(1− η)/2.
(1.43)
Next we consider the lower bound on r. This is given by (1.17). Substituting in the
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values of A from (1.16), we get the expressions for r in (1.24). It is obvious that r < u
when u − y¯ ≥ ρσ2y(1 − κ). Consider next the case that u − y¯ < ρσ2y(1 − κ). Proceeding
as above, we have that r ≤ u if and only if y¯ + ρσ2y(1 − κ)/2 = yˆ((1 − κ)/(1 − ε0)) ≤ u.
Note that this also gives rise to the bound (1.18).
To complete the proof of item 3 of the theorem as well as the bound (1.18), we need to
show that r < min{u, r} whenever min{u, r} = r, that is, whenever ρσ2y(1− η) > u− y¯ ≥
ρσ2y(1− η)/2.
There are two cases to consider:
Case (a): 1− κ ≤ (1− η)/2.
In this case, we need to show that37
u− 12
(u− y¯)2
ρσ2y(1− h)
≤ (1− η)
(
y¯ + 12ρσ
2
y(1− η)
)
+ (η − h)u
1− h (1.44)
for ρσ2y(1− η) > u− y¯ ≥ ρσ2y(1− η)/2. Condition (1.44) simplifies to
1
2ρσ2y(1− η)
(u− y¯)2 − (u− y¯) + ρσ
2
y(1− η)
2 ≥ 0.
Define the function f(x) = 12ax
2 − x + a2 , where a is a constant. We need to show that
f(x) ≥ 0 for x ≤ a. It is easy to verify that the unique zero of f(x) occurs at x = a.
Furthermore, f ′(x) < 0 for x < a, f ′(x) > 0 for x > a, and f ′′(x) > 0. Thus, f(x) > 0 for
x < a. This implies that (1.44) is satisfied for ρσ2y(1− η) > u− y¯ ≥ ρσ2y(1− η)/2.
Case (b):1− κ > (1− η)/2.
In this case, (1.44) needs to hold for ρσ2y(1 − η) > u − y¯ ≥ ρσ2y(1 − κ), which it does by
the same argument we just have gone through. In addition, we must have r ≤ r for
u− y¯
ρσ2y
∈
[(1− η
2
)
, 1− κ
)
. (1.45)
Using (1.12), (1.14), (1.16), and (1.17)), this condition can be written
(1− κ)yˆ
( 1− κ
1− ε0
)
+ κu ≤ (1− η)yˆ
( 1− η
1− ε0
)
+ ηu. (1.46)
Using the definition of yˆ(·) in (1.4), (1.46) simplifies to
u− y¯
ρσ2y
≤ 12
(1− η)2 − (1− κ)2
κ− η . (1.47)
37The left hand side of (1.44) is r when u− y¯ ≥ ρσ2y(1− κ) as derived above and stated in (1.24). The
right hand side is r for u− y¯ ≥ ρσ2y(1− η)/2 as derived above and stated in (1.23).
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Setting (u− y¯)/(ρσ2y) equal to (1− κ), the least upper bound from (1.45), we have, after
some algebra, that (1.47) holds if (η − κ)2 > 0. Hence, r < r on the interval in (1.45).
Thus, we have proved that the claim in item 3 of the theorem as well as the bound (1.18)
as a necessary condition of r ≤ u when η ≤ κ.
Case 4, κ < η and u− y¯ < ρσ2y(1− κ):
Note that in this case, A = (1− κ)/(1− ε0) by (1.16).
Suppose first that u − y¯ ≤ ρσ2y(1 − η) so that Ω = (1 − η)/(1 − ε0). An equilibrium
repo rate only exists if the upper bound, (1.14), is larger than the lower bound, (1.17).
That is, if
(1− η)yˆ
(
1−η
1−ε0
)
+ (η − h)u
1− h ≥
(1− κ)yˆ
(
1−κ
1−ε0
)
+ (κ− h)u
1− h . (1.48)
This yields (1.46) once again. Since η > κ, this, in turn, can now be written as
u− y¯
ρσ2y
≥ 12
(1− κ)2 − (1− η)2
η − κ . (1.49)
Since (u− y¯)/ρσ2y ≤ (1−η), (1.49) does not hold. Thus, there is no equilibrium repo rate,
r ≤ u, when u− y¯ < ρσ2y(1− η).
Suppose next that u− y¯ > ρσ2y(1− η) so that Ω = ω∗ as given by (1.9). The short is
unconstrained and the upper bound, therefore, is
r = u− 12
(u− y¯)2
ρσ2y(1− h)
.
Thus, for there to be an equilibrium repo rate, we must have r ≥ r, which is
u− 12
u− y¯
ρσ2y(1− h)
≥ (1− κ)
(
y¯ + 12ρσ
2
y(1− κ)
)
+ (κ− h)u
1− h . (1.50)
This becomes after some algebra
(u− y¯)2 − 2ρσ2y(1− κ)(u− y¯) + ρ2σ4y(1− κ)2 ≤ 0, (1.51)
or,
(ρσ2y(1− κ)− (u− y¯))2 ≤ 0, (1.52)
which is not possible (because ρσ2y(1− κ) 6= (u− y¯)). Hence, there is no equilibrium repo
rate in Case 4. This establishes the bound (1.20) as a necessary condition for r ≤ u when
η > κ.
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Sufficient conditions for r ≤ u
We now turn to showing that the bounds (1.19) and (1.20) are sufficient conditions
for r ≤ u when η ≤ κ and η > κ, respectively.
Consider first the case that η > κ and assume that (1.20) holds, that is, u − y¯ ≥
ρσ2y(1 − κ). We claim this implies r ≤ u. The construction in the text and in the proof
above demonstrates that there is an equilibrium repo rate r ≤ u. We need to show that
the converse is not possible. Therefore, suppose, by contradiction, that r > u. Thus,
under the repo alternative (Alternative 1), the short optimally chooses to borrow η and,
therefore, repo the fraction
φ = 1− η1− h (1.53)
of her security. Under Alternative 2, the short cannot do worse than choosing ω =
(1− η)/(1− 0) and borrowing η at the unsecured rate. Therefore, along the same lines
as in the derivation of (1.13), for the short to be willing to do a repo, we must have
(1− η)r + ηu ≤ (1− η)yˆ
( 1− η
1− ε0
)
+ ηu (1.54)
which reduces to
r ≤ yˆ
( 1− η
1− ε0
)
= y¯ + ρ2σ
2
y(1− η). (1.55)
However, by η > κ and (1.20), we also have
y¯ + ρ2σ
2
y(1− η) < y¯ + ρσ2y(1− κ) ≤ u. (1.56)
Combined with (1.55), this implies r < u, which is a contradiction. Hence, when η > κ,
(1.20) implies r ≤ u.
Consider next the case that η ≤ κ and assume that (1.19) holds, that is, yˆ((1−η)/(1−
ε0)) ≤ u. We claim this implies r ≤ u. Suppose, by contradiction, that r > u. As above,
this leads to (1.55). But this contradicts (1.19). Hence, when η ≤ κ, (1.19) implies r ≤ u.

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Proof of Theorem 2
Case 1, η ≤ κ:
Necessary condition: By Theorem 1, r > u implies (1.26), or u− y¯ ≤ ρσ2y(1− η)/2. Thus,
we assume that this holds. From (1.29) we see that rneg > u. We need to check that the
two parties are wiling to enter a repo, i.e. rneg ≤ rneg. There are two cases to consider.
Case (a): 1− κ ≥ (1− η)/2.
In this case, by (1.30), A = (1− κ)/(1− ε0). By (1.32), the minimum acceptable rate to
the cash provider is, therefore,
rneg =
(1− κ)yˆ
(
1−κ
1−ε0
)
+ κu− ηu
1− η (1.57)
Since we also have u− y¯ < ρσ2y(1− η), combining (1.57) with the maximum the short is
willing to pay, as given by (1.29), we once again obtain condition (1.46) from the proof of
Theorem 1 (Case 3). Since (u− y¯)/ρσ2y ≤ 1− κ, the same proof as in Theorem 1, Case 3,
applies, establishing that (1.46) holds. In other words, rneg ≤ rneg. It is easy to check
that u ≤ rneg so that any repo rate in the interval (rneg, rneg] is consistent with equilibrium
r > u.
Case (b): 1− κ < (1− η)/2.
We need only consider u − y¯ > ρσ2y(1 − κ), as the reverse is covered by the argument in
case (a). Now, if A = ω∗ as given by (1.9),
rneg = u−
1
2
(u− y¯)2
ρσ2y(1− η)
. (1.58)
The upper bound, rneg is given by (1.29). Comparing these expressions, we have, after
some algebra, that rneg ≥ rneg if and only if
(ρσ2y(1− η)− (u− y¯))2 ≥ 0, (1.59)
which always holds. This is what we wanted to show. Since u ≤ rneg, any repo rate in
the interval (rneg, rneg] is consistent with equilibrium r > u.
If A = φ = (1− η)/(1−h), we know from the discussion in the text that we must also
have ε0 > h. So suppose this holds. Using (1.30), the lower bound can be written
rneg ≥
1−η
1−h(1− ε0)yˆ
(
1−η
1−h
)
+
(
1− 1−η1−h(1− ε0)
)
u− ηu
1− η . (1.60)
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Using (1.29), rneg ≤ rneg, if and only if
1
2ρσ
2
y
1− η
1− h
[
(1− h)2 − (1− ε0)2
]
≥ (ε0 − h)(u− y¯). (1.61)
Rewriting yields the condition
u− y¯ ≤ ρσ2y
1− η
1− h
(
1− 12(h+ ε0)
)
<
1
2ρσ
2
y(1− η), (1.62)
which is the necessary condition, (1.26), for a negative collateral spread.
Sufficient condition: By the same argument as in case (a) above, (1.27) implies that
rneg ≥ rneg and, therefore, also that there is equilibrium r > u.
Finally, note first that the analysis above, and, in particular, (1.57), (1.58), and (1.60),
show that rneg is given by (1.33). The statement in the theorem follows by u ≤ rneg ≤ rneg,
which is already established in all scenarios above. We also see that rneg = rneg if and
only if η = κ and these are then given by (1.57), which collapses to the right hand side of
(1.34).
Case 2, η > κ:
By Theorem 1, if η > κ, r > u is not possible if u− y¯ ≥ ρσ2y(1− κ). Therefore, suppose
u− y¯ < ρσ2y(1− κ).
We consider first the case that (1 − 0)φ > 1 − κ so that A 6= φ. Thus, rneg is given
by (1.57). Suppose now that we also have u − y¯ < ρσ2y(1 − η). Then, combining (1.57)
with the maximum the short is willing to pay, as given by (1.29), we obtain (1.46). But
as already shown in the proof of Theorem 1 (Case 4), this does not hold when η > κ.
Suppose next that u − y¯ > ρσ2y(1 − η) so that Ω = ω∗ as given by (1.9). The exact
same argument as in Case 4 of the proof of Theorem 1 now applies and shows that, once
again, rneg < rneg. Hence, r > u cannot be equilibrium when η > κ and (1− 0)φ > 1−κ.
Last, we consider the case that (1− 0)φ ≤ 1− κ so that A = φ. The same algebra as
in the case of η < κ shows that a necessary condition for a negative collateral spread is
that (1.26) is satisfied. It is straightforward that this is also sufficient. 
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Figure 1.4: Average haircut
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This figure shows the development of the average haircut in the two baskets, GCP ECB and GCP ECB
Extended, around the date of change in haircuts. The data ranges from September 16, 2013 to October
15, 2013. From the list of securities in each basket, we calculate the daily average. The day of change
by the ECB, October 01, 2013, is marked by the dashed line, the change by Eurex Repo on October 02,
2013, by the black line.
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Table 1.3: Ranks
This table shows the rank of the standardized Eonia on the last five days of the maintenance period,
endmp to endmp-4, and the last day of the month, monthend. Eonia is the overnight unsecured
interbank rate. The sample period ranges from January 01, 2007 to August 12, 2008, so that the
last period covers a full maintenance period. Each period refers to one maintenance period, in total
20. The first one is incomplete, as the corresponding starting date of this maintenance period was
on December 13, 2006. stand. Eonia is defined as the spread (Eonia −mean(Eonia)/st.deviation
(in bps). The calculation of the mean and the standard deviation exclude the last five days of the
maintenance period and the last day of the month. The order of ranking is determined by the sign of
the collateral spread on the last day of the maintenance period, endmp. If it is negative, all values in
the maintenance period are ranked in ascending order, starting with the lowest negative value, and
vice versa. The same ranking is done for the last day of the month, but uncoupled from the ranking
for the last days of the maintenance period, e.g. in case it has the largest positive value, it obtains
the first rank. Days in the last week of the maintenance period that have the first rank are marked
in bold.
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
stand. Eonia rank stand. Eonia rank stand. Eonia rank stand. Eonia rank
endmp -5.51 1 23.37 1 -107.52 1 -2.45 3
endmp-1 -4.27 3 -2.80 17 -11.24 2 -9.77 1
endmp-2 -5.51 2 -4.44 18 -11.24 3 -6.84 2
endmp-3 -4.27 4 -6.08 19 -6.54 4 -0.26 12
endmp-4 -3.64 5 -6.08 20 -4.19 5 0.47 19
monthend – – 3.74 2 7.55 1 5.60 1
Period 5 Period 6 Period 7 Period 8
endmp -113.47 1 -0.85 5 0.13 13 28.01 1
endmp-1 -38.96 3 -0.20 7 -0.78 8 0.37 5
endmp-2 -41.53 2 0.13 9 -0.78 7 -3.08 17
endmp-3 -33.83 4 -4.14 2 -1.69 3 -4.81 20
endmp-4 -5.57 5 -4.47 1 -5.33 1 -3.08 18
monthend 9.85 1 1.12 1 6.50 1 2.10 2
Period 9 Period 10 Period 11 Period 12
endmp -1.22 5 -0.09 10 -3.61 1 0.05 9
endmp-1 -3.29 1 -1.52 3 -2.44 4 -3.03 4
endmp-2 -1.53 3 -1.29 5 -0.92 5 -4.19 2
endmp-3 -0.05 16 -0.68 6 0.38 15 -5.11 1
endmp-4 3.36 25 -0.53 8 0.46 21 -4.12 3
monthend 1.48 3 0.87 3 1.74 1 0.05 10
Period 13 Period 14 Period 15 Period 16
endmp 1.20 5 1.44 4 24.85 1 -3.01 1
endmp-1 -0.29 15 -0.67 16 13.20 2 -0.74 6
endmp-2 -0.27 13 -0.65 15 3.86 3 -0.91 5
endmp-3 1.02 6 -0.29 11 0.63 7 -0.45 8
endmp-4 1.93 1 -0.16 9 -0.06 11 -0.35 9
monthend -0.02 10 3.14 1 3.17 4 1.16 4
Period 17 Period 18 Period 19 Period 20
endmp -0.06 9 4.12 1 -2.04 2 3.18 2
endmp-1 -3.81 1 -1.49 19 -0.67 4 0.70 12
endmp-2 -2.95 2 -1.82 20 -0.36 8 0.70 11
endmp-3 -0.40 7 -1.35 18 -0.39 7 2.96 3
endmp-4 0.54 12 -0.77 12 -0.54 6 2.64 4
monthend 2.75 1 2.33 2 3.32 1 9.96 1
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Table 1.4: Descriptive statistics - spikes
This table displays descriptive statistics on the standardized Eonia rate. Eonia is the overnight
unsecured interbank rate. The sample period ranges from January 01, 2007 to August 30, 2008.
endmperiod to endmperiod-4 denote the last five days of the maintenance period, where endmp
is the last day. monthend refers to the last trading day of the month. The standardized Eonia
(stand. Eonia) is calculated in the following way. In each maintenance period we compute (Eonia−
mean(Eonia)/st.deviation (in basis points), where the mean and the standard deviation exclude
the last five days of the maintenance period and the last day of the month. Then we take the average
across maintenance periods. The absolute value is defined as the absolute value of the standardized
Eonia in each maintenance period. The column positive (negative) displays the average value, when
the standardized Eonia is positive (negative). The column upspike-total (downspike-total) shows
the number of times, when the standardized Eonia is positive (negative). The column upspike-
abs. >2 (downspike-abs. >2 ) displays the number of times, when the absolute standardized Eonia
exceeds two, i.e. the standardized Eonia is two standard deviations away from the mean.
stand. Eonia (in bps) upspike downspike
No. Obs. average value absolute value positive negative total abs. >2 total abs. >2
endmp 20 -7.6752 16.3100 9.5942 -21.8047 9 5 11 7
endmp-1 20 -3.5848 5.0124 4.7589 -5.0572 3 1 17 9
endmp-2 20 -4.1806 4.6503 1.5657 -5.1946 3 1 17 8
endmp-3 20 -3.2668 3.7656 1.2470 -4.3953 4 1 16 7
endmp-4 20 -1.4742 2.4150 1.5681 -2.7780 6 2 14 8
monthend 20 3.5834 3.5854 3.7731 -0.0208 19 13 1 0
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Table 1.5: Spikes test
This table shows the regressions of the collateral spread, Eonia-ECB GC Pooling ON. The
time period January 01, 2007 to August 30, 2008 is studied. The collateral spread, which
is the dependent variable, is the daily volume-weighted average spread in basis points. The
independent variables are the following. fincrisis is a dummy variable that is equal to one
from August, 07 2007 onwards. monthend is a dummy variable that is equal to one on the last
trading day of the month, and is excluded from the following percentile dummies. perc10 is
a dummy variable that takes the value of one, when the Eonia is in the lower 10% percentile
in the respective maintenance period. perc90 takes the value of one, when the Eonia value
is in the upper 90% percentile in that maintenance period. The variables perc10|nonendres
and perc90|nonendres are equal to one, when the value of perc10, respectively perc90, is
outside the last five days of the maintenance period. Likewise, the variables perc10|endres
and perc90|endres are equal to one, when the value of perc10, respectively perc90, is inside
the last five days of the maintenance period. Newey-West standard errors with five lags
(Greene (2008)) are in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Eonia – GCP ECB Eonia – GCP ECB
constant -0.2414 -0.0621
(0.2920) (0.2574)
perc10 -3.1908**
(1.3942)
perc90 2.3485*
(1.3070)
perc10|nonendres -0.5564
(1.3372)
perc90|nonendres -0.0563
(0.7500)
perc10|endres -5.2123**
(2.1911)
perc90|endres 6.1432***
(2.3667)
fincrisis -2.1864*** -2.4688***
(0.5443) (0.5211)
monthend 0.9599 0.9643
(0.8331) (0.8363)
No. Obs. 422 422
R-Squared 0.0996 0.1443
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Table 1.7: GCP ECB basket: distribution of securities
This table displays the distribution of the securities that are included in the
GC Pooling ECB basket across the ECB liquidity categories and maturity
buckets on September 26, 2013. There are five categories: I) government secu-
rities, II) local and regional government securities as well Jumbo-style supra-
national/agency bonds, III) corporate, non-Jumbo and financial securities, IV)
unsecured bank bonds, V) asset-backed securities.
A- to AAA Liquidity Group
Years to Maturity Cat I Cat II Cat III Cat IV Total
0-1 177 1,103 1,469 132 2,881
1-3 137 444 711 38 1,330
3-5 120 335 522 33 1,010
5-7 99 217 310 20 646
7-10 121 207 274 13 615
> 10 369 170 130 14 683
Total 1,023 2,476 3,416 250 7,165
Table 1.8: GCP ECB Extended basket: distribution of securities
This table displays the distribution of the securities that are included in the
GC Pooling ECB Extended basket across the ECB liquidity categories, ma-
turity buckets and ratings on September 26, 2013. There are five categories:
I) government securities, II) local and regional government securities as well
Jumbo-style supranational/agency bonds, III) corporate, non-Jumbo and fi-
nancial securities, IV) unsecured bank bonds, V) asset-backed securities.
A- to AAA Liquidity Group
Years to Maturity Cat I Cat II Cat III Cat IV Total
0-1 291 1,227 1,705 4,682 7,905
1-3 186 487 863 2,996 4,532
3-5 160 373 634 1,911 3,078
5-7 133 244 396 938 1,711
7-10 156 222 376 608 1,362
> 10 446 184 270 252 1,152
Total 1,372 2,737 4,244 11,387 19,740
BBB- to BBB+ Liquidity Group
Years to Maturity Cat I Cat II Cat III Cat IV Total
0-1 12 2 99 265 378
1-3 9 3 69 187 268
3-5 7 68 117 192
5-7 8 1 71 64 144
7-10 10 41 50 101
> 10 39 55 56 150
Total 85 6 403 739 1,233
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Table 1.9: Effect of the haircut on the collateral spread
This table shows the results of the analysis of the collateral spread around the change in haircuts, announced on
September 27, 2013 and implemented on October 01, 2013. The collateral spread is measured as the difference
between the Eonia and the ON repo rate belonging to the Extended basket or the ECB basket (in basis points).
Each observation is the daily volume-weighted average spread. The last day of each month was removed in the
regressions. We control for the last day of the maintenance period, endmp1 and endmp2. The dummy variable
newhaircuts captures the effect of the change in haircuts on the collateral spread. It is equal to one starting
October 02, 2013. The first day of October was removed. Newey-West standard errors with two lags are in
parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Sep 13, 2013 – Oct 14, 2013
Eonia – GCP ECB Ext Eonia – GCP ECB
constant 0.8187*** 2.2052***
(0.2363) (0.3398)
newhaircuts -1.2892** -1.4612***
(0.5715) (0.4116)
endmp2 0.2342 -0.0976
(0.5739) (0.3192)
No. Obs. 20 20
R-Squared 0.31 0.47
Sep 06, 2013 – Oct 21, 2013
Eonia – GCP ECB Ext. Eonia – GCP ECB
constant 0.9693*** 2.3025***
(0.1983) (0.2489)
newhaircuts -1.1378** -1.2005**
(0.4713) (0.4372)
endmp1 0.4781** 0.1703
(0.1983) (0.2489)
endmp2 -0.0678 -0.4556
(0.4678) (0.3990)
No. Obs. 30 30
R-Squared 0.26 0.31
Aug 29, 2013 – Oct 28, 2013
Eonia – GCP ECB Ext. Eonia – GCP ECB
constant 1.2497*** 2.4138***
(0.2551) (0.2077)
newhaircuts -1.0968** -1.0049**
(0.4844) (0.4253)
endmp1 0.1977 0.0589
(0.2551) (0.2077)
endmp2 -0.3892 -0.7624*
(0.4443) (0.3976)
No. Obs. 40 40
R-Squared 0.21 0.23
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70 Collateral Spread
2 The German Special Repo market: Activ-
ity and Prices
2.1 Introduction
Financial stability depends on the setup of the financial system. One important backbone
of the bond market is the special repo market. In a special repo transaction a security
is bought by a bank with the promise to return it at a fixed price after e.g. one week.
This type of transaction helps market-makers, who often enter short positions in the bond
market, to meet their clients’ demand. They can borrow the security in the special repo
market for delivering it to their clients, in case they currently do not own it. Despite the
possibility of borrowing, a short position entails the risk of not being able to fulfill the
delivery commitment. Thus, it can be expected that market-makers choose, which short
positions they will enter, ceteris paribus. The underlying characteristics of the security
will impact this choice (Duffie, 1996). Securities that are easy to locate in the market
are likely to go more often on special, i.e. trade in the special repo market. Moreover,
the close link between the bond and special repo market implies that changes in demand
for bonds is reflected in the special repo market (Jordan and Jordan, 1997). When the
demand of a security vastly exceeds the supply, a short squeeze can occur (Nyborg and
Strebulaev, 2004; Sundaresan, 1994) which results in that security being highly special.
The demand for securities is impacted by the market environment, such as volatility
or monetary policies by the Eurosystem spearheaded by the European Central Bank
(ECB).1 Therefore, the questions of interest are: Which characteristics of bonds influence
their special repo trading activity? How does trading in the special repo market react
to external factors? And what are the potential implications for its role in the financial
system?
The market environment for bonds is shaped by financial market uncertainty as well
as the Eurosystem policy measures. These measures include asset purchase programmes
that directly aim at the bond market and measures targeted at the interbank market
1In general, decisions are made and announced by the ECB, whereas the Eurosystem is responsible
for the implementation of those policy decisions.
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for funding liquidity.2 Measures directed at the bond market spill over to the special
repo market due to their close link. Policies aiming at the funding market have an effect
on special repo through the use of collateral at the Eurosystem. The value of eligible
securities is increasing in the potential use, i.e. if they can be used to obtain 1-year or
3-year central bank liquidity, their value rises.
Another Eurosystem policy measure is the switch to a negative rate on its deposit
facility on June 11, 2014.3 Given that all special repo rates are as of now negative, cash
providers receive less cash at the end of the transaction than compared to their initially
provided loan. This is a tangible cost for a bank’s balance sheet, making reverse special
repo transactions less attractive.4 If a bank short-sells a security, it may prefer to wait
until it obtains that security in the cash market rather than borrowing it in the special
repo market. The bank may thus initiate a settlement’s fail in the cash market. The
convention in the cash market is that the delivery obligation is rolled over and the price
agreed upon remains the same. Fleming and Garbade (2004) state that in the case of
negative interest rates, failing on the bond delivery obligation is preferable. However, they
also demonstrate that ancillary costs can force market participants to comply and borrow
that security in the special repo market. Still, it can be overall expected that the number
of special repo trades declines after the switch to a negative policy rate.5 Therefore,
Eurosystem policies have wider effects on financial markets than intended. The analysis
of the reaction of the special repo market to those policies will help to gain a better
understanding of this market and to evaluate wider-ranging consequences of Eurosystem
policies.
In this paper I study special repo transactions from two angles. First, I examine
security-specific characteristics using cross-sectional data. This allows me to identify,
which characteristics of a bond drive its trading in special repo. Second, I examine those
external factors in a fixed-effects regression, to disentangle the results from security-
specific effects and to focus on the impact of the market environment on the whole special
repo market. The data on repo transactions was received from Eurex Repo, a German
company providing a platform for electronic repo transactions. The securities traded on
2Nyborg (2017a) also discusses the impact of the change in the collateral framework designed by the
ECB on financial markets. The focus in this paper is on Eurosystem market actions.
3Holding cash now becomes expensive. Banks are forced to look for investments with non-zero returns.
4ICMA (2015) reports that cash providers in GC repo are dissatisfied with negative repo rates.
5A different factor that plays a role is the start of the implementation of Basel III, which shifts in-
centives to trade in the repo market in Europe. The Basel III rules, adopted in Europe in the CRD
IV package have to be applied gradually from January 01, 2014 and to be fully implemented by Jan-
uary 01, 2019 (http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/implementing-basel-iii-europe, ICMA
(2015)). Shortly speaking, trading in repo, especially short-term, becomes more expensive in terms
of capital. This might also reduce the use of repo in market-making activities.
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that platform are predominantly German bonds, e.g. covered or corporate bonds, even
though trades in e.g. Spanish government bonds are possible. Given that Eurex Repo
allows a smaller set of securities as collateral than the Eurosystem, those securities are
usually eligible to use as collateral for central bank liquidity. The sample period ranges
from January 01, 2007 to June 30, 2015. The data contains the repo rate, the ISIN,
transaction date, purchase date, repurchase date, volume, type of transaction, and type
of security. My interest centers around the special repo transactions.6 This market
has an outstanding volume of EUR 53 billion as compared to the overall volume in the
European repo market, EUR 5,600 billion (European Repo Council survey, December
2015), measured on June 10, 2015. On average, there are 235 transactions per day. My
focus is on transactions with a term of one-week, which constitute the majority of trades
in special repo (71.3%). This data is complemented by bond data from Datastream, data
on the VSTOXX from Bloomberg, and data on Eurosystem policy measures.
The empirical analysis starts with cross-sectional regressions at the bond level. There
are four dependent variables: i) the number of trades, ii) volume iii) the special repo
spread7 and iv) specialness, which is measured as the difference between the general
collateral (GC) rate and the special repo rate. The lower the special repo spread and the
larger specialness is, the more expensive is the bond in special repo. All four variables
are regressed on the issue size, age of the bond, the term of the bond, and the type
of the bond. The major explanatory variable is the issue size of the bond. The larger
the outstanding amount is, the more often the bond trades special, and the lower its
specialness tends to be. Jordan and Jordan (1997) and Corradin and Maddaloni (2015)
both measure the supply of the bond by its availability, as e.g. a fixed amount might be
held by buy-and-hold investors. Still, according to my results a larger issue size implies
a larger supply of this bond. This makes it easier to locate when needed and market
makers/dealers are more willing to trade in this bond. This result is also in line with
Duffie (1996), who states that out of two similar securities the one with lower frictional
trading costs will trade special. According to Friewald, Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam
(2012) a larger issue size implies that this bond is more liquid.
The next step is to examine the impact of market factors on the special repo mar-
ket. I run fixed-effects panel regressions at bond level, in which I include the VSTOXX
for measuring financial market uncertainty and different variables capturing Eurosystem
policy measures as independent variables. The Eurosystem variables contain excess liq-
uidity, announcement days of asset purchase programmes, changes in the outstanding
6The GC repo transactions are eliminated in this analysis, but kept for calculating specialness.
7The effective policy rate is subtracted from the special repo rate, as the level of special repo rates
depend on the overall interest level. Before October 09, 2008, this is the minimum bid rate (MBR) and
afterwards the rate on the deposit facility (also see Nyborg (2016)).
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purchase volumes of the asset purchase programmes, the rate on the deposit facility,
dummy variables capturing the periods before the first one-year Long-term refinancing
operation (LTRO), before the start of both three-year LTROs, quarter- and year-end, and
the respective day of the week. In addition, there is one dummy that obtains the value
of one, when the ECB changes the policy rate from zero to negative on June 11, 2014.
The results of the panel regressions shed light on the impact of financial market uncer-
tainty, and Eurosystem unconventional monetary policy, i.e. creation of excess liquidity
and asset purchase programmes. Financial market uncertainty lowers volumes in the spe-
cial repo market and specialness rises. This indicates risk adjustment by rationing and
higher premia for repo trades, which is in line with a flight-to-liquidity. Duffie (1996)
shows that liquid securities go more often on special. According to Vayanos (2004) and
Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009), there is a quest for liquidity in volatile times, which
shows up here in higher specialness. Excess liquidity by the Eurosystem has a similar
effect on the special repo market: it decreases activity and special repo spreads fall. The
reason is that the value of eligible securities (which applies to securities trading on Eurex
Repo) rises, when the Eurosystem offers long-term financing.
Moreover, the covered bond purchase programmes also dampen trading in special repo.
They tend to lower the number of trades and daily traded volumes, whereas contrary to
expectations specialness of covered bonds decreases on average. This might stem from the
fact that the covered bond market is more liquid again, in which case the GC rate drops
relatively more than the special repo rate. In addition, some bonds may be very scarce
due to the Eurosystem purchase programmes, whereas the demand for other non-bought
bonds falls. The same holds for the Public Sector Purchase Programme.8 Overall, the
current demand for government bonds is high, and the demand for other bonds falls.
Finally, the switch to a negative policy rate also has a an adverse impact on the market.
It is followed by lower activity in the special repo market.
The effect of the negative policy rate is examined in more detail in Section 2.4.3,
where I restrict the sample to bonds that mature after September 11, 2014, three months
after the policy change. Further, I require that the bonds must trade before and after
the change of the policy rate to enable a pre-post-analysis. I run the same fixed effects
panel regression as before, but with different windows around the event. The shortest
window is one month. The switch to a negative rate lowers the number of trades and the
daily traded volume in each bond. This effect strengthens over time.9 The special repo
spread decreases slightly, by one basis point. The cost of lower cash at the term leg of the
8The Quantitative Easing by the Eurosystem was announced on September 04, 2014, and includes the
covered bond purchase programme 3 (CBPP3) and the asset-backed purchase programme. On January
22, 2015, the public sector purchase programme was added.
9This trend is probably supported by the start of Basel III.
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transaction leads market participants, in all likelihood, to avoid trades in the special repo
market. It is shown that after the switch more expensive securities trade less often than
cheaper ones. At the same time, the daily volume shrinks for less expensive securities.
Interestingly, the average specialness of more expensive securities falls more than the
specialness of cheaper securities after the change to a negative policy rate. These results
support the notion that the negative policy rate reduces the appeal for special repo in
market-making activities, which might be strengthened by current changes in regulation.
To summarize, the special repo market reacts strongly towards external factors: finan-
cial market uncertainty, Eurosystem liquidity policies, and asset purchase programmes.
Transactions in the special repo market decrease, potentially impacting market liquidity
in the bond market. The same is true for the negative policy rate. A lower willingness to
transact in the special repo market might lead to a deterioration of bond market liquid-
ity. Lower bond market liquidity may in turn facilitate the potential for short squeezes
in the special repo market. Moreover, bond prices are an important input for the risk
management by banks and the ECB. If less information on prices is available, risk man-
agement becomes more difficult, potentially leading to lower financial stability. In general,
if one market in the financial system is affected by a policy measure, there are usually
spillovers to other markets. Creating a better knowledge of these interdependencies helps
to evaluate policy measures and impacts on the financial system overall.
The literature and research on special repo is scarce so far. Duffie (1996) provides the
foundation for research on special repo. He shows that a bond that trades on special earns
a higher price in the cash market. Trading special is an endogenous phenomenon. If two
securities are similar, the security with the lower trading cost is likely to go on special.
Securities that are easier to trade will thus be more often on special than other securities.
Jordan and Jordan (1997) investigate several of Duffie’s predictions and confirm the re-
lationship between a bond’s specialness and its price. In addition, they find that auction
tightness and the percentage awarded to dealers impacts subsequent specialness. Buraschi
and Menini (2001) add to the understanding of specialness, by applying the expectation
hypothesis to special repo rates. Their results yield that special repo rates contain a time-
varying liquidity risk premium. Fisher (2002), Krishnamurthy (2002), Moulton (2004),
and Graveline and McBrady (2011) study specialness in the context of the on-the-run
phenomenon in the United States. They find that on-the-run securities have a premium
in the bond market over the previous on-the-run security, but trading profits are zero due
to the difference in repo-market financing rates. Fleming and Garbade (2007) compare
the Fed’s securities loan programme from 1999 to 2002 with the specials market and find
no violation of the law of one price. A more recent paper by Corradin and Maddaloni
(2015) analyze the specialness of Italian government bonds. They document that a large
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buyer in the market of bonds has a huge impact on the special repo market. Their focus
is on the SMP by the ECB that aimed at buying bonds from Eurozone countries with
high credit risk. This analysis is complemented by Dufour, Marra, Sangiorgi, and Skin-
ner (2017), who find for Italian sovereign bonds that specialness increases in the bid-ask
spread and they identify patterns around auction dates. So far the emphasis of the special
repo literature has been on specialness. This paper adds to the literature by studying the
number of trades and volumes in the special repo market in addition to special repo rates
and specialness.
The complement to the special repo market is GC repo, where the primary motive
for trading is cash funding. Cash is lent against a basket of securities, and not against a
specific security. Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer (2016) show the determinants of
GC repo rates on the Eurex Repo platform. A detailed description of this market can be
found in Ebner, Fecht, and Schulz (2016). My paper provides the counterpart to Mancini,
Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer (2016) with the focus on special repo transactions. In line
with their result that excess liquidity reduces activity in GC repo, I show that excess
liquidity also lowers activity in special repo. My paper broadens the understanding of the
repo market in Europe and Germany. There are also several studies on the repo market
in the United States. Gorton and Metrick (2011) document the run on bilateral repo
transactions during the financial crisis. Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2014) argue
that triparty repo in the US did not experience a run. Bartolini, Hilton, Sundaresan, and
Tonetti (2011) are the first to denote that there are differences in GC repo rates that
relate to the credit and liquidity risk of the underlying security.
The effects of central bank policy are more and more put into spotlight. In this
paper I study among other factors the impact of Eurosystem policy measures on the
special repo market. Dunne, Fleming, and Zholos (2013) show that there is a substitution
between Eurosystem and interbank repo market liquidity. Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2017) find that the Eurosystem unconventional monetary policies, in
particular the SMP, Outright Monetary Transactions, and LTROs, significantly lowered
sovereign bond yields. Their result is confirmed by Szczerbowicz (2015), who observes
that the covered bond and sovereign purchase programmes decrease both bank covered
bond spreads and sovereign bond spreads. The effects of liquidity allocation in the ECB’s
open market operations are studied by Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2009) and Fecht,
Nyborg, and Rocholl (2011). They analyze if the allocations at the ECB liquidity auctions
are linked to banks’ liquidity positions and find that banks bid more aggressively the more
imbalanced the last auction results were. Banks are also willing to pay more for liquidity
if banks’ liquidity reserves at the Central Bank are more dispersed.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2 the special repo market and the electronic
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trading system of Eurex Repo are described. This is followed by an explanation of the
data used and descriptive statistics in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 contains the empirical
analysis and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The special repo market and Eurex Repo
There are two legs in a repo transaction. A security is sold to the cash giver at the purchase
date and re-bought by the cash taker at the repurchase date. That security is usually a
bond and it serves as collateral in the transaction, since repo is often understood as a
collateralized transaction. If the cash taker defaults, the cash giver can sell the security
in the market.10 The negotiable items are the repo rate, the volume, and the term.11 At
the end of the contract, the cash giver receives the initial cash amount plus the repo rate.
There are two types of repo transactions, general collateral (GC) and special. In a GC
repo transaction, the driver of the transaction is cash funding. The result is that the cash
taker can deliver securities from a basket, which are of the same type and quality. In
special repo, the transaction is initiated by the cash giver, who needs a specific security.
The special repo rate is usually below the GC rate, which is the interest rate for liquidity.
The price of the security is the difference between the GC rate and the special repo rate,
called specialness. It measures the foregone opportunity cost of the cash giver, i.e. the
security taker, to lend his cash at the GC market rate.
The special repo market is crucial for market-making activities in the bond market. If
a market-maker sells a bond to an investor, he might not have this bond in his portfolio.12
In order to fulfill his commitment, he can borrow this bond in the special repo market.
This gives him time to locate the bond in the cash market. On Eurex Repo 71% of
all transactions take place in the one-week segment, which fits to the characterization
of market-makers needing time. Securities might be easier/faster to find in the special
repo market than in the bond market due to the fact that buy-and-hold investors such
as insurance companies are willing to lend their bond, but not sell it. The advantage for
them is that they can earn an additional revenue on their securities. They can invest the
cash they receive from the security taker at the market interest rate, e.g. GC repo rate,
and pay the lower special repo rate to the security taker. So they earn the specialness
premium on the security they have lent.
10The difference between the price in the repo transaction and the market price is then usually settled
between these two counterparties according to the contract GMRA.
11In bilateral repo transactions, the haircut is also part of this set, but not on Eurex Repo, where the
haircut is calculated by the CCP.
12This type of shortselling must be distinguished from the shortselling that is used to bet on a fall in
prices.
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Eurex Repo, a German company, provides a platform for electronic repo trading.13 It
offers GC repo and special repo trades in different types of securities for credit institutions
and investment banks. The participants on this platform can for instance trade German
government bonds or German Pfandbrief securities. Many security types are German,
but there are also French covered bonds or European government bonds. Trades are
anonymous and cleared by the Central Counterparty (CCP) Eurex Clearing. Trades are
marked as ’special’ by traders, who indicate in their quote, if they are looking for a
specific security. Different standard contract terms are offered by Eurex Repo. They
range from overnight to twelve months. In addition, counterparties can also agree on
a flexible term. The securities traded are of high quality. The lowest rating allowed in
special repo is A-. The security in a special repo transaction is transferred to the cash
giver’s account. Most securities that trade special on Eurex Repo are eligible as collateral
at the Eurosystem. Thus, any policy measure that aims at the bond market or changes
the demand for collateral affects special repo. This is discussed further in Section 2.4.1.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The special repo data consists of 510,173 transactions on the Eurex Repo trading platform.
363,940 transactions have a term of one week, which constitute the sample. The data
contains transaction day and time, type of the security, ISIN, rate, volume, purchase day
and repurchase day. About 50%, i.e. 174,964, of all transactions occur in a German ISIN
number. The analysis covers the period from January 01, 2007 to June 30, 2015. The
securities traded are classified into 25 different types. Some types overlap because Eurex
Repo has changed the definition of the types over time. In addition, a bond can fall into
two different classifications, which I account for in the analysis. The dataset contains a
range of different bonds, such as government bonds, or European covered bonds. Some
bonds are not assigned to a bond class, but may just be marked as trading special.
The first dependent variable I examine is frequency: how often does a bond trade
special? It is defined as the number of transactions per trading day, freq. The second
variable of interest is traded volume. In the cross-sectional regression it is defined as
volume per transaction, and in the fixed effects regression as traded volume in one bond
per day. I analyze the log of this variable, as it is highly skewed to the right, logvolume.
The third variable is the difference between the special repo rate and the key policy rate.
On October 09, 2008 the ECB changes from a liquidity-neutral monetary policy framework
13Eurex Repo is a subsidiary of Eurex Frankfurt AG, which belongs to Deutsche Börse Group.
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to full allotment, i.e. all banks now receive unlimited credit against collateral.14 Given
the large amount of liquidity, interest rates fall towards the deposit rate. Instead of the
minimum bid rate, the effective policy rate becomes the deposit facility rate (Nyborg,
2016). Until October 08, 2008, I subtract the minimum bid rate, and from then on the
deposit facility rate, diffrate. The lower the spread is, the more expensive that security is
in special repo. The spread of the special repo rate is complemented by the specialness
of a bond, specialness.
In order to measure specialness, I calculate the difference of the daily volume-weighted
average GC rate to the special repo rate. The GC rate is computed from GC transactions
on Eurex Repo. The matching involves three steps. First, the GC rate is matched for
the same type of security, purchase day and the term of one week. Second, covered
bonds are one type of security, without the distinction between German Pfandbrief and
French Covered bond. If there is no match for a covered bond for the exact same type
of security, the volume-weighted average GC rate for all covered bonds trading on that
day is used. Third, the best estimate for the specialness of the other securities without a
match is the difference between the volume-weighted GC rate of all transactions for the
same purchase day and term of one week. This pooled GC rate is used in the third step.
The total match is 167,880 transactions (46% of all one-week transactions). There are still
transactions without a corresponding match, because the electronic GC repo market is
mainly overnight, and less frequently long-term. Specialness is restricted to be positive.15
The larger the specialness of a specific security is, the more expensive this security is.
[insert Tables 2.1 and 2.2 about here]
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for all dependent variables, bond characteristics
and market environment variables. Data on bond characteristics was downloaded from
Datastream. The data for the VSTOXX stems from Bloomberg. Variables describing
Eurosystem policy measures are taken from the ECB webpage. The sample is composed
of 3,223 bonds and spans a period of 2,171 days. On average, each bond is traded 158
times and has a total traded volume of EUR 2,750 million. Their special repo rate is
about 60 basis points (bps) and their specialness 20 bps. About 157 bonds trade special
every day. The average contract term is 7.6 days. The lower part of Table 2.1 displays
the total trading volume in each type of security. Euro Covered Bonds are the largest
group with 571 bonds. The largest average trading volume of a bond belongs to the group
14Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev (2002) define liquidity neutral monetary policy as an allotment
policy that allows banks to satisfy their reserve requirements on average during the maintenance period.
15The opportunity cost in the special repo transaction is the GC rate, so the security taker will at least
offer this rate. There might be deviations in the best estimate of the corresponding GC rate, even among
repo traders. Since negative observations might be due to different estimates, I eliminate those.
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of German government bonds with EUR 34 billion. This is linked to the issue size, as
German government bonds are usually large: their average issue size exceeds EUR 10
billion. The second largest trading volume per bond can be identified for KFW bonds
with EUR 6.7 billion, whereas the lowest trading volume belongs to European corporate
bonds (EUR 167 million).
Further statistics by type of security can be found in Table 2.2, which displays average
figures for the number of trades, specialness, and further key features of the sample.
The highest average frequency can be found for KFW bonds with 471.4 trades by bond.
The largest specialness belongs to Finnish government bonds, which rarely trade special.
Furthermore, there are wide differences between types of bonds: the lowest average trade
pertains to Belgian and French government bonds with 3.50 trades and 4.12 trades (besides
Spanish sovereign bond with one trade). French government bonds have the lowest average
specialness of 0.10%, but the largest average issue size of EUR 18.3 billion. The second
largest issue size belongs to German government bonds (Germany) with EUR 17.1 billion,
which are traded on average 343.8 times and have a low specialness of 0.15%. Frequency
and specialness are related to the type of bond and further characteristics. Since my
interest centers around characteristics, I will control for bond type effects. With respect
to the term, the average lies between seven and eight days, with the longest being 50 days
(Spanish government bond). This reflects the fact that the term of one week is the most
important one in special repo on Eurex Repo.
2.4 Analysis
The analysis focuses on one-week contracts in the special repo market, the most actively
traded contracts. I identify three blocks of drivers for the special repo market: a) bond
characteristics, b) financial market uncertainty, and c) Eurosystem monetary policy op-
erations. In the last part of the analysis I focus on the ECB’s switch to a negative policy
rate and its impact on the special repo market. The negative policy rate is implemented
to stimulate the circulation of cash and investments. If there is an impact on the special
repo market, this move to negative rates has potentially unintended side effects. Such
side effects need to be understood to evaluate the effectiveness of such a policy decision.
Next, I discuss all potential drivers.
2.4.1 What are the drivers of the special repo market?
In the special repo market the characteristics of a bond are crucial for its trading frequency
and specialness (Duffie, 1996). The demand for a specific security determines how often
a security trades special and how special it is. If there is high uncertainty in financial
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markets, investors will be more risk-averse to trade. Over time, the Eurosystem policy
operations have an impact on special repo. Its liquidity injection, asset purchase pro-
grammes, and the impact of its policy rates will steer activity in special repo. The effects
of those drivers are explained and investigated in detail in the following paragraphs.
Bond characteristics
Duffie (1996) shows that out of two similar securities, the one with lower frictional trading
costs is more likely to go on special. The issue size of a bond facilitates trading in this
bond. The bond supply is larger and this increases the likelihood to trade on special.
Thus, I include the log of the issue size in the regression, logissuesize. As reported in
Table 2.1 the average issue size is EUR 3 billion with a maximum of 43 billion. Jordan
and Jordan (1997) show that specialness is decreasing in the availability of a bond. The
older the bond is, a larger volume of it tends to be held by buy-and-hold investors. The
supply of this security decreases. Further, it is traded less in special repo and with lower
volumes. When it trades, it tends to have a lower rate and a higher specialness. This is
captured by the age of the bond, when it trades, age. The average term of a bond is seven
years, with the maximum being 51 years. In addition, I account for the term of the bond,
term, i.e. the maturity of the bond at issue date. Longer-dated bonds are also believed
to be bought by buy-and-hold investors, who trade less frequently. In fact, these three
factors are identified by Friewald, Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam (2012) as liquidity
proxies of a bond based on its characteristics.
Financial market uncertainty
Nyborg and Östberg (2014) show that banks adjust their portfolios, when financial market
uncertainty increases. Uncertainty has an impact on stocks and bonds by changing their
demand for bonds. This shift in demand will be reflected in the special repo market.
In fact, in volatile times there is a flight-to-liquidity, in which the premium on liquid
securities rises (Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz, 2009; Vayanos, 2004). Securities traded in
Euro Repo are on average more liquid than the whole bond market, as only a selected
number of securities (e.g. excluding ABS) can be traded. Further, liquid securities go more
often on special (Duffie, 1996). Thus, one can expect to observe more special repo trades.
In addition, a risk premium might be added in all special repo trades, since it becomes
more difficult for the security lender to predict if he will need the security himself in the
next few days. Therefore, he requires a compensation for this risk. Special repo spreads
decline, whereas specialness increases. The measure for financial market uncertainty is the
lagged VSTOXX. It captures the expected volatility in the stock market over the next
82 Special Repo
30 days. In the sample period VSTOXX varies between 12.71 and 87.51 index points
(Table 2.1).
Eurosystem monetary policy operations
The period 2008 to 2015 is marked by extensive markets interventions by the ECB. Three
factors are expected to significantly impact the special repo market: a) negative policy
rate b) asset purchase programmes, and c) liquidity injection.
a) Switching to a negative policy rate: on June 11, 2014 the policy rate switches from
zero to negative. I capture this switch by a dummy variable that is equal to one starting on
this date (belowzero). This change from zero to negative policy rate is important, because
ultimately all special repo rates will reach very negative levels. The effect of negative
rates is that the cash taker/ security lender in the repo transaction returns a lower cash
amount than he had originally received, i.e. the cash giver/ security taker pays extra for
receiving the security. This is problematic for banks if they enter a repo transaction and
they obtain a lower cash amount at the term leg than before. The cash amount on the
balance sheet is effectively reduced by entering a repo transaction. If a bank needs to
fulfill a short selling obligation, it may choose to fail it rather than borrowing the security
in the repo market at a negative interest rate. The obligation in the cash market is rolled
over to the next day at no cost, if there are no settlement fail penalties in place.16 The
opportunity cost for cash is the GC overnight rate. Fontaine, Hately, and Walton (2017)
argue that in the case of negative rates, the lower floor of the special repo rate is the GC
overnight rate. Thus, it might be better to invest the cash at the GC overnight rate and
wait for the opportunity to buy the security instead of using the special repo market for
delivery. Reputational costs will restrain this behavior (Fleming and Garbade, 2004), but
it can generally be expected that special repo trades will decline and specialness premia
decrease on average, which I will test in Section 2.4.3.
b) Asset purchase programmes: they affect the demand for securities. Corradin and
Maddaloni (2015) find that an increase in holdings of Italian government bonds within
the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) is linked to higher specialness.17 The four
programmes that affect the Eurex Repo special repo market are the covered bond purchase
programmes (CBPP) 1-3 and the public sector purchase programme (PSPP), which is
part of quantitative easing (QE). The CBPP involves the purchase of covered bonds and
the PSPP European government bonds. The ECB publishes the outstanding volumes
16In Germany (Clearstream), the settlement instruction is just rolled over to the next day, as long as
the security matures or the instruction is deleted by both counterparties.
17In this data set the SMP is not expected to have an effect as it was targeted at GIIPS government
bonds. Those are not part of the dataset or do not show many transactions as the Spanish government
bonds.
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of the Eurosystem programmes on a weekly basis. I calculate the weekly change in
those volumes for the period that the programmes are active (changecbpp1, changecbpp2,
changecbpp3, changepspp). Since CBPP focuses on the covered bond market, only the
effect on covered bonds is measured. I also exclude bonds from these variables, whose issue
size is below the eligible size announced by the ECB. The minimum issue size of CBPP1
is EUR 500 billion, and it is EUR 300 billion for CBPP2. There is no such restriction
for CBPP3. The CBPPs are focused on the covered bond market. The PSPP has a
larger reach, since it is much bigger in size: it has a maximum change of EUR 16 billion,
whereas the largest covered bond programme is CBPP3 with a maximum change of EUR
5 billion (Table 2.1). The larger the change in purchases is, the higher is the pressure on
special repo rates and specialness increases. Volumes should not be affected. In addition,
I include dummies for the announcement days of those programmes (cbpp1announce,
cbpp2announce, cbpp3announce, qeannouncement). CBPP1 is announced on May 07,
2009, CBPP2 on October 06, 2011, CBPP3 on September 04, 2014, and PSPP on January
22, 2015.
c) Liquidity injection: the Eurosystem injects liquidity against eligible collateral.
Banks can use their eligible securities for obtaining liquidity from the Eurosystem. This
option is very attractive in the Eurosystem long-term refinancing operations (LTRO) of
more than one year. Those operations usually instigate a large demand for liquidity.18
The potential of obtaining long-term financing from the central bank raises the value of
eligible securities, to which securities traded on Eurex Repo belong. Thus, special repo
rates fall relative to the effective policy rate. The abundance of liquidity may lead banks
to recede from the interbank market, thus lowering activity. This effect is captured in the
variable of excessliq, which is defined as the sum of volumes at the current accounts and
deposit facility minus volumes at the lending facility and reserve requirements. Its average
during the sample period is EUR 193 billion (Table 2.1) with a minimum of -EUR 134
billion and a maximum of EUR 812 billion. In addition, I include dummy variables that
are equal to one the period before a LTRO with a long maturity before1year, beforeltro1,
beforeltro2. before1year measures the effect for the period between the announcement
(May 07, 2009) before the one-year LTRO in June 24, 2009. beforeltro1 and beforeltro2
capture the effect of the time span between the announcement on December 08, 2011 and
the implementation of both 3-year LTROs, December 21, 2011, and February 29, 2012.19
The idea is that the demand for collateral is very high before the start of these LTROs.
This will be reflected in the special repo market. I expect the number of transactions,
18In the first one-year LTRO banks demand EUR 442 billion, and in the two three-year LTROs, the
total liquidity injected amounts to nearly EUR 1 trillion.
19The Eurosystem liquidity policies are discussed in more detail in Nyborg (2017b).
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traded volume and specialness to be higher, and special repo spreads to be lower. In the
regressions I will also control for the period of full allotment (fullallot) starting on Octo-
ber 09, 2008. Banks now receive all credit they demand from the Central Bank, which is
a response to severe disruptions in the interbank after the collapse of Lehman Brothers
on September 15, 2008. This fundamental change in monetary policy might affect the
dependent variables.
2.4.2 Regression analysis
In my analysis I separate the security-specific factors from external factors that influence
the activity in the special repo market. In the first part I conduct a cross-sectional
regression testing for the impact of bond characteristics. In the second part I run a
fixed-effects panel regression testing for the effect of market factors. In the third part my
interest centers around the impact of a recent policy measure by the ECB, the switch to
a negative policy rate.
Cross-sectional regressions
In this section I test for the impact of bond characteristics on their frequency per trading
day (freq), the volume per transaction (logvolume), the difference between the special repo
rate to the policy rate (diffrate) and specialness (specialness). To be more precise, I take
the total number of trades over the sample period, the average of volume in each trade,
the volume-weighted average spread, special repo rate – policy rate, and volume-weighted
average specialness for each bond. Then I regress each dependent variable on the log of
the issue size of each bond (logissuesize), its average age (age), its term (term) and on
dummies for each type of security (∑251 αk). Age is calculated as the average of the period
issue day – transaction days, and is measured in years. The term, also measured in years,
is equal to the time span issue date - redemption date. A security can belong to more
than one type. If a security is classified as German Pfandbrief and European covered
bond, then the dummy for each equals one. Several types can only be traded later in the
sample period, i.e. a security might appear to trade less than another security, but in fact
the basket can only be traded starting 2012. The dummies subsume this effect. Since the
sample period contains time-varying effects, which might affect the dependent variables,
the regression is also conducted solely for the year 2007, excluding all extraordinary policy
measures. Thus, I run the following regression:
yi = α1 + α2logissuesizei + α3agei + α4termi +
29∑
5
αkTypei + εi. (2.1)
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Table 2.3 presents the results. Each regression contains 25 dummy variables for the
type of security, whose coefficients are not reported. The main explanatory variable is
the issue size of each bond. If the issue size is higher by 10%, the bond trades on average
0.0061 times more often each day. The volume in each transaction is higher. A 10%
increase translates into a 3.8% increase in volume. The special repo spread tends to be
higher by 0.49 basis points. This translates into a lower specialness of about 0.58 basis
points. In the whole sample period as well as for the year 2007 the term of the bond
is statistically significant at the 5% level for the frequency of trading with coefficients
of 0.0038 and 0.0026 respectively. There seems to be a preference to trade in long-term
bonds, despite the notion that mainly buy-and-hold investors invest in those bonds. This
variable is also significant for the other dependent variables in the whole sample period,
but not if only the year 2007 is considered. The effect of term on the frequency of trading
is counteracted by age. An increase by one year lowers the number of trades per trading
day by -0.0069, which is significant at the 1% level for the whole sample period. Older
bonds tend to trade less often on special, which is in line with a larger share of the bond
being owned by buy-and-hold investors.
[insert Table 2.3 about here]
The main result from the bond characteristics is that issue size is an important deter-
minant of how often the bond trades special and for its rate. This is in line with Duffie
(1996), who predicts that a bond with lower frictional trading cost will trade more often
on special. The larger the issue size is, the larger is the supply of the bond in the market,
given its type. Thus, its special repo spread tends to be higher and its specialness lower.
The size of a bond issue or of one issuer, such as a country, leads to self-coordination,
as shown by He, Krishnamurthy, and Milbradt (2016) in their theoretical model. As in-
vestors know that other investors trade more often in this bond, they will also trade in
this bond, given its type. So it is no wonder that the issue size of a bond impacts the
demand and special repo trades for this bond. The next section focuses on the impact of
external factors on the special repo trades of a bond.
Panel regressions
Trading in special repo is a function of a bond’s characteristics, but also external factors.
These external factors are ECB monetary policy decisions, including its asset purchase
programmes, the introduction of negative interest rates, and the amount of liquidity
distributed (Section 2.4.1). I run a fixed effects panel regression at the bond level. The
time variable is the transaction day. Standard errors are clustered at the bond level. The
dependent variables are the frequency of trades in one bond per transaction day (freq), the
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log of the volume of a bond per day (logvolume), the volume-weighted average spread of
the special repo rate to the policy rate per day (diffrate), and the volume-weighted average
specialness per day (specialness). The variables freq and logvolume are demeaned.
I run the following regression to estimate the effects on the dependent variables:
yi,t = β1 + β2belowzeroi,t + β3excessliqi,t−1 + β4vstoxxi,t−1 +
7∑
m=5
βmcbppannouncei,t (2.2)
+
10∑
m=8
βmchangecbppi,t + β11psppannouncei,t + β12changepsppi,t +Xβ + εi,t.
The variable belowzero is a dummy variable that is equal to one when the ECB changes
the rate on the deposit facility to negative, i.e. from June 11, 2014 until the end of
the sample period. excessliq measures the excess liquidity (in the Euro area), lagged
by one day, and measured in billion. vstoxx is the VSTOXX, also lagged by one day.
cbppannounce are three dummy variables that are equal to one on the days that the
CBPP 1-3 are announced. changecbpp are three variables that measure the change in
outstanding volumes for CBPP 1-3. In the regressions they are all measured in billions.
psppannounce is a dummy variable equal to one on January 22, 2015. changepspp is equal
to the change in outstanding volumes of the PSPP, also in billions. The control vector X
contains further dummy variables: the variables before1year, beforeltro1, and beforeltro2,
which are equal to one for the period before the large long-term LTROs.20 fullallot is
a dummy variable that is equal to one from October 09, 2008 to the end of the sample
period. depositfacility captures the level of the interest rate on the deposit facility.21
Further variables in X are controls for seasonal effects. These controls include dummies
for the day-of-the week, quarter-end and year-end dummies. As shown in Chapter 3 and
by Munyan (2015), banks tend to reduce their exposure to the GC repo market at the end
of the quarter, mainly due to window dressing (Gropp and Heider, 2010). The same effect
can be expected to be present in special repo. In addition, I use three dummy variables
capturing three lags of the futures delivery day of German government bonds.22
[insert Table 2.4 about here]
Table 2.4 displays the results for the variables of interest.23 The switch to a negative
policy rate, financial market uncertainty, and excess liquidity all decrease activity in the
20before1year is equal to one from May 07, 2009 to June 24, 2009. beforeltro1 is equal to one from
December 08, 2011 to December 21, 2011. beforeltro2 is equal to one from December 22, 2011 to February
28, 2012.
21This rate is left out in the regression of diffrate, because it is subtracted from the special repo rate.
22German bunds have to be delivered on the tenth of the end-of-quarter month or the next following
business day.
23Seasonal effects and the rate on the deposit facility are not shown.
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special repo market and increase prices (lower special repo spread, higher specialness).
Financial market uncertainty, (vstoxx), has a strong effect on volume, the special repo
spread and specialness. Specialness rises, whereas the volume and the special repo spread
tend to decrease. If the VSTOXX increases by ten index points, specialness is positively
affected by 3 bps, whereas volume decreases by 2.4%, and the special repo spread is lower
by 12 bps. Negative policy rates (belowzero) decrease the frequency of trades by -0.13.
This coefficient is significant at the 1% level. The special repo spread is also reduced, while
specialness is not affected. The ECB excess liquidity (excessliq) has a significant impact
at the 1% level on the frequency of trading, the special repo spread and specialness. It
decreases the frequency by -0.01, if it rises by EUR 100 million. The special repo spread
is lower by 5 bps, and specialness rises by one basis point. In relation to the supply of
funding liquidity by the ECB, activity in the special repo market before the three-year
LTROs tends to be subdued. Frequency is lower before the first three-year LTRO, and
the daily volume is smaller in the period from the announcement to the start of the
second three-year LTRO. However, before the first one-year, the first and second three-
year LTRO, specialness is higher by 16, 8 and 12 bps, respectively. This indicates that
securities have a larger price in special repo, since they can be used to obtain liquidity
from the ECB for a long time period.
As can be seen, the asset purchase programmes also dampen activity in the special
repo market, but specialness rather goes down than up. First I discuss the impact of
the announcements, before I move to the volumes. The announcements of CBPP1 and
CBPP2 influence the special repo spread and specialness. The announcement of CBPP1
(cbpp1announce) goes along with lower special repo spreads (-6.4 bps) and lower special-
ness (-9.6 bps). The announcement of CBPP2 leads to higher special repo spreads (9.8
bps) and also lower specialness (8.7 bps). The announcement of CBPP3 has no obvious
effect. The implementation of CBPP1 lowers the number of trades (freq). The coefficient
of -0.11 is significant at the 5% level. The coefficients are also negative for CBPP2 and
CBPP3, but not significant. Instead of the frequency, CBPP2 affects logvolume. If there
is a positive change of EUR 100 million in CBPP2, then the volume tends to be lower by
5.3%. The implementation of CBPP1, changecbpp1 decreases special repo spreads and
specialness on average in the special repo market. A EUR 1 billion change is followed
by a decrease of 18 bps in specialness. Special repo spreads also decrease by 17 bps. A
change in the volumes of CBPP2 only affects the special repo spread, but not specialness.
A larger purchase volume by EUR 100 million would lead to a decline in special repo
spreads by 0.9 bps. CBPP3 only affects the special repo spread. Contrary to CBPP1
and CBPP2, the coefficient on diffrate is positive and significant for a change in volumes
of CBPP3. Special repo spreads increase by 1 basis point, if CBPP3 changes by EUR
100 million. It can be noted, when comparing all covered bond purchase programmes,
that CBPP1 has the largest influence on the number of trades per day, and specialness
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in covered bonds.
The biggest asset purchase programme by the Eurosystem is its PSPP (part of QE),
which aims at the whole financial market. Its impact is similar to the covered bond pur-
chase programmes. The announcement on January 22, 2015, is followed by less trades
in the special repo market on the same day. On average it is lower by 0.22. Special-
ness rises by 5 bps. The change in outstanding volumes of the PSPP (changePSPP)
affects the frequency of trading, special repo spreads, and specialness. The frequency of
trading decreases by -0.0059 if the change amounts to EUR 1 billion. The special repo
spread is higher by 0.32 bps, and specialness lower by 0.28 bps. Like the other purchase
programmes, PSPP also calms down the special repo market.24 25
The Eurosystem policies and the market environment have a strong impact on the
special repo market. The prediction that a negative policy rate lowers activity in the
special repo market is backed by the data, as the frequency of trading decreases. This
effect is investigated in more detail in Section 2.4.3. This is important, because - due to
its close connection to the cash market - there might be spillovers from the special repo
market to the cash market, such as a decrease in market liquidity. The effect of Eurosystem
excess liquidity is also confirmed by the data. Special rates decrease, as the value of
eligible securities rises, if banks can obtain long-term financing from the Eurosystem.
Trading activity in the special repo market is also lower, as banks potentially reduce
their interbank activity. Specialness rises slightly, implying that special repo rates fall
more than GC rates (Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer, 2016). The same argument
explains, why there is lower activity and small special repo spreads before the start of the
three-year LTROs. Specialness is significantly higher, as liquid securities obtain a lower
haircut at the Eurosystem, which is more valuable, if the bank can obtain a larger amount
of central bank long-term financing.
VSTOXX measuring uncertainty in financial markets lowers daily volume, which can
be interpreted as a form of rationing. Investors trade the bond at the same daily frequency,
but at lower volumes. Higher specialness indicates that the premium of trading specific
securities rises. In combination with the notion that more liquid securities go more often
on special (Duffie, 1996), those results reflect a flight-to-liquidity, which occurs during
market stress (Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz, 2009). Investors are more risk-averse and
are willing to pay a premium to obtain a liquid security (Vayanos, 2004).
24As a robustness check, I run the same regressions only for the period of full allotment. In the case of
full allotment, the results are qualitatively the same. Results are available upon request from the author.
25Since the measure of specialness depends on the matching used, the regression is performed for the
use of different GC rates, and the one-week unsecured rate, Euribor (as shown in Chapter 1, there is a
close relationship between unsecured and secured rates.). Table 2.5 shows the results. The conclusions
drawn do not change, when using different types of matching. In the regression with the Euribor, the
results of changecbpp2 and changepspp are different, which might be due to a separate effect of those
programmes on the unsecured rate than the secured rate. In Chapter 1 it is also revealed that there can
be circumstances, when the repo and unsecured rate move independently from another.
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The asset purchase programmes by the Eurosystem tend to decrease activity in the
special repo market and to reduce specialness. Corradin and Maddaloni (2015) find that
specialness increases for Italian bonds, when the Eurosystem starts to buy government
bond securities of troubled countries (SMP). There are two conditions for this effect to
occur. First, those bonds must become scarcer in the cash and special repo market.
Second, the GC rate for those bonds decreases less than their special repo rates. If the
collateral value of those bonds increases, the GC rate will drop as well (Bartolini, Hilton,
Sundaresan, and Tonetti, 2011). The distance between the GC rate and the special repo
rate determines specialness. The decrease in specialness during the first covered bond
purchase programme is due to a significant drop in the GC rate for covered bonds. The GC
rate drops significantly during the first covered bond purchase programme.26 In addition,
the purchases by the Eurosystem might lead to a segmented market. Those covered bonds,
which are purchased by the ECB, obtain a high specialness premium and the specialness
of the other potentially drops. This is in accordance with Trebesch and Zettelmeyer
(2016) who show that the Eurosystem SMP purchase programme only affects the yields
of bonds they have bought, not the other ones. The PSPP has a similar effect as CBPP1
on the overall special repo market, but special repo spreads tend to be higher. When
the frequency regression is run only for government bonds, the coefficient on changepspp
is insignificant. The frequency does not decrease for those bonds, whereas special repo
spreads do, contrary to the positive overall effect. This supports the explanation of market
segmentation. At the start of PSPP, there seem to be no spillover effects yet to other
assets by means of substitution, i.e. investors purchase cheaper substitutes to those bonds
that the Eurosystem is buying (Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2017).
All in all, the special repo market reacts strongly to the implementation of Eurosystem
policies. The asset purchase programmes have a large impact, but so does the liquidity
injection by the Eurosystem, as demonstrated by the effect of excessliq. Specialness rises,
as these securities can be used to obtain (long-term) central bank liquidity. This has an
effect on asset markets. Given that the price of a bond reflects its specialness premium
(Duffie, 1996), the prices of bonds are higher in the cash market. The liquidity injection
by the Eurosystem has thus wide-ranging effects. In addition, the ECB moves into the
territory of negative interest rates. This seems to lower activity in the repo market, which
is analyzed further in the next section. It is important, because the special repo is used
for market-making in the cash market. The less attractive it is to trade in the special repo
market, the more market-making in the cash market might suffer. In the view of efficient
markets, less trading opportunities might be used and less information about prices will
be available. As the Eurosystem uses market data to determine the collateral values of
the bonds pledged, this also potentially lowers the precision of their risk management.
26Results from the regression of the GC rate on the independent variables are available on request.
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2.4.3 The effect of a negative deposit facility rate on special
repo
On June 11, 2014 the ECB introduces a negative rate on its deposit facility, the (effective)
policy rate. This decision is made to incentivize banks to lower their cash deposits at
the Eurosystem and look for other investment possibilities with the ultimate goal of
stimulating growth.27 The policy rate changes from 0.00 to -0.10%. The rate is further
lowered to -0.20% on September 10, 2014. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the development in
the number of transactions of the one-week contracts for the whole sample period and the
subsample period May 01, 2014 to December 31, 2014. The two dates of rate changes are
marked by black lines. Over the whole sample period the number of transactions varies
considerably. The largest increase occurs in 2010. The largest decrease, though, can be
seen in 2014. In Figure 2.2 it is apparent that it takes some time until activity declines after
the switch to a negative policy rate. At the beginning of July, the number of transactions
starts to fall until the end of the year 2014. It is important that no other monetary
policy decisions by the ECB are implemented until mid September: the first TLTRO is
conducted on September 18, 2014, and CBPP3 in October 2014. Figure 2.3 shows the
effect on the special repo rate by type of security around the date of June 11, 2014. Except
for three types of securities (EIB, European Corporate, German Pfandbrief), the average
volume-weighted special repo rate is above zero before the switch to the negative deposit
facility rate. Afterward it is negative for all types of securities.
[insert Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 about here]
The effect of a negative policy rate is now tested for all dependent variables. The tests
focus on the change on June 11, 2014. As in Section 2.4.2, I run separate panel regressions
for each dependent variable (freq, logvolume, diffrate, specialness). The panel variable is
the bond and the time variable is one day. I use three different event windows: one month
before and after the switch to a negative rate, two months before and after, and three
months before and after. This should allow for a better estimation of this policy change.28
The sample of bonds is restricted to those that trade before and after the switch to the
negative rate. In addition, bonds that mature before the end of the last event window,
September 11, 2014, are eliminated as well. In addition to the independent variables
belowzero, excessliq, and vstoxx I include in X as further controls dummy variables for the
end-of-quarter, lagged futures delivery day, and the weekday. The following regression is
27Their decision is justified and explained on http://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-
more/html/why-negative-interest-rate.en.html.
28The last window contains the second rate decrease on September 10, 2014.
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run:
yi,t = β1 + β2belowzeroi,t + β3vstoxxi,t−1 + β4excessliqi,t−1 +Xβ + εi,t (2.3)
Table 2.6 presents the results. The variable of interest is belowzero. Panel A shows the
results for the period: May 11–July 11, 2014, Panel B for April 11–August 11, 2014, and
Panel C for March 11–September 11, 2014. The frequency of trading special by bond
decreases, when the deposit facility rate turns negative. The coefficient on belowzero in
the shortest time period is not significant, but strongly significant in Panel B and C. In
the six-months period, the frequency by bond decreases by 0.11. The effect on volume is
significant in the two-months window (Panel A). The daily volume in each bond is 8%
lower, when the policy rate becomes negative. This effect gets stronger over time. In the
six months-window (Panel C) it is up to 15%. The difference between the special rate
and the policy rate decreases with the switch to the negative policy rate. The coefficient
is between 1 and 2 bps in each time window and significant at the 5% level. The average
specialness also becomes lower. This is the case for all event windows. The coefficient
ranges from 3.8 bps (Panel A) to 7 bps (Panel C) at a significance level of 5%. When
using the same sample for the special repo spread (diffrate), there is no significant change
in the latter.
[insert Table 2.6 about here]
The activity in the special repo declines, as evidenced by the figures and the regres-
sions. The number of trades and daily volume in each bond become smaller. The effect
strengthens over time, as market participants adjust their trading behavior. This is driven
by the fact that in all special repo trades the cash taker/ security giver receives a lower
volume than he has provided. Even if the opportunity cost, the specialness, stays con-
stant, this cost is more tangible. This disincentivizes investors and market-makers to
use the special repo market. Special repo rates are driven further towards the policy
rate, whereas specialness decreases. Market participants now trade in special repo, in all
likelihood, when they direly need the security, or when the special repo rate is not that
much lower than the GC rate. In order to minimize costs, they try to trade less and/or in
securities with a lower specialness.29 Once banks adjust to the new market environment
of negative interest rates, this trend might reverse, of course.
In order to test if there is a difference in cheaper/more expensive securities, I split
the sample in two. For the period before June 11, 2014, I compute the average special
repo rate for each bond and determine the median. The securities whose special repo rate
is above the median are labeled cheap. The securities whose rate are below the median
29The repo market is also affected by changes in regulation, Basel III, which make trading in repo more
expensive in terms of capital. This supports this trend.
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are comparatively expensive.30 Figures 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 depict the differential effect
of both groups on the dependent variables. The blue columns depict periods before the
change, the gray patterned columns those after the change. It can be seen that the number
of daily trades in cheaper securities is in general higher. After the change to a negative
policy rate this number remains constant. It decreases, though, for securities that are
on average more expensive (lower special repo rate). The figure displaying volume per
transaction shows the reverse. Volumes for cheaper securities decrease per transaction,
whereas they remain constant for the more expensive securities. The special repo rates
of cheaper securities move closer to the policy rate, but they stay at the same level for
more expensive securities as compared to the previous months. This is also reflected in
specialness, which falls less for cheap securities than for more expensive securities.
[insert Table 2.7 about here]
I test these observations formally by running the same regressions as above for these
two subsamples. Table 2.7 reports the results, which confirm the conclusions drawn from
the figures. Cheaper securities still trade at the same frequency, but at a lower volume.
Expensive securities trade less often, at the same volumes and special repo spreads. The
special repo rates of cheaper securities fall relative to the effective policy rate. Specialness
declines most for the expensive securities, but also for cheaper securities. Banks now
trade less often, which will affect their market-making activities in the cash market.
2.5 Conclusion
Special repo trades are impacted by three different set of drivers: bond characteristics,
Eurosystem monetary policy measures and financial market uncertainty. The issue size is
a strong determinant of how often a bond trades special. The reason is that the supply of
this bond is more easily available. It is safer to short a bond that is in large supply than a
bond that has a small outstanding issue. There is also a tendency to trade in bonds that
have a longer term. Over time, the special repo market reacts to measures taken by the
Eurosystem and expected volatility in the market. Larger expected volatility in the stock
market leads to rationing, a lower daily traded volume and larger specialness, which is in
line with flight-to-liquidity during market stress.
Three factors by the Eurosystem influence activity in the special repo market, its
liquidity injection, its asset purchase programmes and its switch to a negative policy
rate. Excess liquidity, which leads to higher values for eligible securities (including those
trading on Eurex Repo), tends to decrease the number of trades in the special repo
30The deposit facility rate is zero at this point in time, so that diffrateis equal to the special repo rate
before the change.
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market and reduce special repo rates relative to the effective policy rate. A similar effect
can be observed before the Eurosystem injects very long-term financing. Before the two
three-year LTROs, activity in the special repo market decreases. Specialness is on average
higher before these LTROs. Liquid securities, which trade more often on special, are more
valuable than illiquid securities, since they obtain a lower haircut at the ECB, and banks
can thus receive more long-term central bank financing. The Eurosystem asset purchase
programmes tend to decrease activity in the special repo market, with the PSPP (part
of Quantitative Easing) being the largest programme. The number of trades declines,
special repo spreads drop, and specialness decreases. This is again due to the fact that
there is a concentration in special repo on one asset class, i.e. government bonds. For
this asset class special repo spreads decrease, whereas they do increase for larger purchase
volumes.
The ECB’s switch to a negative deposit facility rate on June 11, 2014 lowers the
frequency of trades, the daily traded volume in each bond, the special repo spread, and
specialness. A negative repo rate makes a repo transaction very unattractive for the
security borrower. It effectively reduces the available cash of a bank after the term leg of
the transaction has been settled. The aim of the ECB to switch to a negative rate is to
force banks to invest their cash in investments with a positive return. It has the negative
side effect of reducing the attractiveness of market-making in the cash market. Thus,
market liquidity in the cash market is possibly lower, if it is very expensive to cover short
positions in the special repo market.31 This in turn may rise the potential for squeezes in
the special repo market, as it becomes more difficult to locate the security.
Even though, the special repo market is not the focus of ECB liquidity policy measures,
it is indirectly affected. It supports market liquidity in the bond market. If this is
impaired, less bond trades might occur and less prices form. Bond prices are important
for banks’ risk and collateral management. The Eurosystem also determines its collateral
values from bond prices. If there is less information available, risk management of banks
and the ECB might become less accurate. It is crucial to have an understanding of how
financial markets are connected and how they react to different policy measures, in order
to have a good basis for policy decisions.
31The ongoing implementation of Basel III due to higher capital requirements also impedes trading in
repo. This is another factor, why banks might reduce trading in special repo, until they are used to the
new market environment.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Figures
Figure 2.1: Number of special repo transactions, one-week contracts, Jan 2007 - Jun 2015
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This figure shows the daily number of transactions in the one-week segment in the period January 01,
2007 to June 30, 2015 (source: Eurex Repo). The first black line denotes the switch to a negative policy
rate on June 11, 2014. The second black line relates to the following decrease in the deposit facility rate
on September 10, 2014.
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Figure 2.2: Number of transactions, one-week contracts, May 2014 - Dec 2014
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This figure shows the daily number of transactions in the one-week segment in the period May 01, 2014
to December 31, 2014 (source: Eurex Repo). The first black line denotes the switch to a negative policy
rate on June 11, 2014. The second black line relates to the following decrease in the deposit facility rate
on September 10, 2014.
Figure 2.3: Special repo rate, one-week contracts, volume weighted average
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This graph shows the volume-weighted average of the special repo rate in the period in two different time
periods for the different types of securities. Securities have to be traded in both time periods and mature
after September 11, 2014. The blue bar denotes the period 12 May – 10 June 2014. The red bar is the
period 12 June – 11 July 2014. Here I use the repo rate instead of the spread for illustration purposes.
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Figure 2.4: Number of trades per day
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This graph shows the number of trades per day. It compares the number of trades before and after
the switch to the negative deposit facility rate. The blue bars show the periods before, and the gray
bars the periods after. The securities are split in two samples. The left bars display the changes in
trades for those, whose volume-weighted average rate is higher than the median rate of all securities
(cheap securities). The right bars represent the securities that have a lower volume-weighted average rate
(expensive securities). Securities have to be traded in both time periods and mature after September 11,
2014.
Figure 2.5: Volume by transaction
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This graph shows the traded volume per day. It compares the volume before and after the switch to
the negative deposit facility rate. The blue bars show the periods before, and the gray bars the periods
after. The securities are split in two samples. The left bars display the changes in trades for those, whose
volume-weighted average rate is higher than the median rate of all securities (cheap securities). The
right bars represent the securities that have a lower volume-weighted average rate (expensive securities).
Securities have to be traded in both time periods and mature after September 11, 2014.
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Figure 2.6: Volume-weighted average special repo spread
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This graph shows the volume-weighted average special repo spread per day. It compares the special
repo spread (in %) before and after the switch to the negative deposit facility rate. The blue bars show
the periods before, and the gray bars the periods after. The securities are split in two samples. The
left bars display the changes in trades for those, whose volume-weighted average rate is higher than the
median rate of all securities (cheap securities). The right bars represent the securities that have a lower
volume-weighted average rate (expensive securities). Securities have to be traded in both time periods
and mature after September 11, 2014.
Figure 2.7: Volume-weighted average specialness
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This graph shows the volume-weighted average specialness per day. It compares the specialness (in %)
before and after the switch to the negative deposit facility rate. The blue bars show the periods before,
and the gray bars the periods after. The securities are split in two samples. The left bars display the
changes in trades for those, whose volume-weighted average rate is higher than the median rate of all
securities (cheap securities). The right bars represent the securities that have a lower volume-weighted
average rate (expensive securities). Securities have to be traded in both time periods and mature after
September 11, 2014.
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2.6.2 Tables
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics I
This table presents descriptive statistics on the Eurex Repo data and explanatory variables. The
sample spans the time period January 01, 2007 - June 30, 2015. The lower panel displays the sum
of traded volume (volume) by type of security on bond level.
No. Obs. Mean St. Error Median St. Dev. Min Max
Sum Traded Volume in mio. (bond) 3,223 2,750 148 468 8,430 0.9928 155,000
Frequency (bond) 3,223 158.29 4.80 39.00 272.58 1.00 2716.00
Special Rate (bond) in % 3,223 0.60 0.02 0.11 1.17 -2.00 4.34
Specialness (bond) in % 2,428 0.24 0.00 0.20 0.17 0.00 1.90
Traded bonds per day 2,171 157.31 1.07 154.00 49.74 1.00 392.00
Contract Term 510,173 7.61 0.02 7.00 12.49 1.00 480.00
Amount Outstanding (in mio.) 3,214 3,340 96.5 1,490 5,470 25 43,200
Term of bond in years 3,215 7.24 0.09 6.01 5.04 0.25 51.04
VSTOXX 2,171 25.49 0.21 23.08 9.57 12.71 87.51
ExcessLiq (in EUR mio.) 2,170 193,188 4,706 131,662 219,221 -134,833 811,857
Change in vol. CBPP1 (in EUR mio.) 2,170 28.18 2.04 0.00 95.25 0.00 803.00
Change in vol. CBPP2 (in EUR mio.) 2,171 7.55 0.79 0.00 36.93 0.00 704.00
Change in vol. CBPP3 (in EUR mio.) 2,170 214.62 16.34 0.00 761.18 -28.00 5,078.00
Change in vol. PSPP (in EUR mio.) 2,170 442.54 49.45 0.00 2,303.42 0.00 16,549.00
Traded volume by type in EUR million
Agency 243 3,020 421 332 6,560 1 50,900
Austrian government 5 2,290 1,150 887 2,580 10 5,720
Belgian government 12 450 145 318 503 36 1,720
Dutch government 9 988 221 845 664 24 2,040
EFSF 66 1,630 345 250 2,800 2 12,200
EIB / KFW 34 3,230 669 1,990 3,900 14 20,000
EIB 16 3,650 922 3,080 3,690 2 12,500
Euro covered bond 571 1,790 108 1,120 2,570 1 28,600
Euro gov’t guaranteed 77 1,890 414 247 3,640 1 14,500
European corporate 394 167 22 41 434 1 4,660
European government 195 2,080 226 1,040 3,160 3 31,900
Finnish government 2 939 901 939 1,270 38 1,840
French covered bond 136 1,230 110 772 1,290 8 7,720
French government 26 1,030 192 726 981 50 3,630
Germany 10 year 118 6,300 771 1,440 8,370 2 40,200
Germany 79 34,400 3,940 21,500 35,000 31 155,000
German Corporate 56 709 145 124 1,090 2 4,850
German KfW / Laender 385 2,090 159 831 3,130 1 24,400
German gov’t guaranteed 50 4,780 632 3,530 4,470 27 19,200
German Jumbo Pfandbrief 289 2,970 211 1,950 3,590 2 22,000
German Laender 179 1,100 131 570 1,750 1 14,000
German Pfandbrief 89 418 81 154 767 1 5,940
KFW 5 6,720 2,680 7870 5,990 287 14,000
Spanish government 5 183 60 128 135 94 420
Other special 589 544 106 59 2570 1 41,400
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics II
This table presents average figures by type of security. For all statistics on bond level, first the number
was calculated for each bond and then the average was calculated. Specialness was calculated as the
volume-weighted average for each bond, and then the average was taken. The sample period is January
01, 2007 to June 30, 2015.
Average figures bond level bond level transaction level bond level bond level
Frequency Specialness Contract Term Amount Outst. Term of bond
total # in % days in EUR mio. years
Agency 219.56 0.29 7.39 2,810 5.92
Austrian government 15.00 NA 11.69 8,190 10.42
Belgian government 3.50 NA 23.69 8,300 7.89
Dutch government 8.00 NA 10.18 14,900 9.39
EFSF 116.26 0.20 7.25 3,400 3.11
EIB / KFW 227.68 0.21 7.01 4,470 7.36
EIB 293.50 0.36 7.13 3420 13.01
Euro covered bond 191.00 0.22 7.48 1,520 7.50
Euro gov’t guaranteed 146.99 0.22 7.27 2,620 7.43
European corporate 24.17 0.30 8.25 1,270 6.54
European government 59.30 0.19 9.56 14,600 13.02
Finnish government 7.50 1.42 13.20 4,750 13.15
French covered bond 164.61 0.24 7.44 1,460 7.79
French government 4.12 0.10 6.07 18,300 5.79
Germany 10 year 69.43 0.11 7.29 10,600 2.50
Germany 343.78 0.15 7.28 17,100 12.22
German corporate 31.20 0.20 14.00 997 6.64
German KfW / Laender 218.53 0.25 7.47 1,560 6.36
German gov’t guaranteed 293.80 0.16 7.23 3,410 6.85
German Jumbo Pfandbrief 350.45 0.22 7.42 1,560 7.05
German Laender 61.83 0.17 9.65 1,050 8.26
German Pfandbrief 66.93 0.35 7.76 451 6.61
KFW 471.40 0.13 7.41 3,800 4.45
Spanish government 1.00 NA 50.60 16,500 17.28
Other special 26.98 0.24 9.25 1,680 7.32
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Period
2007
freq
logvolum
e
diffrate
specialness
freq
logvolum
e
diffrate
specialness
constant
-1.3298***
7.6260***
-1.1767***
1.5144***
-1.1053***
8.8257***
-1.3430***
2.1378***
(0.1448)
(1.0049)
(0.1521)
(0.1531)
(0.3115)
(1.3948)
(0.1595)
(0.2803)
logissuesize
0.0643***
0.3874***
0.0518***
-0.0606***
0.0521***
0.2717***
0.0494***
-0.0574***
(0.0071)
(0.0479)
(0.0072)
(0.0072)
(0.0147)
(0.0665)
(0.0076)
(0.0120)
age
-0.0069***
0.0147
0.0041**
-0.0008
-0.0046*
-0.0464***
0.0004
-0.0023
(0.0013)
(0.0101)
(0.0017)
(0.0016)
(0.0026)
(0.0134)
(0.0017)
(0.0025)
term
0.0038***
0.0124**
-0.0033***
0.0024**
0.0026**
0.0133
-0.0001
-0.0004
(0.0009)
(0.0053)
(0.0009)
(0.0010)
(0.0011)
(0.0097)
(0.0007)
(0.0010)
N
o.
O
bs.
2,773
2,773
2,773
2,425
648
648
648
554
R
-Squared
0.3443
0.3833
0.1085
0.1359
0.1644
0.3739
0.2641
0.1521
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Table 2.4: Fixed effects regressions
This table presents panel regressions. They are estimated with fixed effects on bond level.
freq is the number of transactions in one bond in one day. logvolume is the natural log
of the daily transaction volume in EUR. diffrate is calculated as the difference between the
special repo rate and the effective policy rate. It is the daily volume-weighted average. Until
October 08, 2008, the policy rate is the minimum bid rate in the weekly Eurosystem liquidity
auctions. Thereafter, it is the interest rate on the deposit facility. specialness is equal to
the GC rate - special repo rate. It is the daily volume-weighted average. A definition of the
independent variables can be found in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.1. The regression also includes
as controls the rate on the deposit facility, dummies for quarter-end, year-end, weekdays
and three lags of the future delivery days. Standard errors clustered on bond level are in
parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels.
freq logamount diffrate specialness
constant -0.0616** 0.3734*** 0.1348*** -0.4186***
(0.0312) (0.0426) (0.0093) (0.0326)
belowzero -0.1265*** -0.0047 -0.0254*** -0.0023
(0.0187) (0.0281) (0.0050) (0.0054)
excessliqt−1 -0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0005*** 0.0001***
(0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000)
vstoxxt−1 0.0008 -0.0024*** -0.0116*** 0.0031***
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0003)
cbpp1announce -0.0337 -0.1232 -0.0639*** -0.0960***
(0.0885) (0.1256) (0.0195) (0.0189)
cbpp2announce -0.0137 0.1389 0.0976*** -0.0865***
(0.0794) (0.0918) (0.0180) (0.0174)
cbpp3announce -0.0108 -0.2354* 0.0276 0.0183
(0.0876) (0.1372) (0.0180) (0.0183)
psppannounce -0.2201*** -0.3318** 0.0160 0.0486***
(0.0660) (0.1448) (0.0149) (0.0168)
changecbpp1 -0.1050** -0.0226 -0.1657*** -0.1847***
(0.0509) (0.0698) (0.0142) (0.0126)
changecbpp2 -0.1151 -0.5256*** -0.0945** -0.0580
(0.0837) (0.1245) (0.0451) (0.0527)
changecbpp3 -0.0049 0.0102 0.0106** 0.0038
(0.0114) (0.0195) (0.0044) (0.0046)
changepspp -0.0059*** -0.0011 0.0032*** -0.0028***
(0.0021) (0.0034) (0.0005) (0.0005)
before1year 0.0269 -0.0688* 0.1348*** 0.1654***
(0.0287) (0.0352) (0.0087) (0.0083)
beforeltro1 -0.0830*** -0.0935*** -0.1785*** 0.0785***
(0.0223) (0.0264) (0.0087) (0.0144)
beforeltro2 -0.0146 -0.1082*** -0.1813*** 0.1155***
(0.0197) (0.0264) (0.0051) (0.0069)
fullallot 0.0633* -0.3743*** 0.2247*** 0.5163***
(0.0348) (0.0475) (0.0072) (0.0302)
No. Obs. 254,155 254,155 254,155 116,122
R-Squared 0.0021 0.0069 0.2559 0.1696
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Table 2.5: Robustness check: results of specialness regression with different matching
This table presents panel regressions for different measures of specialness. The regressions are estimated with
fixed effects on bond level. specialness is equal to the GC rate - special repo rate. It is the daily volume-weighted
average on transaction day. The GC rate chosen is the volume-weighted average GC rate of the same type of
security, the same purchase day and the term of one week. If there is no match for a covered bond, the volume-
weighted average GC rate for all covered bonds trading on that day is used. After this matching, the pooled GC
rate for all types of securities is used instead. The first column represents this matching methodology, which is
used in Table 2.4. The second column shows the results of this regression, when only the GC rate of the same
type or the GC rate of covered bonds is used. The third column displays the results for the panel, if only the
GC rate of the same type is taken. The fourth column shows the results for the subsample, for which the GC
pooled rate was applied. The next column displays the results, if the pooled GC rate was used for the whole
sample. The last column uses the one-week Euribor as benchmark, i.e. Euribor - special repo rate (since in
Chapter 1 we show that the GC repo rate and unsecured rate are strongly interconnected). A definition of the
independent variables can be found in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.1. The regression also includes as controls the rate
on the deposit facility, dummies for quarter-end, year-end, weekdays and three lags of the future delivery days.
Standard errors clustered on bond level are in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Benchmark Subsample Subsample Subsample Other match 1 Other match 2
GC Pooled, GC cov, GC Pooled GC Pooled
GC cov, GC rate GC rate GC rate (subsample) (full sample) Euribor
constant -0.4186*** -0.4407*** -0.4650*** -0.4156*** -0.4222*** -0.6271***
(0.0326) (0.0356) (0.0343) (0.0360) (0.0300) (0.0297)
belowzero -0.0023 -0.0205 -0.0038 -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0190***
(0.0054) (0.0136) (0.0164) (0.0056) (0.0054) (0.0050)
excessliqt−1 0.0001*** 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
vstoxxt−1 0.0031*** 0.0056*** 0.0053*** 0.0022*** 0.0029*** 0.0053***
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
cbpp1announce -0.0960*** -0.1063*** -0.0933*** -0.0539***
(0.0189) (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0186)
cbpp2announce -0.0865*** -0.0666*** -0.0799*** 0.0102
(0.0174) (0.0178) (0.0173) (0.0164)
cbpp3announce 0.0183 0.0208 0.0194 0.0177
(0.0183) (0.0179) (0.0182) (0.0165)
psppannounce 0.0486*** 0.1151*** 0.1101*** 0.0499*** 0.0486*** 0.0395
(0.0168) (0.0106) (0.0121) (0.0180) (0.0168) (0.0144)
changecbpp1 -0.1847*** -0.2673*** -0.3053*** -0.1979*** -0.1827*** -0.3629***
(0.0126) (0.0171) (0.0205) (0.0141) (0.0125) (0.0131)
changecbpp2 -0.0580 -0.0743 -0.1530 0.0141 -0.0521 0.2365***
(0.0527) (0.00911) (0.0971) (0.0527) (0.0529) (0.0429)
changecbpp3 0.0038 -0.0077 -0.0117 0.0058 0.0043 0.0041
(0.0046) (0.0134) (0.0159) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0045)
changepspp -0.0028*** -0.0052** -0.0080*** -0.0025*** -0.0028*** -0.0006
(0.0005) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004)
before1year 0.1654*** 0.1209*** 0.1201*** 0.1937*** 0.1675*** 0.1369***
(0.0083) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0083) (0.0083)
beforeltro1 0.0785*** 0.3337*** 0.3337*** 0.0581*** 0.0857*** 0.3260***
(0.0144) (0.0549) (0.0547) (0.0150) (0.0144) (0.0089)
beforeltro2 0.1155*** 0.2250*** 0.1989*** 0.0947*** 0.1099*** 0.1809***
(0.0069) (0.0211) (0.0206) (0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0054)
fullallot 0.5163*** 0.5026*** 0.5312*** 0.5274*** 0.5210*** 0.7270***
(0.0302) (0.0382) (0.0380) (0.0329) (0.0302) (0.0275)
No. Obs. 116,122 26,179 23,283 92,850 116,122 253,820
R-Squared 0.1696 0.202 0.2051 0.1578 0.1682 0.3469
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Table 2.6: Change to a negative policy rate
This table presents panel regressions estimated around the date of switch to a negative policy rate, June
11, 2014. They are run with fixed effects on bond level. The sample only contains bonds that are
traded before and after the switch to a negative rate and that mature after September 11, 2014. The
independent variable of interest is belowzero, a dummy variable that is equal to zero starting the day
of June 11, 2014. freq is the number of transactions in one bond in one day. logvolume is the natural
log of the daily transaction volume in EUR. diffrate is calculated as the daily volume-weighted average
difference between the special repo rate and the effective policy rate. Until October 08, 2008, the effective
policy rate is the minimum bid rate in the weekly ECB liquidity auctions. Thereafter, it is the interest
rate on the deposit facility. specialness is equal to the GC rate - special repo rate. It is the daily volume-
weighted average. A definition of the independent variables can be found in sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.1. The
regression also includes dummies for quarter-end, weekdays and three lags of the future delivery days.
Standard errors clustered on bond level are in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Panel A 11.05.-11.07.2014
freq logvolume diffrate specialness
constant 0.1643 0.3960** -0.0717*** 0.3709***
(0.1422) (0.1714) (0.0208) (0.0453)
belowzero -0.0492 -0.0786** -0.0132** -0.0383***
(0.0347) (0.0374) (0.0062) (0.0091)
vstoxxt−1 0.0010 -0.0112 0.0081*** -0.0077***
(0.0095) (0.0107) (0.0013) (0.0021)
excessliqt−1 -0.0014*** -0.0006 -0.0004*** -0.0005***
No. Obs. 6,135 6,135 6,135 2,399
R-Squared 0.0135 0.0180 0.0104 0.0227
Panel B 11.04.-11.08.2014
constant 0.2193** 0.3539*** 0.0070 0.2566***
(0.1005) (0.1212) (0.0090) (0.0261)
belowzero -0.1018*** -0.1155*** -0.0172*** -0.0663***
(0.0346) (0.0371) (0.0059) (0.0077)
vstoxxt−1 -0.0024 -0.0033 0.0016** -0.0006
(0.0055) (0.0066) (0.0006) (0.0013)
excessliqt−1 -0.0013*** -0.0012*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0001)
No. Obs. 11,363 11,363 11,363 4,274
R-Squared 0.0150 0.0149 0.0030 0.0394
Panel C 11.03.-11.09.2014
constant 0.3096*** 0.3941*** 0.0126 0.3082***
(0.0899) (0.1114) (0.0128) (0.0228)
belowzero -0.1147*** -0.1471*** -0.0118** -0.0698***
(0.0305) (0.0361) (0.0051) (0.0055)
vstoxxt−1 -0.0090* -0.0088 0.0004 -0.0034***
(0.0047) (0.0060) (0.0008) (0.0012)
excessliqt−1 -0.0011*** -0.0009** -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0001)
No. Obs. 17,808 17,808 17,808 5,859
R-Squared 0.0110 0.0103 0.0008 0.0428
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Table 2.7: Differential effect
This table presents panel regressions estimated around the date of switch to a negative policy rate, June
11, 2014. They are run with fixed effects on bond level. The sample only contains bonds that are
traded before and after the switch to a negative rate and that mature after September 11, 2014. The
independent variable of interest is belowzero, a dummy variable that is equal to zero starting the day of
June 11, 2014. Each cell reports the coefficient on belowzero. The regression also includes the lagged
VSTOXX, the lagged excess liquidity, dummies for quarter-end, weekdays, and three lags of the future
delivery days. freq is the number of transactions in one bond in one day. logvolume is the natural log of the
daily transaction volume in EUR. diffrate is calculated as the daily volume-weighted average difference
between the special repo rate and the effective policy rate. Until October 08, 2008, the policy rate is the
minimum bid rate in the weekly Eurosystem liquidity auctions. Thereafter, it is the interest rate on the
deposit facility. specialness is equal to the GC rate - special repo rate. It is the daily volume-weighted
average. Standard errors clustered on bond level are in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
meanrate>median (bond) meanrate≤median (bond)
freq freq
11.05.-11.07.2014 -0.0207 -0.0811
(0.0476) (0.0511)
11.04.-11.08.2014 -0.1009* -0.1060**
(0.0516) (0.0416)
11.03.-11.09.2014 -0.0931** -0.1478***
(0.0425) (0.0407)
logvolume logvolume
11.05.-11.07.2014 -0.1137** -0.0301
(0.0514) (0.0547)
11.04.-11.08.2014 -0.1786*** -0.0337
(0.0504) (0.0547)
11.03.-11.09.2014 -0.2194*** -0.0425
(0.0489) (0.0522)
diffrate diffrate
11.05.-11.07.2014 -0.0314*** 0.0092
(0.0061) (0.0114)
11.04.-11.08.2014 -0.0353*** 0.0072
(0.0026) (0.0135)
11.03.-11.09.2014 -0.0322*** 0.0183
(0.0023) (0.0116)
specialness specialness
11.05.-11.07.2014 -0.0085 -0.0735***
(0.0066) (0.0185)
11.04.-11.08.2014 -0.0474*** -0.0940***
(0.0035) (0.0184)
11.03.-11.09.2014 -0.0519*** -0.0991***
(0.0031) (0.0130)
3 Frictions in the Interbank Market: Evi-
dence from Volumes
3.1 Introduction
Recently it has become clear that the interbank market functions less well than one may
have thought prior to the crisis. Given the fact that liquidity positions by banks matter
for their bidding at Eurosystem’s auctions (Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev, 2009), it
suggests that liquidity allocation in the interbank market is often not perfectly efficient.
In understanding the function of the interbank market it is important to note that it
consists of several segments, i.e. the unsecured and the secured market, and as a fallback
option there are the standing facilities by the Eurosystem (spearheaded by the European
Central Bank).1 The interbank market has to function well for the efficient distribution of
liquidity, insuring banks against liquidity shocks such as large deposit withdrawals (Bhat-
tacharay and Gale, 1987).2 Frictions may impede the efficient reallocation of liquidity in
the interbank market, resulting in liquidity shortages to banks and potentially ending in
insolvencies (Rochet and Vives, 2004). The preeminent friction in the interbank market
is aggregate credit risk in the banking sector. This goes hand in hand with the uncer-
tainty about the credit risk of a single bank (Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen, 2015). A
less known friction than credit risk is short squeezing (Nyborg and Strebulaev, 2004), i.e.
banks that are short of funds being squeezed by other banks. In addition, the interbank
market is exposed to conditions in other financial markets (e.g. stock market) in which
banks trade their assets (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Overall, frictions may cause
allocational inefficiencies in the interbank market: despite aggregate sufficient liquidity,
banks who need the liquidity the most are not able to obtain it or just at very high costs.
Understanding these frictions and their impact on liquidity allocation in the interbank
market, especially in different periods of stress, is therefore important. If a friction lowers
trading activity in the interbank market or raises volumes at the standing facilities, this
1As an alternative to the interbank market banks can access the standing facilities to obtain or deposit
liquidity at the Eurosystem (spearheaded by the ECB) at a cost (Section 3.3.1). The ECB decides on
monetary policy measures that are implemented by the Eurosystem, which comprises of the national
central banks and the ECB.
2The interbank market is also important as channel for the distribution of credit to companies, and
thus may affect the cost of capital to firms (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995), but this function is not the
focus here.
106 Frictions
suggests that the allocation works less smoothly. In this paper I analyze the impact
of frictions on traded volumes in two segments of the interbank market and the use of
the Eurosystem standing facilities. In addition, I provide several stylized facts of what
happened during the crisis in the European interbank market. The two segments examined
are the overnight unsecured market (Eonia)3 and one electronic overnight secured market
(GC Pooling). Transactions in GC Pooling are operated on Eurex Repo’s trading platform
and cleared by the Central Counterparty (CCP) Eurex Clearing. The use of the standing
facilities reflect the general state of the interbank market and thus complement the analysis
of the secured and unsecured market. The time period studied is March 17, 2004 to
November 30, 2011. This includes the financial crisis, in which the impact of frictions
changes due to banks becoming more alert to risks in financial markets and the switch in
the Eurosystem’s institutional framework to full allotment, i.e. the Eurosystem injects as
much liquidity as banks demand.
The frictions that are important in this setting (in Section 3.2) are squeezing, credit
risk, uncertainty about a single bank’s risk, and expected volatility in the stock mar-
ket. Interbank market data as well as the data for friction measures were retrieved from
Bloomberg. Data on Eurosystem liquidity operations, reserve maintenance periods and
the use of the standing facilities was obtained from the ECB webpage. In addition, I
study the effect of institutional factors, since they affect banks’ supply and demand for
interbank market exposures.
The Eurosystem’s operational framework for monetary policy shapes the Euro area
interbank market. It displays several calendar day regularities that have been studied so
far primarily in rates (Hamilton (1996) in the US, Fecht, Nyborg, and Rocholl (2008),
Nautz and Offermanns (2008) in the Euro area). Munyan (2015) documents seasonality
in repo volumes at quarter- and year-end in the US, which are also accounted for in this
study. Likewise, which is explored in this paper, trading volumes display patterns that
stem from the Eurosystem institutional framework and end-of-quarter effects. A study of
those calendar day effects helps to better understand the role of the interbank market in
banks’ liquidity management and the importance of regulations on liquidity allocation in
the interbank market.
As a first step, I run daily time series regressions of volumes on dummy variables
capturing calendar day effects. Three time periods are considered, before the crisis (March
17, 2004, – July 31, 2007), first stage of the crisis (August 09, 2007 – September 12, 2008)
and after full allotment (October 09, 2008 – November 30, 2011). I find evidence that
there are calendar day effects stemming from the periodicity of the Eurosystem’s liquidity
operations in Eonia volumes and in the use of the standing facilities, i. e. volumes increase
3Eonia denotes the overnight unsecured interbank interest rate. My focus is on volumes and when
referring to the Eonia market I mean the volumes traded overnight.
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on the last days of the maintenance period.4 There is a strong end-of quarter effect
in volumes, i.e. interbank market volumes, Eonia and GC Pooling, are lower, whereas
volumes at the standing facilities (except for the period of full allotment) are higher.
This is due to balance sheet reporting at the end of the quarter (Gropp and Heider,
2010). Trading activity at the end of maintenance period changes during the sample
period. Before the start of the crisis, there is higher interbank activity at the end of the
maintenance period, but also high volumes at the standing facilities, which implies that
there is demand and supply for liquidity that does not meet in the interbank market,
which is allocationally not efficient. Due to a more accommodative liquidity stance by
the Eurosystem, calendar day effects in the last week of the maintenance period weaken
in the first stage of the crisis. The change to full allotment by the Eurosystem reverses
this effect as compared to the pre-crisis period. At the end of the maintenance period,
volumes at the standing facilities and in the Eonia market are lower (and unchanged for
GC Pooling). This analysis reveals that trading patterns in the interbank market strongly
depend on institutional factors. At the end of the quarter, banks typically avoid interbank
market exposures. The end-of-maintenance period effect depends on the supply of central
bank liquidity. The more accommodative the supply is, the lower is the risk of a lack of
liquidity, and the need to trade in the interbank market.
The analysis of frictions is set within the framework of the Eurosystem monetary
operations to accurately capture the links between volumes and frictions. Daily volumes
and friction measures are transformed into weekly averages ranging from one liquidity
providing monetary auction to the next one. The sample spans the same time periods
as the calendar day regressions (March 17, 2004 – November 30, 2011), but the only
breakpoint used in this analysis is the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent
switch to full allotment. I perform time series regressions of volumes on my measures of
frictions.
Before Lehman, I find evidence for the impact of frictions on the allocational efficiency
of the interbank market. Volumes react to frictions, pointing towards disruptions in the
interbank market. Credit risk raises volumes in both of the analyzed segments of the
interbank market, Eonia and GC Pooling. Given that both markets are overnight, this
is possibly due to shifts in volumes from long-term to short-term maturities in interbank
loans, implying that long-term loans are reduced (European Central Bank 2008). There is
also evidence for market segmentation in the unsecured market, which has lower volume
when the market is able to differentiate between riskier and safer banks. Before Lehman,
the expected volatility in the stock market positively affects the use of the standing facil-
ities, in particular the deposit facility, and trading in GC Pooling, supporting the notion
4The reserve maintenance period has a length of four to six weeks, and is the period, in which banks
have to fulfill their reserve requirements, as determined by the Eurosystem (European Central Bank
2002).
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of precautionary liquidity hoarding (Acharya and Merrouche, 2012) and the necessity to
trade in an anonymous market. Squeezing never materializes because the Eurosystem
allocates more credit when banks bid more aggressively. Interest rate spreads actually
tend to decrease after an aggressively bid auction.
In the period of full allotment, the impact of frictions on interbank market volumes
should be minimal, since the Eurosystem now provides unlimited liquidity.5 There is evi-
dence, though, of a significant impact of credit risk and market segmentation on volumes.
Standing facilities react to credit risk, and the lending facility positively to expected
volatility. A rise in credit risk is followed by a larger liquidity uptake in the next Eurosys-
tem’s monetary operation. All of the latter imply that precautionary liquidity hoarding
still seems to play a role and the overall availability of bank loans has decreased. In the
GC Pooling market, trading volume reacts positively to the uncertainty about a bank’s
risk, but reactions to any other friction measure cannot be observed. This indicates that
in this period banks identified as riskier may still lose access to some funding sources and
thus obtain more liquidity from GC Pooling, which allows for anonymous trading. All in
all, the impact of frictions on trading in the interbank market is still strong, also after the
unlimited supply provided by the Eurosystem, implying that this supply of central bank
money is necessary.
In general, volumes tend to shift from risky markets to less risky markets in each
period. At first, maturities in the interbank market are shortened (European Central Bank
2008), so volumes in the overnight interbank market rise. After the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, volumes in the unsecured market are lower and higher in GC Pooling. When
credit risk rises in this period, volumes shift towards the deposit facility. As stated above,
the sensitivity of banks towards risk has increased after Lehman Brothers. So despite the
Eurosystem’s liquidity insurance, banks’ reaction towards risk can still be observed. This
shows that if there are severe frictions in the interbank market, it is difficult to alleviate
these solely by central bank liquidity. The functioning of the interbank market depends
on the financial health of its participants.
This paper is directly linked to the strand of literature that deals with the character-
istics of the interbank market. One of the main building blocks of my analysis is Hei-
der, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2015)’s model on the unsecured interbank market. Other
models on the interbank market exist, which explain its features (Freixas and Jorge, 2008;
Hauck and Neyer, 2014; Heider and Hoerova, 2009). Empirical evidence on the interbank
market is provided by Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar (2011), Copeland, Martin, and Walker
(2014) and Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2014) in the US, and by Abbassi, Bräuning,
Fecht, and Peydró (2014) and Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer (2016) in Europe.
5In this period the hypothesis of squeezing cannot be studied because the Eurosystem has abandoned
its liquidity-neutral policy (Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev, 2002), i.e. it injects only the amount of
liquidity allows banks to fulfill on average their reserve requirements during the maintenance period.
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The latter find that the repo platform GC Pooling acts as a risk buffer in times of stress.
The stabilizing role of the repo market is predicted by Heider and Hoerova (2009)’s model.
The role of GC Pooling as reliable liquidity source is confirmed in my results. Further,
I show that trading in an anonymous repo market becomes attractive when volatility in
the stock market rises. Dunne, Fleming, and Zholos (2013) study the link between Eu-
rosystem auction and interbank market activity. They use data on BrokerTec, another
European repo trading platform. They find substitution between central bank and repo
liquidity in the Euro area before the change to full allotment, but not afterwards. This
stands in contrast to my results, but their database is different from mine. Moreover, I
combine the analysis of the secured overnight market with the analysis of the unsecured
market and the use of the standing facilities.
In addition to papers investigating developments of the interbank market during the
crisis, this paper is related to the strand of literature that studies the characteristics of
the repo market. The first important contribution to repo markets is made by Duffie
(1996). He develops a model that connects the prices of bonds to their repo specialness.
Specialness will increase their prices, ceteris paribus. Further contributions to the de-
terminants of the repo rate are made by Jordan and Jordan (1997), Bartolini, Hilton,
Sundaresan, and Tonetti (2011) and Buraschi and Menini (2001). There is a discussion
about the role of repo during the financial crisis. Gorton and Metrick (2011) argue that
there has been a run on repo, which is disputed by Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov
(2014). Copeland, Martin, and Walker (2014) find systematic differences between runs in
the bilateral and the triparty repo market. The model by Martin, Skeie, and von Thadden
(2014) contributes to this discussion, showing in a model based on Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) that the bilateral repo market is more robust than the triparty market in the US.
One feature of banks during the financial crisis is liquidity hoarding„ which also features
in my analysis. Liquidity hoarding is predicted by Caballero and Simsek (2010)’s model
on the complexity in the financial sector. Empirical evidence is provided by Acharya
and Merrouche (2012) who study the liquidity management of banks in the UK before
and during the financial crisis. They find that during the crisis banks started to hoard
liquidity, which also led to an increase in overnight interbank rates.
This paper further contributes to the literature on financial stability and financial
markets’ connectedness starting with Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), who look at the inter-
action of credit limits and asset prices. They find that small shocks can have perturbing
effects on output and asset prices via feedback loops. In this respect, Holmstrom and
Tirole (1998) discover that the government has a role in stabilizing asset markets. Dia-
mond and Rajan (2011) create a model, in which banks start hoarding liquidity to protect
themselves from potential asset fire sales.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following way. Section II develops the main
hypotheses. Section III gives background information on the structure of the interbank
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market and its exposure to the Eurosystem monetary operations. Section IV describes the
data used for the analysis and provides summary statistics on those. Section V lays out
the empirical analysis and its results. and Section VI concludes. The Appendix contains
a description of trading in GC Pooling.
3.2 Hypotheses development
The basis for the following analysis is the emergence of allocational inefficiencies in the
interbank market. Frictions can lead to allocational inefficiencies by inhibiting the flow of
liquidity to banks, who need it the most. Institutional factors can also be a constraint for
an efficient liquidity allocation, as they influence banks’ preferences for interbank market
exposures. The empirical evidence on regularities in the interbank market and the theory
on frictions provide the basis for the following five hypotheses. They predict how and
which regularities and frictions (i.e. short squeezing, credit risk and uncertainty about a
bank’s risk, link to other financial markets) affect volumes in the interbank market and
the standing facilities. Therefore, if liquidity was allocated perfectly in the interbank
market, the use of the standing facilities would always be close to zero, and interbank
market volumes would not react to calendar day effects or frictions. The hypotheses
mainly relate to the period before the policy break in the ECB/ Eurosystem monetary
policy stance, the switch to full allotment. Full allotment shifts the allocation of liquidity
completely to the Eurosystem, which is captured in the last hypothesis.
Interbank market rates and market activity are affected by the institutional frame-
work and balance sheet reporting by banks. Evidence for the impact of the institutional
framework on the Eonia rate is found by Nautz and Offermanns (2008), which often jumps
at the end of the maintenance period.6 That is a sign for strong imbalances at the end
of the maintenance period. This will lead most likely to more volume in the interbank
market as well as at the standing facilities, since banks must ensure to fulfill their reserve
requirements. This means that they trade more for liquidity. At the same time banks
demand more from the Eurosystem as it might be more difficult to find a cash lender,
since all banks must first be certain that they are able to meet their reserve requirements
themselves, before they lend money. Moreover, balance sheet reporting days create sub-
optimal behavior in the interbank market for liquidity. Banks want to polish their balance
sheets on reporting days and lower their interbank market activity. This restricts optimal
liquidity allocation in the market, forcing banks to access the standing facilities more
often on these days. Munyan (2015) indeed shows that end-of-quarter and end-of-year
effects have a significant negative impact on repo market activity in the US.
6The Eurosystem institutional setting is explained in detail in Section 3.3.
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Hypothesis 1. Trades in the interbank market as well as volumes at the Eurosystem
standing facilities increase at the end of the maintenance period and decrease at the end
of reporting cycles.
The idea of squeezing is advanced by Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) who show that
the strategic behavior of short and long banks in multi-unit auctions is the result of their
interactions in the secondary market for liquidity, which in turn impacts this market.
Banks who are in need of liquidity submit higher bids in the auction, since they might
have to pay elevated prices in the secondary market set by the bank long in liquidity
exercising its market power. This incentivizes long banks to also bid more aggressively
to implement a squeeze thereafter, which will be easier the more liquidity the short bank
is lacking. Higher bidding aggressiveness can thus be linked to a higher potential and
a higher probability for a squeeze. The potential for a squeeze may lead to unexpected
allocations (some banks get more than expected, others get less), leading to a higher
use of the standing facilities (Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev, 2009). Because a large
potential for a short squeeze is associated with large imbalances of reserves among banks
going into refinancing operations, we might also expect to see more trading in the after
market. This is because imbalances may persist due to the discriminatory format of the
auctions as shown by Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004).
Hypothesis 2. The potential of short squeezing leads to an increase in the use of the
standing facilities and in interbank volumes after the auction.
Empirical evidence for short squeezing in the interbank market is provided by Bindseil,
Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2009) and Fecht, Nyborg, and Rocholl (2011) by using Eurosys-
tem auction bidding data. I complement their results by looking at traded volumes in the
interbank market.
[insert Figure 3.1 about here]
The friction perceived to be predominant in the interbank market is credit risk, as
modeled by Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2015) for the unsecured market.7 Following
a similar argument as Akerlof (1970), the equilibrium in the interbank market depends on
the average level of credit risk in the market as well as the dispersion of banks around this
level. Every single bank’s credit risk is private knowledge. In the case that the level of
credit risk is low, all banks participate in the market. If credit risk is high and dispersion
7Credit risk has always been an integral component of the interbank market, as one can observe from
the one-week interbank interest rate spread, which is defined as the difference between the unsecured
rate, Euribor, and the OIS rate, Eonia swap rate. On average the Euribor was 2.71 basis points (bps)
above the Eonia swap rate in the years before the crisis (see Figure 3.1).
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among banks is low (zero in the extreme case), a high interest rate will be charged to all
banks. If credit risk is high and dispersion is high, good banks will leave the interbank
market as they find better funding opportunities. If credit risk is so high, that it cannot
be compensated by the interest rate, the interbank market will stop working completely,
or rather there will be severe credit rationing. Better information can mitigate the adverse
selection problem. The easier it is to single out good banks, the better one can differentiate
in the unsecured interbank market. Good banks receive a lower interest rate, whereas bad
banks must pay a high interest rate and/or are credit rationed.
The adverse selection argument only refers to the unsecured interbank market. In the
repo market the problem should be less severe, because loans are secured against collat-
eral. Especially repo trading via a CCP provides protection, as trading is anonymous
and the CCP becomes the counterparty to each trade. If banks refrain from trading in
the unsecured market, they will likely switch to the repo market. If credit risk is so high
that it impairs trading in both markets, banks will mainly use the standing facilities for
managing their liquidity position.
Hypothesis 3. When the average level of credit risk is elevated, trades will decrease
in the unsecured and increase in the secured market. When credit risk is very high, less
trades will occur in both the unsecured and secured market and there is a higher use of the
standing facilities. A high observable dispersion in credit risk leads to market segmenta-
tion: it lowers trades in the unsecured market and raises trades in the secured market.
The expected effects of credit risk and observable dispersion are similar, but the inter-
pretation of both effects is different. Credit risk leads to adverse selection in the interbank
market, so that the good banks leave. Instead, if there is high observable dispersion of
credit risk among banks, it might be easier to identify and shut out bad banks, as in this
case their individual distributions of credit risk are less likely to overlap.
The interbank market is not isolated, but linked to other financial markets. Nyborg
and Östberg (2014) show that tensions in the interbank market lead to increasing traded
volume of highly liquid stocks. In the same vein, liquidity conditions in other security
markets may spill over to the interbank market. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show
in their model that market and funding liquidity is linked. Assume that Bank A pro-
vides funding liquidity to a speculator in stocks by means of a collateralized loan, e.g.
a repo or stock lending transaction. Bank A manages its own liquidity position in the
interbank market, and adjusts margins based on its expectations of future prices and
volatility. If expected stock market volatility goes up, Bank A raises margins, as well as
all other banks from which the speculator receives funding. He might find it now very
difficult to fulfill all margin requirements. Knowing that Bank A has a close relationship
to that speculator, it is now perceived as riskier in the interbank market. Thus, it might
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have to pay a premium and/or is credit rationed. In order to avoid that Bank A turns to
the repo market, ideally with anonymous trading, or to the Eurosystem standing facilities.
Hypothesis 4. Higher stock market volatility leads to a higher use of the secured inter-
bank market as well as the standing facilities and a decrease in the unsecured volumes.
Frictions only impact the interbank market, as long as this is the main platform to
reallocate liquidity. This role changes after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, when the
Eurosystem changes the monetary policy stance, switching to full allotment. The Eu-
rosystem becomes the main supplier of liquidity. Thus, the case of very high credit risk
in Hypothesis 3 is actively counteracted by the Eurosystem. If the full allotment policy
works, there should be no detectable impact of frictions in volumes.
Hypothesis 5. After the switch to full allotment, frictions do not impact the market for
liquidity.
With the Eurosystem being the main provider of liquidity, its allocation foregoes
market efficiency. However, this ensures that the liquidity supply to some banks does
not dry up, which can be caused by frictions. As I will analyze in Section 3.5 frictions
may inhibit a smooth liquidity allocation in the interbank market. First, the institutional
details of the Eurosystem and the interbank market are discussed in the next section.
3.3 Institutional background
This section provides an overview of the structure of the interbank market, the weekly
liquidity operations by the Eurosystem since March 2004, and the data that I will use.
This will form the basis for the empirical analysis in Section 3.5.
3.3.1 The interbank market and the Eurosystem Open Market
Operations
The interbank market can be divided into the unsecured and secured market. Transactions
in the secured market are called repurchase agreements (repo). The cash receiver in a
repo transaction sells securities to the cash provider and promises to buy them back after
an agreed term at a fixed price plus interest (repo rate). The unsecured market has
the advantage of requiring little infrastructure and is built on trust between banks. The
repo market, in which loans are backed by securities, is considered to be safer. There
are different tenors for loans: overnight, tomorrow/next, one week and longer maturities.
The Eonia market is the European unsecured overnight market, whose volumes are part
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of the analysis. The unsecured overnight interest rate, the Eonia, is calculated as the
daily average weighted rate of the overnight transactions of 43 panel banks who report
their total trade volume and their average rate to the ECB. The average amount traded
in the Eonia market in June 2014 amounts to EUR 27 billion.
One secured market, which I will use as counterpart to Eonia, is GC Pooling. In
General Collateral (GC) repo the main motive is cash funding, so that the security ex-
changed serves as collateral. GC denotes the fact that the securities in a repo trade have
to meet certain criteria and the cash taker can choose, which securities he wants to use as
collateral. The total European repo market (see Figure 3.1) amounts to ca. EUR 5,500
billion in December 2013 (about twice the size of France’s GDP).
GC Pooling, a market operated by Eurex Repo, allows anonymous electronic repo
trading in standardized GC baskets. In this paper, I analyze trading in the ECB basket,
which is the first GC Pooling basket that Eurex Repo introduced in 2005. This basket
entails about 7,500 securities, of which 2,500 are issued by central banks, governments,
and supranationals, and roughly 5,000 securities by credit institutions and agency credit
institutions. The lowest possible rating is A-/A3. Any counterparty risk is eliminated in
GC Pooling, because all trades are cleared by the CCP Eurex Clearing. In June 2014,
about EUR 14 billion were traded on a daily basis in the GC Pooling overnight segment.
The total daily average outstanding volume in GC Pooling is EUR 181 billion (including
all maturities).
The interbank market is directly influenced by the Eurosystem Open Market Opera-
tions (OMO), which constitutes the primary market for liquidity, whereas the interbank
market is the secondary market (Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev, 2009). The ECB
follows a liquidity neutral policy (Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev, 2002), i.e. the Eu-
rosystem distributes as much credit as banks need to fulfill their reserve requirements
during the maintenance period, which are set by the Eurosystem.8 The OMOs contain
Main Refinancing Operations (MROs) and Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO).
MROs have a short maturity, whereas LTROs provide financing for three months. Since
March 10, 2004, the Eurosystem carries out weekly MROs, in which it distributes loans
to banks with a maturity of one week. The last MRO with a term of two weeks matures
on March 17, 2004. Until October 08, 2008 it uses variable tender auctions, which are
executed as discriminatory auctions. In the first stage of the crisis, it applies a policy of
frontloading, which allows banks to obtain sufficient liquidity early in the maintenance
period.9 As a result of the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 and its
8The fulfillment of reserve requirements forces banks to deposit liquidity on their current account at
the Eurosystem. This amount of liquidity has to be on average equal to their level of reserve requirements.
This system is in place, so that banks need to participate in the Eurosystem OMOs (European Central
Bank, 2002).
9Jean-Charles Trichet explains the policy of frontloading in his speech delivered at the ’European
Banker of the Year 2007’ award ceremony on September 30, 2008.
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disruptive impact on financial markets, the Eurosystem adopts a full allotment policy, in
which it satisfies the total liquidity demand by banks, i.e. they hand out as many loans as
demanded against collateral at a fixed interest rate. In addition, the Eurosystem injects
credit using LTROs with a maturity of one year. The first one-year LTRO is settled
on June 25, 2009 and matures on July 01, 2010 with a volume of EUR 442 billion. In
December 2011 the first three-year LTRO is implemented.
The procedure for the MRO auctions is as follows: one day before the auction, the ECB
announces the specific terms of the auction including the benchmark allotment, i.e. the
amount they intend to allocate to banks during the auction. Banks have to submit their
bids until 9:30am. The results of the auction are announced the same day at 11:15am.
Credits are handed out against eligible collateral and are settled one day after the auction.
On average 322 banks take part in the MRO auctions in the time period analyzed.
The maintenance period, during which banks have to meet their reserve requirements,
lasts about one month and usually ends on a Tuesday. Occasionally, it may also end on a
Monday or Wednesday. The Minimum Bid Rate (MBR) for those auctions is determined
by the ECB and is framed by the rates of the standing facilities. The standing facilities
can be used by banks to deposit or obtain liquidity on an overnight basis, the last liquidity
resort for banks. Usually banks avoid using these standing facilities, as the interest rates
in the interbank market are more beneficial for borrowers and lenders. From April 09,
1999 until May 12, 2009 the rate on the lending facility is 100 bps higher than the MBR
and the rate on the deposit facility is 100 bps lower.10 The Eurosystem cannot perfectly
predict banks’ liquidity needs. At the end of the maintenance period it either allocates
too little or too much liquidity, which is the main driver of the use of the standing facilities
in this week. Any excess or deficit liquidity is also reflected in the interbank overnight
interest rate, which is expected to be close or equal to the MBR in the auction. On
average the Eonia exceeds the MBR by only six bps from March 17, 2004 to June 30,
2007, but at the end of the maintenance period deviations are often more sizable as can
be seen by the spikes in Figure 3.6 (also see Chapter 1 for a detailed analysis of Eonia
spikes).
3.4 Data and descriptive statistics
In this section I describe the main variables of the analysis and provide summary statistics.
The discussion will highlight some developments that take place in the interbank market
before and during the financial crisis.
For analyzing the question of calendar day patterns and the sensitivity of the interbank
market to frictions, I use two different data sources, data published on the ECB webpage
10The band around the MBR is then lowered to 75 bps.
116 Frictions
and Bloomberg. The sample spans the period from March 17, 2004 to November 30, 2011,
one month before the Eurosystem implements the first three-year LTRO. The liquidity
injection by this LTRO leads to a sizeable decrease of interbank volumes (Figure 3.3),
rendering the interbank market dispensable.11 The analysis, therefore focuses on the
period before. There are three subperiods that are of interest. The first period ranges
from March 17, 2004 until the end of June 2007, which is before the crisis. The second
period starts August 09, 2007 and runs until the week before the collapse of Lehman
Brothers (until September 12, 2008).12 The last period starts with the introduction of
full allotment by the Eurosystem on October 09, 2008 and ends November 30, 2011.
The endogenous variables consist of interbank market volume data and the use of the
Eurosystem standing facilities. The exogenous variables capture calendar day effects
and potential sources of frictions. First endogenous variables are described, and their
descriptive statistics are discussed. Then I move to the presentation of the exogenous
variables.
[insert Figure 3.3 about here]
Endogenous variables. The dataset is composed of daily volumes at the standing
facilities (Standing fac., Deposit fac., Lending fac.), which was retrieved from data pub-
lished by the ECB on liquidity conditions in the Euro area. In addition, I retrieved data
on daily volumes and interest rates on the unsecured overnight market Eonia and the
secured CCP market GC Pooling from Bloomberg (Eonia, GC Pooling), which obtains
GC Pooling data from Eurex Repo. The Eonia data begins in 2004, whereas the GC
Pooling data is only available since June 01, 2007. The Eonia volume is analyzed for all
periods and GC Pooling volumes for the crisis periods13.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide summary statistics on those volumes for each period: pre-
crisis, first stage of the crisis and full allotment (in Panel A, B, and C). Volume statistics
are complemented by statistics on the benchmark allotment (retrieved from the ECB),
which is the liquidity neutral amount the Eurosystem intends to allocate in the MRO. It
is announced one day ahead and the Eurosystem may deviate from this amount in the
auction, if it updates its estimates of this amount. The statistics on the deviation are also
displayed in this table as well as the friction measures, which are discussed subsequently.
[insert Tables 3.2 and 3.3 about here]
11In the two three-year LTROs settled on December 22, 2011 and March 01, 2012 a total of EUR 1
trillion in credits are distributed to banks, which dampens activity in the interbank market to a very low
level.
12On August 07, 2007 BNP Paribas closes two funds related to subprime mortgages, so that markets
starts to realize that there is a severe problem. The difference between the one-week Euribor and the
one-week Eonia Swap spread increases from 1 basis point to 15 bps on August 09, 2007.
13Since GC Pooling was introduced in 2005, its volume has reached a considerable size only in 2007.
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In the pre-crisis period (Table 3.2, Panel A), the Eurosystem standing facilities are used
only to a limited extent. The daily volume average is EUR 359 million. In comparison,
EUR 39,000 million are traded in the unsecured overnight market on a daily basis. The
overnight GC Pooling market is still small, about 10% of the Eonia market with an average
volume of EUR 3,300 million. The average deviation from the benchmark allotment in
the MROs is EUR 760 million, which confirms that the Eurosystem follows a liquidity
neutral policy (Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev, 2002).
During the first stage of the crisis (Table 3.3, Panel B), one can observe changes in
the analyzed volumes. The use of the standing facilities increases to about EUR 739
million per day. This is driven by an increased use of the deposit facility, by about EUR
370 million, whereas the average use of the lending facility only increases by EUR 11
million. In the overnight interbank market, volumes increase as well, in the Eonia market
by about 25% to EUR 52,000 million and in GC Pooling by more than 100% to EUR 7,000
million, as it is still a growing market. The higher use of the deposit facility points reflects
liquidity hoarding and volumes that are not reallocated in the interbank market. Despite
this, there are also higher volumes in the Eonia and GC Pooling market, both overnight.
This may be explained by a shift from long to shorter maturities, as term markets become
more illiquid (European Central Bank 2008). Another important point to note is that
the average deviation from the benchmark allotment increases from EUR 1,000 million
to EUR 25,100 million in this period, with a maximum of EUR 217,000 million. This
is allegedly the result of the Eurosystem’s new policy of frontloading, so that banks can
fulfill their reserve requirements early. The Eonia – MBR spread (see Figure 3.6) stays
positive, which suggests that the Eurosystem does not completely abandon its liquidity
neutral policy.
[insert Figure 3.4 about here]
After the collapse of Lehman, when full allotment is introduced (Table 3.3 Panel C),
tensions in the interbank market become severe. Volumes at the standing facilities shoot
up to an average of EUR 119,000 million (Figure 3.4), which is the result of an excessive
use of the deposit facility (mean of EUR 117,110 million). The use of the lending facility
also rises, but to a smaller extent with an average amount of EUR 1,401 million. Volumes
in the unsecured interbank market decline to an average of EUR 35,490 million, whereas
volumes in GC Pooling increase to EUR 9,564 million. The large volume at the deposit
facility is the consequence of the unlimited liquidity supply by the Eurosystem that is ap-
parently used as substitute for interbank market liquidity. The total outstanding liquidity
from Eurosystem monetary policy operations is higher than before, EUR 633,000 million.
In combination with an increased use of the lending facility it points to strong problems
in the interbank market. It seems that several banks have completely lost access and thus
resort to Eurosystem liquidity and its standing facilities. GC Pooling market volume sees
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an increase due to its safe trading mechanism, whereas the Eonia market loses volume,
as unsecured loans are considered too risky to hand out. So it is vital to analyze the
development of the frictions in the interbank market.
Exogenous variables. They are composed of measures for frictions and calendar day
effects. Calendar day effects (Hypothesis 1) are captured by dummy variables. I control
for daily (Weekday), end-of-the-quarter(DumQtr) and last week of the maintenance period
(Endres) effects. Information on the maintenance period and dates of the Open Market
Operations were retrieved from the ECB website.14
The first friction measure is bidding aggressiveness (Bidag), the variable for short
squeezing (Hypothesis 2), whose data was collected from the ECB website, in particular
the dates of the auctions, the weighted average winning bid rate and the stop-out rate of
the auction and liquidity allotted in MROs and LTROs. Bidding aggressiveness (Bidag)
is measured by the spread of the weighted average bid rate – one-week Eonia Swap on the
Eonia before the auction (8:30am). The Eonia Swap is the main alternative to partici-
pating in the MRO. Banks may short the Eonia swap and invest in the interbank market
overnight at the Eonia rate (Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev, 2009). The Eonia Swap
rate at 8:30am is taken from Carl Kliem Interbank & Securities Broker and was provided
by the ECB. The fact that banks choose to bid at higher rates in the Eurosystem auction,
given the current interbank market rate, indicates their need for liquidity and their fear
to be squeezed later. A higher value of Bidag is linked to higher funding risk. Due to the
weekly rhythm of the MROs, Bidag is available at a weekly frequency.
With the introduction of full allotment the variable of bidding aggressiveness cannot
be used any longer, as the Eurosystem provides loans at a fixed rate satisfying banks’
total liquidity demand. The possibility of squeezing due to liquidity shortage from the
Eurosystem thus diminishes. Instead, the unlimited liquidity supply by the Eurosystem
leads to the opposite effect, excess outstanding liquidity, which needs to be controlled
for. The amount of liquidity in the system in this period is captured by the sum of the
outstanding MRO and LTRO amount (Liq).
To capture credit risk (Hypothesis 3), CDS data from Eonia panel banks and from GC
Pooling banks, which participate in December 2009, is used.15 The data of the end-of-day
mid points of the 5-year CDS spreads was retrieved from Bloomberg. If the CDS of a bank
is not traded on one day, the value of the last day is used. Banks that were nationalized
or encountered severe problems during the financial crisis (and thus had to be saved by
other banks and/or the government) were excluded from the panel as well as banks that
do not have CDS contracts that can be traded. This leaves 35 banks in the Eonia panel
14The link is http://www.ecb.europa.eu/events/calendar/reserve/html/index.en.html.
15The names can be found in the Table 3.1.
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out of 43 and 17 out of 22 in the GC Pooling panel. 12 banks are represented in both
panels. The CDS spreads of all banks are averaged each day to determine the mean CDS
spread (CDS). The average CDS spread is calculated for GC Pooling, Eonia separately
and their combined panel for the analysis of the use of the standing facilities. In order
to measure the dispersion of credit risk, the same raw data is used as for the measure of
credit risk.
Uncertainty about the credit risk of a single bank (Hypothesis 3) is measured by the
coefficient of variation, i.e. the standard deviation of banks’ CDS spreads divided by the
average level of CDS, where the latter is calculated as a moving-average of the previous
ten days (CoeffVar). This measure is unitless and captures the dispersion of CDS spreads
each day given the aggregate level of credit risk. The higher the CoeffVar is, the easier it
is to distinguish safe and risky banks. The sign of the coefficient of CoeffVar will indicate,
if more precise information/ lower uncertainty about a single bank’s credit risk increases
or lowers volumes in the unsecured interbank market.
The last friction measure, the connection to other financial markets (Hypothesis 4),
is captured by the VSTOXX, which measures expected volatility in the stock market
(VSTOXX). It is calculated from EURO STOXX 50 option prices. A higher VSTOXX
is expected to have a negative impact on the unsecured market and a positive impact on
the other analyzed volumes.
Summary statistics on all friction measures are reported in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. In the
pre-crisis period, Panel A, frictions are at a low level. Bidding aggressiveness is on average
-1.13 bps, indicating that banks bid below the interbank market rate in the auction. The
maximum average bidding aggressiveness, however, is 10 bps above the interbank market
rate. The CDS spreads of the total panel of banks and the individual market panels (as
explained above) vary on average from 12.68 bps to 14.40 bps, with GC Pooling having the
riskiest panel. The coefficient of variation shows a different pattern, its highest average
value is reached for the Eonia panel with 0.384. The VSTOXX displays low volatility
with a mean of 16.4 index points. In this period there are no signs for disruptions of the
interbank market as one expects. There is no direct sign for strong short squeezing, as
the bidding aggressiveness has on average a negative value.
In the first stage of the crisis, Table 3.3 Panel B, all frictions measures rise. The
bidding aggressiveness of banks increases as compared to the previous period. The mean
is higher by 17 bps and the value is always positive, as the minimum is 0 basis points,
indicating that the lower bound is now given by the interbank market interest rate. The
average CDS spread of the total panel rises in this period to 68 bps. In addition, the
mean of the coefficient of variation as well as the VSTOXX are higher with values of 0.43
and 24.40 index points. So the interbank market experiences tensions. Interbank loans
are on average riskier now, as the banks’ average credit risk is higher. This may lead to
less interbank lending. Eonia and GC Pooling volumes are higher in this period, but they
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most likely profit from a shift to shorter maturities in transactions, which is triggered
by these tensions. There is potentially market segmentation, as indicated by a higher
coefficient of variation. Some banks have problems acquiring funds, thus also bidding
more aggressively in the auctions (Cassola, Hortacsu, and Kastl, 2013). That is, funding
risk has risen for many banks. Banks respond by keeping the liquidity obtained in the
MRO in the deposit facility instead of lending it to banks short in liquidity. Overall, this
period is marked by strong frictions inhibiting trading in the interbank market.
In period of full allotment, Table 3.3 Panel C, all friction measures are even higher
than in the previous period, providing evidence that the Lehman collapse constitutes a
severe disruption to the interbank market. The average CDS spread of the whole panel is
176 bps and the coefficient of variation rises to 0.721, possibly leading to higher market
segmentation. The average VSTOXX is 32.2 index points. The large liquidity accumula-
tion at the Eurosystem deposit facility, higher use of the lending facility, low volumes in
the Eonia market and high level of frictions point towards a partly dysfunctional inter-
bank market. This is supported by higher volume in GC Pooling, where banks can obtain
credit regardless of differences in their credit risk. Now I turn to the empirical analysis of
calendar day effects and frictions.
3.5 Empirical Analysis
This section shows the results for the study of frictions and interbank market volumes.
Before evaluating the impact of frictions in a regression model, I first analyze calendar
day effects (Hypothesis 1) to better understand, how the institutional framework affects
(optimal) liquidity allocation in the interbank market. This gives way to the analysis of
the impact of frictions on volumes.
3.5.1 Calendar day effects
In this first part of the empirical analysis I study the calendar day effects of the standing
facilities, the Eonia and the GC Pooling market. This sheds light on the first hypothesis.
In the ideal case of a fully efficient and balanced interbank market there are no seasonal
effects in the use of the standing facilities and traded volumes. In Figure 3.3 one can
recognize recurrent spikes in the volumes of Eonia, GC Pooling and the standing facilities
indicative of patterns. I run daily time-series regressions for each volume on a set of
dummy variables capturing calendar days. The baseline regression, estimated by OLS,
takes the following form (standard errors are corrected by Newey-West’s method with lags
being determined by the integer closest to the fourth root of the number of observations
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(Greene, 2008). Volumes are in logs.
yt = α0 +α1Endrest+α2DumQtrt+
6∑
k=3
αkWeekdayk,t+
12∑
m=7
αmWeekdayk,t ∗ Endrest+εt, (3.1)
where yt denotes the log volume of the standing facilities, the deposit facility, the lending
facility, Eonia, and GC Pooling volume. Endres is the last week of the maintenance
period, DumQtr is the last day of the quarter, Weekday denotes the day of the week
(Monday to Thursday indicated by k) and t is the time index. The last week of the
maintenance period is interacted with the respective day dummies (Weekday*Endres).
For GC Pooling an additional variable is added in the second period, 21 Dec 2007 – 31
Dec 2007, when nearly no trades take place (Endyear). In the last period, full allotment,
a dummy variable for the one-year LTRO is added to the regression (One-Year LTRO). It
is equal to one for the period 25 Jun 2009 - 01 Jul 2010. In this period liquidity is overly
abundant, as EUR 442 billion are allotted in this LTRO.
[insert Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 about here]
The results are displayed in Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. The most distinct effects can be
found for the last week of the maintenance period and the end of the quarter. In the pre-
crisis period (Table 3.4) the last two days of the maintenance period (Monday*Endres,
Tuesday*Endres) turn out to be significant at the 1% level for the use of the standing
facilities. The use of the standing facilities is enormous on the last day of the maintenance
period with a level by 1,000% higher than on a Friday outside the last week of the
maintenance period. In the Eonia market the volume is larger on the last three days
of the maintenance period. The relative increase is smaller, about 30%. The end of
the quarter (DumQtr) plays a similarly important role and has a comparable size effect
on the use of the standing facilities. Trading in the Eonia market decreases by 20%
at the significance level of 1%. The end of the quarter effect in the Eonia market has
been documented by Bindseil, Weller, and Wuertz (2003). Gropp and Heider (2010)
and Teixeira, Silva, Fernandes, and Alves (2014) note that banks usually hold Tier 1
capital in excess of regulatory requirements, with the level being specific to each bank.
This implies that banks want to improve their balance sheet at the end of the quarter,
also called window dressing. The increase in interbank market activity at the end of the
maintenance period implies that banks use it to obtain the liquidity they need for fulfilling
their reserve requirements. Higher volumes at the standing facilities, however, indicate
that there is supply and demand for liquidity that does not meet in the interbank market.
Potential counterparties of a bank might have already traded and so banks resort to the
standing facilities. This is a cause of the decentralized nature of the interbank market. On
days when there is more demand for liquidity or when banks reduce interbank positions as
122 Frictions
at the end of the quarter, it is more difficult to obtain liquidity in the interbank market.
There is a higher potential for stress on those days.
In the first stage of the crisis, Table 3.5, only the last day of the maintenance period
matters for the use of the standing facilities (Tuesday*Endres), with a similar size effect
as before. The Eonia market does not show any specific day patterns or rise at the end
of the maintenance period. The end-of-the-quarter effect strengthens for the use of the
standing facilities (except for the lending facility) and the Eonia market. In the case of
GC Pooling only the end of the year 2007 (Endyear) is significant, when nearly no trades
take place. Due to higher frictions in the interbank market (Section 3.4), the Eurosystem
adjusts its liquidity distribution during the maintenance period to frontloading. Most
banks seem to fulfill their reserve requirements before the end of the maintenance period.
So frontloading alleviates possible liquidity constraints at the end of the maintenance
period, which proves to be effective. The strengthening of the end-of-quarter effect is in
line with Teixeira, Silva, Fernandes, and Alves (2014)’s findings who show that Tier 1
capital ratios are even higher in this period in Europe, which is due to the various equity
injection schemes in many countries. In this period banks have an incentive to appear
strong (as they also face many write-offs), thus window dressing is a main driver of the
end-of-quarter effect.
The full allotment policy of the Eurosystem modifies the trading behavior of banks in
the interbank market, Table 3.6. The last day of the maintenance period leads to negative
spikes for the use of the standing facilities (except for the lending facility) and in Eonia
volumes (lower by 90% and 9%). GC Pooling volumes show no reaction. The end of the
quarter is not important for the use of the standing facilities any longer, whereas volumes
in the Eonia market and in the GC Pooling market still react negatively. The first one-
year LTRO (One-Year LTRO) implemented by the Eurosystem shows a positive effect
on the use of the deposit facility, negative for the lending facility and negative for Eonia
and GC Pooling. The negative coefficients on the last day of the maintenance period are
a result of banks shifting liquidity from the deposit facility to their current accounts to
fulfill the reserve requirements. Banks focus on fulfilling their reserve requirements and
do not release liquidity to the interbank market. The negative impact of the one-year
LTRO on interbank volumes implies that banks continue to substitute secondary market
liquidity with primary market liquidity (Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev, 2009).
The analysis of calendar day effects shows that the Eurosystem institutional frame-
work has a strong impact on trading in the interbank market. In times of low market
disturbances, there are strong seasonal effects at the end of the maintenance period.
Seasonal effects due to the institutional framework change the more accommodating the
Eurosystem monetary policy becomes. They imply, especially seasonality in the volumes
at the standing facilities (before the crisis), that liquidity allocation in the interbank mar-
ket is not perfectly efficient, when institutional factors become binding. At the end of
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the reporting period banks actively manage their balance sheet. This lowers activity in
the interbank market, showing that in terms of reporting it is less preferable than the
standing facilities, which are usually more expensive to use than the interbank market.
The role of the interbank market changes completely, when the Eurosystem switches
to full allotment. This leads to different patters in interbank market trading, as seen
in the regression results. It is not used anymore as the main tool for fulfilling reserve
requirements, but for obtaining liquidity on an ad-hoc basis. The Eurosystem is now the
main liquidity provider. I will examine the frictions and volumes in two time frames,
before the collapse of Lehman and full allotment (Mar 17, 2004 –Sep 14, 2008) and after
the start of full allotment (Oct 09, 2008 – Nov 30, 2011). The first period is used to test
Hypotheses 2-4 as outlined in Section 3.2, whereas the second period tests if the impact of
frictions is eliminated after the change in the Eurosystem monetary policy, Hypothesis 5.
Given that frictions impact the use of the standing facilities and lower trading in the
interbank market, this points towards allocational inefficiencies.
3.5.2 Frictions
In this subsection I analyze the impact of frictions on interbank volumes and the use of
the standing facilities, i. e. I test the previously stated Hypotheses 2-4 (Section 3.2). The
following time-series regression is run
yt = β0 + β1Bidagt−1 + β2∆CDSt−1 + β3∆CoeffVart−1 + β4VSTOXXt−1
+ β4Endrest + β5DumQtrt +
n∑
j=1
γjyt−j + εt,
(3.2)
where yt represents the interbank volume/ use of the standing facilities, Bidag measures
bidding aggressiveness, CDS is credit risk, CoeffVar the information about the distribu-
tion of credit risk and VSTOXX the expected volatility in the stock market. Endres is
a dummy variable for the last week of the maintenance period and DumQtr is the week
containing the last day of the quarter, yt−j are autoregressive terms with t denoting the
time index and j the lag. In the second period analyzed, the period of full allotment,
Bidag is dropped and ∆Liq is added, which measures the change in total liquidity out-
standing by the Eurosystem. Moreover, the dummy variable One-Year LTRO is added
that is equal to one for the period June 25, 2009 – July 01, 2010.
In order to match the weekly frequency of the MROs, I calculate weekly averages for
all endogenous and exogenous variables starting from the settlement day of the auction to
the next auction day, whereas bidding aggressiveness based on weekly data is calculated
on the day of the auction. The regressions are run separately for each volume (in logs),
i. e. the use of the standing facilities, deposit, and lending facility, volumes in the Eonia
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and GC Pooling market. The explanatory variables are lagged by one week to avoid
simultaneity between the dependent and independent variables. Thus, I measure the
subsequent development of volumes after e.g. a change in credit risk.
Autoregressive terms (AR model) are included in each regression. If the interbank
market only changes as a result to new shocks, which I want to capture, then autoregressive
terms are vital for the test. The number of lags is determined by the Hannan-Quinn
criterion. This criterion is strongly consistent and balances out too many and too few lags
(Lütkepohl, 2007). The maximum lag length is five weeks, because the maximum length
of the maintenance period in my sample is six weeks and the most relevant information
is contained in the current maintenance period. At the same time autocorrelation is
controlled for.
Volumes, bidding aggressiveness and VSTOXX are stationary, whereas credit risk as
well as dispersion are non-stationary.16 Volumes, Bidag and VSTOXX were demeaned,
while the non-stationary variables, CDS and CoeffVar, were differenced. Since both vari-
ables CDS and CoeffVar were calculated on the same data basis, the change in CoeffVar
as well as the demeaned VSTOXX 17 were individually regressed on the change in CDS
for both periods considered, to single out its effect. The first-stage regressions were run
without an intercept, since it was not significant in any of those models. The residuals of
the first-stage regression are then included in the estimation. The regression for measur-
ing frictions is estimated by means of full maximum likelihood (FMLE), which includes
the initial observations in the estimation. The final regression model looks the following:
yt = β0 + β1Bidagt−1 + β2∆CDSt−1 + β3Res(∆CoeffVar | ∆CDS),t-1
+ β4Res(VSTOXX | ∆CDS),t-1 + β4Endrest + β5DumQtrt +
n∑
j=1
γjyt−j + εt.
(3.3)
Results for the Period before Lehman
Table 3.8 shows the results of the regressions in the period before the collapse of Lehman
Brothers. The first autoregressive term, yt−1, is significant for all volumes except for
the use of the lending facility. The highest persistence can be seen in the Eonia volume
with a coefficient of 0.67. Bidding aggressiveness (Bidagt) has a significant effect on the
use of the standing facilities, and on the deposit facility itself. One basis point higher
yields a higher use of the standing facilities by 3.4%, whereas the use of the deposit
16Dickey-Fuller tests are reported in Table 3.7 Bidding aggressiveness is stationary for the pre-crisis
and first stage of the crisis separately, but not when both periods are combined. For now it is treated
as stationary variable, but since there are signs for a structural break in this variable, this will be later
taken into account.
17Since VSTOXX is econometrically stationary, it was not differenced, in order to preserve the char-
acteristics of this variable. Differencing a stationary variable will render the time series of that variable
non-invertible, which is undesirable for the regression (Hamilton, 1994).
Chapter 3 125
facility is even higher by 4.8%, significant at the 1% level. Credit risk (∆CDSt−1) plays
a role in the Eonia market and GC Pooling market, but not for the use of the standing
facilities. A change in the average level of credit risk by one basis point raises the Eonia
volume in the following week by 0.7% and GC Pooling volume by 1.9%. The coefficient
of variation (Res(∆CoeffVar | ∆ CDS),t-1) has a significant negative impact on volumes in the
Eonia market, but not on other volumes. An increase by 0.1 points in the coefficient of
variation leads to a 8.5% decrease in the Eonia volume. A rise in the expected volatility
(Res(VSTOXX | ∆CDS),t-1) by one index point raises the use of the standing facilities the
following week by 5.4% at the 1% significance level, which is driven by the deposit facility.
It also raises the volume in GC Pooling by 4.6%.
[insert Table 3.8 about here]
The implications of those results for the hypotheses in Section 3.2 are mixed. The
positive effect of bidding aggressiveness on the use of the standing facilities, which relates
to Hypothesis 2, means that the potential of a squeeze may lead to allocational ineffi-
ciencies in the interbank market. Excess liquidity is parked at the deposit facility and
is not completely reallocated in the interbank market. The Eonia–MBR spread actually
seems to drop following an aggressively bid auction (Table 3.12). This will be studied
in more detail in Section 3.5.3 The coefficient on credit risk for Eonia is not in line with
the hypothesis that volumes in the unsecured market decrease after a change in credit
risk. Given that credit risk is elevated in the period before the collapse of Lehman, its
coefficient was expected to be negative. One likely explanation is the shift from long
maturities to short maturities in the first stage of the crisis as observed in Section 3.4.
The Eonia market, thus, serves as market with low credit risk. The result on credit risk
is complemented by the result of the coefficient of variation. A higher coefficient results
in a decrease of Eonia volumes, which points into the direction of market segmentation.
If single banks become riskier, they are excluded from the Eonia market. However, these
regressions do not show evidence that these banks turn to the standing facilities for ob-
taining liquidity. The standing facilities do not display higher usage after an increase in
credit risk or the coefficient of variation.
The overnight GC Pooling market shows a positive reaction to credit risk, which is
due to a combination of its short maturity and its safety due to the CCP. It does not
react to the change in uncertainty about the riskiness of single banks. Thus, it acts as a
risk buffer for the complete market as indicated by Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer
(2016)’s results. This is also in line with the first part of Hypothesis 3 on credit risk. The
non-sensitivity of GC Pooling to the uncertainty about the risk of single banks does not
accord with the second part of Hypothesis 3, as neither risky Eonia banks nor risky banks
in the GC Pooling panel obtain additional liquidity on the aggregate from GC Pooling.
The riskiest banks in the Eonia panel at the end of the period are Dexia, Bank of Ireland
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and Caixa, who are not participants of GC Pooling. Banks that are potentially excluded
from the Eonia market have to use other ways to obtain liquidity. If there are liquidity
constrained banks in GC Pooling due to credit risk, this is not reflected in its overall daily
trading volume.
The higher use of the deposit facility following an increase in expected stock market
volatility (Hypothesis 4) indicates precautionary liquidity hoarding (Acharya and Mer-
rouche, 2012), in case that the access to interbank market liquidity becomes more difficult.
The higher volume in GC Pooling is also in line with Hypothesis 4, as eventually banks
perceived as risky trade more in the anonymous repo market. Overall, frictions in the
interbank change the use of the standing facilities, and volumes in the interbank market,
supporting the notion that they impact the allocational efficiency of the interbank market.
Another question that arises is the timing of the effect of the variable of the uncertainty
about the credit risk of a bank on the Eonia volume. Is it related to the end of the
maintenance period? Or is it linked to the accumulating difficulties of banks in September
2008? In order to study these questions, I add an interaction term to the regression
analysis before Lehman. The first interaction term is the product of the dummy for the last
week of the maintenance period and the coefficient of variation. The second interaction
term is given by the product of a dummy for the month of September and the coefficient of
variation. The answer to the first question is no18 and the answer to the second one is yes,
Table 3.15. Market segmentation rises at the beginning of September, when rumors begin
to spread about the funding difficulties of Lehman Brothers, which leads to increasing
and diverging CDS spreads, as many financial institutions have exposures to Lehman.
For GC Pooling this effect is not present. However, its volumes do rise in September. So
Eonia volume is negatively affected by higher riskiness of single banks, whereas increasing
tensions lead to an larger volume in GC Pooling.
Results for the Period of Full Allotment
Due to the large liquidity supply by the ECB, measures of frictions are expected to be
insignificant (Hypothesis 5). Results for the period after the start of full allotment are
displayed in Table 3.9. Persistence in volumes, yt−1, increases for the use of the standing
facilities and the interbank market. The coefficient on ∆Liq is significant for Eonia,
GC Pooling volumes and the use of the standing facilities. A change in outstanding
liquidity decreases volumes in Eonia and GC Pooling markets by 54% and 70% at the
1% significance level. A change in credit risk (∆CDSt−1) only affects the use of the
standing facilities, especially the deposit facility, significantly. A positive change in credit
risk by one basis point raises the use of the deposit facility by 0.5%. The coefficient
of variation (Res(∆CoeffVar | ∆CDS),t-1) does not affect Eonia volumes in this period. It is
18The results are available on request.
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weakly significant for GC Pooling volumes with a positive impact and not for the use of
the standing facilities. Expected volatility (Res(VSTOXX | ∆CDS),t-1) positively affects the
use of the lending facility.
[insert Table 3.9 about here]
After a positive change in credit risk the use of the standing facilities rises, which is
driven by the deposit facility.19 The lending facility is not affected, neither are Eonia or
GC Pooling. This implies that, despite the full allotment policy, credit risk remains an
important factor and leads to liquidity hoarding at the deposit facility. Increases in credit
risk have no impact on the use of the lending facility, but a subsequent test (Table 3.13)
demonstrates that the amount allotted to banks in MROs and LTROs rises as a result.20
The coefficient of variation only has a weak impact in this period, not on Eonia but
on GC Pooling, indicating that if some banks are known to be riskier than others then
volumes tend to be higher in GC Pooling. Higher expected stock market volatility leads
to a higher use of the lending facility. As Abbassi, Bräuning, Fecht, and Peydró (2014)
show, interbank market access after the collapse of Lehman becomes more difficult for
banks, which is amplified by strained conditions in other financial markets. Therefore,
more banks are forced to use the lending facility.
The period after full allotment thus provides partial support for Hypothesis 5, which
says that frictions do not impact the market for liquidity anymore. The Eonia market
shows no sensitivity to frictions anymore, since the Eurosystem is now the main liquidity
provider. However, the positive reaction of the use of the standing facilities and liquidity
demand in MRO and LTRO auctions to credit risk is not consistent with this hypothesis.
This result points towards stronger credit rationing in the interbank market, when credit
risk rises further. Despite its lower significance for liquidity reallocation (due to monetary
policy and/or breakdown of this market Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2015), the
volume in the unsecured market is still considerably high (Section 3.4)). It is allegedly
used for liquidity distribution among interrelated banks, e.g. German Landesbanken.21
Instead, the GC Pooling market can provide liquidity, if the unsecured interbank market
is tight. A bank cannot be excluded from trading in GC Pooling by other participants as
long as Eurex allows its access to its repo markets. GC Pooling does not show an increase
in volumes after a change in credit risk, but when individual banks become riskier, which
19As a check that eventually other risky banks influence trading in GC Pooling and Eonia, I use as
a measure of credit risk and coefficient of variation data from the panel of banks in January 2011. The
results are qualitatively the same. So the banks that drive the results in this period are included in the
2009 panel.
20Including the other risk variables in the regression yields the same result.
21These are state-owned banks in Germany, who are regionally organized and concentrate on wholesale
banking.
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is a sign for market segmentation. So GC Pooling acts as risk buffer for single banks, but
not necessarily for the whole market.
The change in liquidity policy by the Eurosystem takes volume from the interbank
market and thus its role of reallocation of liquidity as evidenced. This is also in line
with Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer (2016). Instead of being used as a fallback
option, the deposit facility takes the role of liquidity storage. Inefficiencies in the interbank
market persist despite the excessive liquidity supply by the Eurosystem, indicating that
the liquidity injection by the Eurosystem is necessary, as otherwise frictions would prevent
many banks from obtaining liquidity in the interbank market, thus resulting in large
allocational inefficiencies.
The analysis of both periods shows that the interbank market is exposed to different
frictions. Eonia and GC Pooling markets seem to be safe havens in the period before
Lehman, rising volumes when credit risk increases. Despite this fact, there are signs of
market segmentation in the Eonia market. The standing facilities experience liquidity
hoarding, which explodes in the period of full allotment, when liquidity supply by the
Eurosystem is unlimited. This takes away volume from Eonia and GC Pooling markets.
The latter market is still a reliable liquidity source in the period of full allotment.
3.5.3 Squeezing and Risk factors
The mechanics of squeezing
Unlike the other frictions analyzed, squeezing does not result from inherent uncertainty
in the banking sector, but stems from the strategic interplay between banks. Thus, it
deserves a closer look. It mainly occurs in the liquidity neutral policy period and so the
focus in this section is on the period before Lehman (Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev,
2002). Recalling Hypothesis 2: the potential of short squeezing leads to an increase in the
use of the standing facilities and in interbank volumes after the auction. The question is
if the Eurosystem reacts to the potential of short squeezing by injecting more liquidity
into the banking sector, if banks bid more aggressively.
The first step is to divide the sample into two subperiods (pre-crisis and first stage of
the crisis). Results are displayed in Tables 3.10 and 3.11. Bidding aggressiveness (Bidag)
is not significant in any of those. The result is thus driven by the difference in the level of
bidding aggressiveness in both periods. Fecht, Nyborg, and Rocholl (2011) find evidence
that the liquidity needs of banks leads to higher bidding aggressiveness in the auction. The
more dispersed liquidity balances are before the auction, the more aggressively banks bid.
Cassola, Hortacsu, and Kastl (2013) note that banks increase their bidding aggressiveness
during the crisis. Two-thirds of this increase are driven by a higher willingness to pay for
liquidity, whereas for the other third this is a strategic response. The Eurosystem acts
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more accommodatively in the second period (first stage of the crisis), thus volumes at the
deposit facility are higher.
In order to understand the relationship between bidding aggressiveness, the Eurosys-
tem liquidity provision, and the interbank market, I perform further tests, as documented
in Table 3.14. My focus is on bidding aggressiveness and the deviation of the allotted
amount in the auction to the pre-announced benchmark allotment. The question is if the
Eurosystem deviates by more from this announced amount, if they observe a high bidding
aggressiveness. That would lower the probability of a short squeeze. In order to exclude
other factors, the period analyzed is the period before the start of the crisis. Variables
are defined as in the previous sections.
[insert Table 3.14 about here]
The first column of Table 3.14 shows that bidding aggressiveness is positively related
to the end of the maintenance period. The deviation of the allotted amount to the
benchmark allotment is higher when the bidding aggressiveness in an auction is high.
The relationship is supposedly not perfect, i.e. the Eurosystem injects more into the
interbank market based on their updated beliefs of what is needed in the banking sector.
In the last auction of the maintenance period the deviation is not significantly higher,
since the Eurosystem accounts for the end of the maintenance period in their estimation
and rather distributes too much liquidity than too little. This is supported by the fact that
the spread Eonia–MBR often spikes downwards at the end of the maintenance period.22
For banks it is probably easier to deal with excess liquidity than too little liquidity at the
end of the maintenance perio.
The volume at the deposit facility does not increase when the deviation is higher, but
the traded volume in the Eonia market does. Since I want to focus on the spread Eonia–
MBR that relates to bidding aggressiveness, the last week of the maintenance period was
removed for the analysis of squeezing. The Eonia-MBR spread reacts negatively to an
increase in bidding aggressiveness and positively to the deviation amount. So the part of
the deviation that correlates with bidding aggressiveness leads to an easing of liquidity
conditions in the interbank market, driving down the spread. The deviation that is not
related to bidding aggressiveness has the opposite effect. The Eurosystem has revised its
estimates of liquidity needs, but seems to underestimate those liquidity needs, since the
spread is subsequently higher, as well as trading in the interbank market. Nevertheless,
these results imply that squeezing does not materialize in the interbank market after an
aggressively bid auction. The Eurosystem acts accommodatively. Thus, the occurrences
of allocational inefficiencies due to short squeezing after an aggressively bid auction are
reduced by the accommodative reaction by the Eurosystem.
22In 23 out of 39 maintenance periods the Eonia–MBR spread turns negative in the last week of the
maintenance period (see Figure 3.6).
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The relationship of the different risk factors
This part focuses on the risk friction measures. The measures CDS, CoeffVar and VS-
TOXX are highly correlated. In the main test, they are conditioned on CDS, which
measures credit risk. Here, I change the order of conditioning. I now condition on the
variable CoeffVar. Results are shown in Tables 3.16 (period before Lehman) and 3.17
(period of full allotment). All results are the same in the period before Lehman, ex-
cept for two changes. The effect of ∆CoeffV ar on the Eonia volume and the effect of
(Res(∆CDS | ∆CoeffVar),t-1) on GC Pooling volumes are insignificant, but they still carry the
same sign. In the period of full allotment the coefficient of variation becomes significant
in the regression of the deposit facility and GC Pooling. It implies that indeed ∆CDS
and ∆CoeffV ar capture a similar variation, which tends to strengthen the impact of one
variable on the respective volume.
When all variables are regressed on VSTOXX instead, results in the period before
Lehman are qualitatively the same except for the insignificance of the coefficient of credit
risk in the GC Pooling regression.23 In the period of full allotment it also subsumes the
effect of credit risk on the standing facilities without strengthening its own impact. There
is a common component of credit risk with the coefficient of variation and volatility.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper I provide evidence that in normal times liquidity reallocation in the interbank
market is not always perfectly efficient (measured by the use of standing facilities), which
is impaired further by frictions. Credit risk is the central friction. The more severe it is,
the worse conditions are in the interbank market. The switch to full allotment replaces the
interbank market by primary market liquidity provision. However, the liquidity uptake
and storage at the Eurosystem is still a function of credit risk, implying that tensions in
the interbank market are still present.
First, I find that seasonal effects arise from the Eurosystem institutional framework
and reporting cycles. The end of the maintenance period sees higher volumes in the
interbank market and also a higher use of the standing facilities. The latter indicates
that there is excess demand and supply of liquidity that is not cleared in the interbank
market. At the end of the quarter window dressing plays a significant role. Banks reduce
risky interbank loans and prefer to store at or borrow liquidity from the safe standing
facilities. In the first stage of the crisis, calendar day effects become less important in the
interbank market, as the ECB starts to loosen its liquidity policy. The largest change,
though, occurs with the switch to full allotment. Now primary market liquidity substitutes
secondary market liquidity, raising the volumes at the standing facilities and reducing the
23Results are available on request from the author.
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level of volumes in the interbank market. At the end of the maintenance period volumes
at the deposit facility are lower and higher at the lending facility. Volumes in the Eonia
market decrease, opposite to the period before, whereas there is no aggregate effect on
GC Pooling volumes. Window dressing is still important in the unsecured and secured
overnight interbank market.
Second, I study the impact of frictions on volumes in the interbank market and volumes
at the the Eurosystem standing facilities, which form a fallback option to the interbank
market. In the period before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, allocational inefficiencies
due to frictions are present in the interbank market. Squeezing, however, does not mate-
rialize due to an accommodative liquidity provision by the Eurosystem. Credit risk plays
a role in the unsecured market. Contrary to expectations, credit risk raises volumes in
the Eonia market before Lehman, whereas a higher perceived riskiness of single banks
decrease volumes. Banks shorten the maturities of their unsecured loans as a precaution
to a rise in credit risk, whereas some banks are presumably completely excluded from
trading in the Eonia market. This supports the notion of market segmentation. Volumes
at the standing facilities and in GC Pooling increase when expected volatility in the stock
market rises, implying first liquidity hoarding, and second the necessity for trading in an
anonymous repo market. In the period after the introduction of full allotment, the use of
the standing facilities is sensitive towards credit risk, whereas the unsecured segment of
the interbank market shows no sensitivity towards any friction measure. Volume traded
in GC Pooling rises when the uncertainty about a bank’s default risk increases, implying
that GC Pooling is a reliable hub for liquidity. After the start of full allotment, stock
market volatility leads to a higher use of the lending facility. This implies that there
are spillovers from other security markets to the interbank market. So despite the ex-
tensive liquidity supply by the Eurosystem, frictions persist, implying that without the
intervention by the Eurosystem allocational inefficiencies would probably be huge.
As shown and also evidenced by Abbassi, Bräuning, Fecht, and Peydró (2014) the
unsecured interbank market is alive after the collapse of Lehman and the switch to full
allotment. Banks still trade unsecured. The unsecured market has the huge advantage
of not requiring any infrastructure, whereas the overnight repo market needs a trading
platform and securities serving as collateral. Completely replacing the unsecured market
by the secured market or by Eurosystem monetary operations is not desirable. It is then
either the Central Counterparty or the Eurosystem, who become the main counterparts
in the interbank market, which reduces market discipline. The CCP and Eurosystem bear
the credit risk of each bank. Even though, they have their risk mechanisms for credit risk
in place, it creates other problems. If now one of the CCPs fails, this would be disastrous
to the repo market. Instead, it is important that banks are fundamentally sound and
there is sufficient transparency so that trust returns to the interbank market.
There are two routes to follow. On the one hand, the structure of the interbank market
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needs to be more robust, so that it allows banks to obtain liquidity when necessary. On
the other hand, trading in the interbank market depends on the solvency of banks. If
this risk does not decrease, banks will not be willing to trade with each other. CCPs help
to make the interbank market more robust, but in this case the risk concentrates at the
CCPs and banks have less incentive to monitor each other. The credible threat of losing
access to liquidity should help to discipline banks. The question then remains how to deal
with banks that have completely lost access to liquidity in the interbank market. The
ECB determines the playing field, but it is not supposed to be the main actor. There are
several possibilities to be the lender of last resort. The relative rate on the lending facility
can be decreased. Instead of returning to a liquidity-neutral policy the Eurosystem may
allocate more funds so that banks have a liquidity buffer if they want to.
Chapter 3 133
3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Trading in GC Pooling
Repo transactions can be traded bilaterally over-the-counter (OTC), arranged by voice-
brokers or by a triparty agent. The share of repos (Automated Trading Systems (ATS)
and post-trade registration) cleared by a central counterparty (CCP) stands at 32.5% in
June 2014, while the largest part of repo trading still consists of direct bilateral trading
with 53.2% (ICMA, 2014).24 One of the ATS that clears repo trades via a CCP is operated
by Eurex Repo. In June 2014 Eurex Repo has 130 participants, out of which 115 trade
in their main product GC Pooling.
Eurex Repo provides a quotebook for repo traders in which traders can enter their
quotes. These quotes can consist of one or two repo rates and can only be entered in
the pre-trading phase and during trading hours. Those quotes can be directly accepted
by other traders which leads to the conclusion of a trade. Furthermore, one functionality
of the system allows traders to signal their interest in a trade, which is called indication
of interest. Other participants can react by sending an addressed offer, which may be
accepted or rejected, thus leading to a trade or not. Quotes may also be accepted in part
by a counterpart. The remaining quote size will stay in the quotebook. In an open repo,
participants are able to set their own time span for the repo trade and they may exchange
change rate requests. At the close of trading the remaining quotes in the quotebook are
canceled. After the conclusion of a trade Eurex Clearing steps in as central counterparty.
It nets all positions that a clearing member has entered during the day on the basis of
the currency, the ISIN and settlement account. The GC baskets have their own ISIN,
as e.g. the GC Pooling ECB basket. This reduces the margin requirement and Eurex
Clearing only provides the net collateral or net cash position of all concluded trades to
the counterparty. Thus, counterparty risk is effectively eliminated by the use of the CCP.
24Using average daily turnover instead of outstanding amount (ICMA), the Money Market Study by
the ECB finds a percentage of 62%. CCP transactions normally have a short term, thus resulting in a
relatively high turnover.
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3.7.2 Figures
Figure 3.1: 1w Euribor - 1w EoniaSwap
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This graph shows the daily spread between the one-week Euribor and Eonia Swap (source: Euribor-EBF). The sample
period is July 20, 2005 to August 30, 2008. The Euribor represents the unsecured rate, whereas the Eonia Swap is the OIS
reference rate.
Figure 3.2: Outstanding repo volume in Europe
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This graph displays the semi-annual outstanding repo volumes in Europe for the period June 2001 to December 2013
(source: ICMA). The largest contraction in this market can be noticed in December 2008, from which the market recovers
subsequently.
Chapter 3 135
Fi
gu
re
3.
3:
Vo
lu
m
es
in
th
e
in
te
rb
an
k
m
ar
ke
t
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
9
0
Jan-04
Jun-04
Nov-04
Apr-05
Sep-05
Feb-06
Jul-06
Dec-06
May-07
Oct-07
Mar-08
Aug-08
Jan-09
Jun-09
Nov-09
Apr-10
Sep-10
Feb-11
Jul-11
Dec-11
May-12
Oct-12
Mar-13
Aug-13
In
 E
U
R
 b
n
 
Eo
n
ia
 v
o
lu
m
e
G
C
P
 v
o
lu
m
e
3
-y
e
ar
 L
T
R
O
  
2
2
 D
e
c 
1
1
 
St
ar
t 
o
f 
cr
is
is
 
0
9
 A
u
g 
0
7
 
C
o
lla
p
se
 o
f 
Le
h
m
an
  
1
5
 S
ep
 0
8
 
T
hi
s
gr
ap
h
sh
ow
s
th
e
da
ily
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
of
vo
lu
m
es
in
th
e
Eo
ni
a,
Eo
ni
a
vo
lu
m
e,
an
d
G
C
Po
ol
in
g
m
ar
ke
t,
G
C
P
vo
lu
m
e,
(s
ou
rc
e:
EC
B,
Eu
re
x
R
ep
o)
.
T
he
sa
m
pl
e
pe
rio
d
is
Ja
nu
ar
y
01
,2
00
4
to
D
ec
em
be
r
31
,2
01
3.
T
he
se
rie
s
of
G
C
Po
ol
in
g
st
ar
ts
on
Ju
ne
01
,2
00
7.
136 Frictions
Figure
3.4:
Volum
es
at
the
EC
B
and
in
the
interbank
m
arket
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
2
5
0
3
0
0
3
5
0
4
0
0
Jan-04
May-04
Sep-04
Jan-05
May-05
Sep-05
Jan-06
May-06
Sep-06
Jan-07
May-07
Sep-07
Jan-08
May-08
Sep-08
Jan-09
May-09
Sep-09
Jan-10
May-10
Sep-10
Jan-11
May-11
Sep-11
In
 EU
R
 b
n
 
D
ep
o
sit vo
l
Len
d
in
g vo
l
Eo
n
ia vo
l
G
C
P
 vo
l
Start o
f crisis 
0
9
 A
u
g 0
7
 
C
o
llap
se o
f Le
h
m
an
  
1
5
 Sep
 0
8
 
T
his
graph
show
s
the
daily
developm
ent
ofvolum
es
at
the
EC
B
standing
facilities
and
in
the
Eonia
and
G
C
Pooling
m
arket
(source:
EC
B,
Eurex
R
epo).
D
epositvoland
Lending
voldisplay
the
series
for
the
volum
es
at
the
deposit
and
the
lending
facility.
Eonia
voland
G
C
P
vol
represent
the
volum
es
in
the
Eonia
and
the
G
C
Pooling
m
arket.
T
he
sam
ple
period
is
January
01,2004
to
N
ovem
ber
30,2011,the
last
day
ofthe
regression
analysis.
Chapter 3 137
Figure 3.5: Development of risk measures
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This graph is based on daily data (source: ECB, Eurex Repo, Bloomberg). It shows the development of the risk measures
for credit risk (CDS) of the combined Eonia and GC Pooling panel, uncertainty (CoeffVar) and expected volatility in the
stock market (VSTOXX).
Figure 3.6: Eonia - MBR
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This graph is based on daily data (source: ECB, Bloomberg). Eonia is the European Overnight Index Average, while the
MBR is the ECB minimum bid rate in the weekly auction for liquidity, its policy rate. The spread displays several spikes,
mainly occurring at the end-of-the-maintenance period, indicating that it is strongly influenced by the ECB institutional
framework. The graph only covers the period until the bankruptcy of Lehman and the introduction of full allotment,
because with start of full allotment the policy rate changes to the deposit facility rate.
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3.7.3 Tables
Table 3.1: List of CDS banks
This list shows the banks trading in the Eonia market and/ or the
GC Pooling market whose CDS spreads were used for calculat-
ing the average credit risk (CDS) and the coefficient of variation
(CoeffVar). The composition of the panel stems from December
2009. The star designates if the bank belongs to both panels.
Eonia banks GC Pooling banks
ABN Amro Barclays*
Intesa Bayerische Landesbank*
Bank of Ireland BNP Paribas*
Barclays* Commerzbank*
Bayerische Landesbank* Credit Suisse
BBVA Deutsche Bank*
BNP Paribas* DZ Bank*
Santander Fortis*
Bank of Tokyo HSBC*
Calyon HSH Nordbank
CGD IKB
Citibank JP Morgan
Commerzbank* LBBW*
Dankse Bank LB Hessen
Deutsche Bank* Norddeutsche Landesbank*
Dexia SEB
DZ Bank* Unicredit*
Erste Bank
Fortis*
HSBC*
ING
Natixis
JP Morgan
KBC
Caixa
LBBW*
MPS
Norddeutsche Landesbank*
Nordea
Rabobank
Raiffeisen Zentral
Societe Generale
Handelsbanken
UBS
Unicredit*
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the descriptive statistics on the exogenous and endogenous variables. The first
five lines: Standing facilities, Deposit facility, Lending facility, Eonia volume and GC Pooling volume
denote the volumes in those segments. Benchmark allotment is the estimated liquidity neutral amount
and Deviation denotes the difference between the benchmark allotment amount and the actual amount
distributed. Total outstanding liquidity is the sum of the outstanding MRO and LTRO amount. Bidding
aggressiveness is calculated as the difference between the weighted average bid rate in the auction and the
one-week Eonia Swap rate at 8.30am. CDS Comb is the average CDS spread of all banks participating
in the Eonia and/ or GC Pooling market, while CDS Eonia and CDS GC Pooling is the average CDS
spread for the respective market. CoeffVar is the standard deviation across the respective panel divided
by the average CDS level of the ten previous days.
Pre-Crisis (Mar 17, 2004 – Jun 30, 2007)
Panel A No. Obs. Median St.dev. Mean St.error Min. Max.
Standing facilities (EUR mio.) 844 73 972.107 358.8 33.461 6 9386
Deposit facility (EUR mio.) 844 41 688.927 191.5 23.714 4 8066
Lending facility (EUR mio.) 844 11 576.077 167.3 19.829 0 8833
Eonia volume (EUR mio.) 844 38,153 8,783.4 39,039 302.34 17,133 80,996
GC Pooling volume (EUR mio.) 21 3,475 1,221.53 3,302 266.6 1,176 5640
Benchmark allotment (EUR mio.) 221 285,500 27,609 284,415 2,111 205,500 336,000
Deviation (EUR mio.) 221 500 1,069 760 81.76 -4,970 5,000
Total outstanding Liq. (EUR mio.) 844 398,000 46,404 387,000 1,597 280,000 46,000
Bid. aggressiveness (bps) 221 -1.0 1.638 -1.13 0.056 -5.8 10
CDS Comb (bps) 844 12.86 2.845 12.75 0.098 8.54 18.98
CDS Eonia (bps) 844 12.72 2.855 12.68 0.098 8.56 19.01
CDS GCP (bps) 844 14.60 2.793 14.4 0.096 10.00 20.90
CoeffVar Comb 844 0.357 0.044 0.372 0.001 0.295 0.475
CoeffVar Eonia 844 0.364 0.048 0.384 0.002 0.302 0.500
CoeffVar GCP 844 0.372 0.040 0.379 0.001 0.316 0.495
VSTOXX index (index points) 831 15.8 3.115 16.4 0.108 11.6 31.7
to be continued
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics cont.
First Stage Crisis (Aug 09, 2007 – Sep 12, 2008)
Panel B No. Obs. Median St.dev. Mean St.error Min. Max.
Standing facilities (EUR mio.) 281 356 1,368 739 81.6 40 12,900
Deposit facility (EUR mio.) 281 264 1240.5 560 74 40 12,402
Lending facility (EUR mio.) 281 19 431.5 179 25.74 0 3,883
Eonia volume (EUR mio.) 281 51,472 10,101 51,753 602.6 17,748 82,340
GC Pooling volume (EUR mio.) 280 6,995 2,637 7,008 157.6 50 16,680
Benchmark allotment (EUR mio.) 57 158,000 55,386 157,471 7,336 -197,138 259,000
Deviation (EUR mio.) 57 18,000 35,358 25,100 4,683 3,000 217,000
Total outstanding Liq. (EUR mio.) 281 455,000 37,958 460,000 2,264 397,000 637,000
Bid. aggressiveness (bps) 57 15.5 6.89 16.2 0.41 0.0 31.5
CDS Comb (bps) 281 64.2 29.784 68.1 1.777 20.8 146.2
CDS Eonia (bps) 281 63.3 28.098 66.2 1.676 21.1 147.4
CDS GCP (bps) 281 60.6 27.48 65.2 1.639 20.3 130.8
CoeffVar Comb 281 0.402 0.108 0.431 0.006 0.256 0.870
CoeffVar Eonia 281 0.369 0.052 0.377 0.003 0.251 0.510
CoeffVar GCP 281 0.472 0.162 0.521 0.010 0.266 1.200
VSTOXX (index points) 275 23.9 4.1214 24.4 0.2485 17.2 40.2
FullAllotment (Oct 09, 2008 – Nov 30, 2011)
Panel C No. Obs. Median St.dev. Mean St.error Min. Max.
Standing facilities (EUR mio.) 809 92,500 88,093 119,000 3,097 5,010 385,000
Deposit facility (EUR mio.) 809 91,541 87,713 117,110 3,083.8 4,981 384,260
Lending facility (EUR mio.) 809 243 3,067 1,401 107.8 0 28,707
Eonia volume (EUR mio.) 807 34,698 9,408 35,490 331.2 5,781 62,893
GC Pooling volume (EUR mio.) 807 8,984 3,870 9,564 136.2 453 24,055
Benchmark allotment (EUR mio.) 164 15,000 150,143 -988 11,724 -359,500 366,000
Deviation (EUR mio.) 164 141,000 127,409 157,000 9,949 -151,000 477,000
Total outstanding Liq. (EUR mio.) 809 647,000 124,132 633,000 4,364 407,000 896,000
CDS Comb (bps) 809 167.7 59.445 175.8 2.090 90.9 393.5
CDS Eonia (bps) 809 152.5 62.264 165.6 2.189 81.6 396.5
CDS GCP (bps) 809 144.8 42.278 154.5 1.486 95.4 314.4
CoeffVar Comb 809 0.740 0.186 0.721 0.007 0.400 1.172
CoeffVar Eonia 809 0.577 0.221 0.636 0.008 0.339 1.225
CoeffVar GCP 809 0.568 0.260 0.673 0.009 0.348 1.371
VSTOXX Index (index points) 776 27.9 11.547 32.2 0.415 18.5 87.5
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Table 3.4: Calendar day effects - Pre-crisis period
This table is based on regressions with daily data and shows the empirical
regularities in volumes that stem from the ECB operational framework and
calendar day effects. The sample period is the pre-crisis period ranging from
Mar 17, 2004 – Jun 30, 2007. The first column displays the use of the standing
facilities, the second and third the use of the deposit and lending facility, the
fourth the volume traded overnight in the Eonia market and the fifth the vol-
ume traded overnight in GC Pooling. Those volume measures, the dependent
variables, are in logs. In terms of independent variables, the regression entails
dummies for the weekdays Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, their
interaction terms with the last five days of the maintenance period Endres, the
variable Endres itself, and a dummy for the last day of the quarter, DumQtr.
Standard errors given in parentheses were corrected by using Newey-West with
five lags (Greene, 2008). The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Standing fac. Deposit fac. Lending fac. Eonia
Weekdays
Intercept 4.1811*** 3.7188*** 2.1900*** 10.5267***
(0.1057) (0.095) (0.1827) (0.0211)
Monday 0.1680 -0.0819 0.6510*** -0.0292*
(0.1321) (0.1132) (0.2447) (0.0164)
Tuesday 0.0517 0.0564 0.2310 -0.0122
(0.1238) (0.1174) (0.2188) (0.0188)
Wednesday 0.0239 -0.0800 0.3550 -0.0299*
(0.1240) (0.1070) (0.2212) (0.0174)
Thursday -0.0294 -0.2185** 0.2120 -0.0384***
(0.1278) (0.1039) (0.2357) (0.0167)
Interaction Terms
Monday*Endres 0.9549*** 0.8461*** 1.4670*** 0.0209
(0.2551) (0.2279) (0.5354) (0.0314)
Tuesday*Endres 2.4779*** 1.9717*** 3.5650*** 0.0262
(0.2850) (0.2859) (0.4992) (0.0376)
Wednesday*Endres -0.1742 -0.3052 0.3780 -0.1499***
(0.2675) (0.2420) (0.4850) (0.0374)
Thursday*Endres -0.1704 -0.3706** 0.3660 -0.0685***
(0.2681) (0.1888) (0.5455) (0.0294)
Other factors
Endres 0.7438*** 0.8345*** 0.2680 0.2341***
(0.1930) (0.1748) (0.3692) (0.0304)
DumQtr 2.4839*** 1.7381*** 3.3770*** -0.2160***
(0.2505) (0.4022) (0.3461) (0.0542)
No. Obs. 844 844 844 844
Adj. R2 0.327 0.337 0.206 0.178
F-statistic 41.9 43.9 21.6 19.3
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Table 3.5: Calendar day effects - First stage of the crisis
The table based on regressions with daily data shows the empirical regularities in volumes
that stem from the ECB operational framework and calendar day effects. The sample
period spans the dates Aug 09, 2007 – Sep 12, 2008. The first column displays the use of
the standing facilities, the second and third the use of the deposit and lending facility, the
fourth the volume traded overnight in the Eonia market and the fifth the volume traded
overnight in GC Pooling. Those volume measures, the dependent variables, are in logs. In
terms of independent variables, the regression entails dummies for the weekdays Monday,
Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, their interaction terms with the last five days of the
maintenance period Endres, the variable Endres itself, and a dummy for the last day of the
quarter, DumQtr. Standard errors given in parentheses were corrected by using Newey-West
with five lags (Greene, 2008). The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Standing fac. Deposit fac. Lending fac. Eonia GC Pooling
Weekdays
Intercept 5.6668*** 5.3051*** 2.6270*** 10.8284*** 8.8035***
(0.1482) (0.1648) (0.3601) (0.0266) (0.0616)
Monday 0.3322*** 0.1238 1.2200*** -0.0194 0.0273
(0.1325) (0.1278) (0.4576) (0.0269) (0.0520)
Tuesday 0.0866 0.1743 0.5760 -0.0153 0.0131
(0.1762) (0.1443) (0.4962) (0.0270) (0.0627)
Wednesday -0.0621 -0.0099 0.1920 0.0165 -0.0279
(0.1638) (0.1270) (0.4553) (0.0315) (0.0610)
Thursday -0.1783 -0.0603 -0.1540 -0.0070 -0.0348
(0.1451) (0.0976) (0.4380) (0.0304) (0.0703)
Interaction Terms
Monday*Endres 0.1039 0.4016 -0.8150 0.0114 -0.0094
(0.2796) (0.2821) (0.6734) (0.0468) (0.1075)
Tuesday*Endres 2.0363*** 1.7600*** 2.9530*** 0.0886 0.2026
(0.4811) (0.4581) (0.8644) (0.0635) (0.1249)
Wednesday*Endres -0.3707 -0.3919 -0.4910 -0.0962 0.2297
(0.2861) (0.2867) (0.9458) (0.0630) (0.1531)
Thursday*Endres -0.023 -0.0384 -0.7320 -0.0875* 0.1952
(0.269) (0.2262) (0.8979) (0.0522) (0.1348)
Other factors
Endres 0.3759 0.5265 0.2580 0.1028* -0.1051
(0.3404) (0.3236) (0.7594) (0.0568) (0.1316)
DumQtr 2.4849*** 2.7909*** 0.8900 -0.6824*** -0.3300
(0.3396) (0.3596) (1.4882) (0.1529) (0.2769)
Endyear -3.1628***
(0.2137)
No. Obs. 281 281 281 281 281
Adj. R2 0.314 0.328 0.12 0.184 0.453
F-statistic 13.8 14.7 4.8 7.3 22
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Table 3.6: Calendar day effects - Full Allotment
The table based on regressions with daily data shows the empirical regularities in volumes
that stem from the ECB operational framework and calendar day effects. The sample
period spans the dates Oct 09, 2008 – Nov 30, 2011. The first column displays the use of
the standing facilities, the second and third the use of the deposit and lending facility, the
fourth the volume traded overnight in the Eonia market and the fifth the volume traded
overnight in GC Pooling. Those volume measures, the dependent variables, are in logs. In
terms of independent variables, the regression entails dummies for the weekdays Monday,
Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, their interaction terms with the last five days of the
maintenance period Endres, the variable Endres itself and a dummy for the last day of the
quarter, DumQtr. One-Year LTRO is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in the
period Jun 25, 2009 – Jul 01, 2010. Standard errors given in parentheses were corrected by
using Newey-West with five lags (Greene, 2008). The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Standing fac. Deposit fac. Lending fac. Eonia GC Pooling
Weekdays
Intercept 10.9921*** 10.9644*** 5.6115*** 10.5142*** 9.2414***
(0.2154) (0.2199) (0.2892) (0.0336) -(0.0451)
Monday 0.0670*** 0.0675*** 0.3359*** 0.0167 -0.0348
(0.0206) (0.0211) (0.1523) (0.0220) (0.0380)
Tuesday 0.0621*** 0.0611*** 0.2199 0.0227 -0.0483
(0.0261) (0.0265) (0.1660) (0.0238) (0.0414)
Wednesdays -0.1698*** -0.1890*** 0.1348 0.0319 -0.0693
(0.0246) (0.0298) (0.2091) (0.0238) (0.0509)
Thursday -0.1472*** -0.1496*** 0.0237 0.0176 -0.1149***
(0.0234) (0.0234) (0.1471) (0.0215) (0.0420)
Interaction Terms
Monday*Endres 0.0353 0.0347 0.1443 -0.0540* 0.0535
(0.0572) (0.0575) (0.3164) (0.0318) (0.0698)
Tuesday*Endres -0.9204*** -0.9495*** 1.5883*** -0.0869** 0.0052
(0.1382) (0.1415) (0.4075) (0.0438) (0.0909)
Wednesday*Endres -0.0154 -0.0016 0.1805 -0.0433 0.0917
(0.0549) (0.0587) (0.3080) (0.0328) (0.0828)
Thursday*Endres 0.0212 0.0211 0.1362 -0.0370 0.0938
(0.0420) (0.0429) (0.2329) (0.0300) (0.0757)
Other factors
Endres 0.4997*** 0.5136*** -0.5985 -0.0166 -0.0572
(0.1363) (0.1371) (0.4001) (0.0392) (0.0603)
DumQtr 0.1787 0.1842 1.0501 -0.6931*** -0.4310**
(0.2262) (0.2290) (0.5729) (0.1524) (0.1945)
One-Year LTRO 0.8523*** 0.8763*** -0.8108*** -0.2145*** -0.3292***
(0.2072) (0.2088) (0.2778) (0.0420) (0.0594)
No. Obs. 809 809 809 809 809
Adj. R2 0.219 0.225 0.042 0.202 0.125
F-statistic 21.5 22.3 22 19.5 11.4
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Table 3.7: Test for non-stationarity
The tests for non-stationarity are based on the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The
null hypothesis is that the series tested is non-stationary. The superscripts ∗, ∗∗,
and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Before Lehman refers
to the period Mar 17, 2004 – Sep 12, 2008. Pre-Crisis is defined as the dates Mar
17, 2004 – Jun 30, 2007. First Stage spans the period Aug 09, 2007 – Sep 12,
2008 and Full Allotment refers to Oct 09, 2008 – Nov 30, 2011. Deposit facility,
Lending facility, Standing facilities, Eoniavol and GCP denote the volumes at the
deposit facility, lending facility, standing facilities, in the Eonia market and in the
GC Pooling market. Bidag, bidding aggressiveness, is calculated as the difference
between the weighted winning average bid rate in the auction and the one-week
Eonia Swap rate at 8.30am. TotLiq denotes the sum of outstanding MRO and
LTRO volumes. CDScomb is the average CDS spread of all banks participating in
the Eonia and/ or GC Pooling market, while CDSeon and CDSgcp is the average
CDS spread for the respective market. Coeffcomb is the standard deviation across
the panel divided by the average CDS level of the ten previous days. Coeffeon
and Coeffgcp is the same measure, only defined for the Eonia and GC Pooling
panels.VSTOXX is the measure for volatility.
Before Lehman Pre-Crisis First Stage Full Allotment
Deposit facility -4.971*** -8.101*** -4.291*** -3.764***
Lending facility -12.91*** -12.12*** -11.34*** -6.192***
Standing facilities -5.962*** -12.07*** -11.28*** -6.247***
Eoniavol -5.415*** -8.556*** -4.311*** -5.176***
GCP -5.748*** NA -5.471*** -4.150***
Bidag -1.991 -7.312*** -3.253** NA
TotLiq -2.546 -1.753 -5.471*** 2.438
CDScomb 0.2313 -2.163 -0.8991 0.1861
CDSeon -0.232 -2.142 -1.174 0.2604
CDSgcp 0.6497 -2.208 -0.7286 -0.2398
Coeffcomb -0.4208 -2.527 -0.294 -1.800
Coeffeon -3.188** -2.373 -3.809*** -1.770
Coeffgcp 1.042 -3.081** 0.2696 -1.174
VSTOXX -3.181** -3.972*** -3.204** -3.237**
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Table 3.8: Frictions - Before Lehman
The table shows regressions based on weekly averages of volumes on the discussed measures of
interbank market frictions for the period before Lehman (Mar 17, 2004 – Sep 12, 2008). The
GC Pooling time series starts on 2007. Each column represents a separate regression, one for
each volume measure. The first column involves the use of the standing facilities, the second and
third the use of the deposit and lending facility, the fourth the volume traded overnight in the
Eonia market and the fifth volume traded overnight in GC Pooling. Those volume measures, the
dependent variables, are in logs and demeaned. Bidag is the difference between the winning average
bid rate in the auction and the one-week Eonia Swap rate, measuring the potential for squeezing.
∆ CDS captures credit risk and Res(∆CoeffVar|∆CDS) the information about the riskiness of a single
bank. Res(VSTOXX|∆CDS) captures the expected volatility in the stock market. Both ∆ CoeffVar
and VSTOXX were both individually regressed in a first stage regression on ∆ CDS to single
out their effect in this regression. Calendar dummies (Endres, DumQtr, Endyear) are included.
Endres captures the last week of the maintenance period, DumQtr the last week of the quarter,
and Endyear the period 21 Dec 2007 - 31 Dec 2007. The regression containing autoregressive terms
was estimated by means of full maximum likelihood. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The
superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Standing fac. Deposit fac. Lending fac. Eonia GC Pooling
Intercept -0.502*** -0.438*** -0.532*** -0.043 -0.274***
(0.087) (0.097) (0.106) (0.041) (0.076)
yt−1 0.167*** 0.227*** 0.020 0.671*** 0.303**
(0.067) (0.069) (0.066) (0.067) (0.144)
yt−2 -0.117* -0.013 -0.081 0.021 -0.206
(0.068) (0.069) (0.065) (0.086) (0.127)
yt−3 0.211*** 0.135* 0.153*** 0.049 -0.217*
(0.068) (0.071) (0.065) (0.080) (0.128)
yt−4 -0.024 0.050 0.044 0.077 0.299**
(0.072) (0.072) (0.068) (0.068) (0.151)
yt−5 0.141**
(0.066)
Bidagt−1 0.034*** 0.048*** 0.014 0.002 0.009*
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.003) (0.005)
∆ CDSt−1 0.021 0.018 0.022 0.007*** 0.019***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.002) (0.005)
Res(∆CoeffVar|∆CDS),t−1 -0.341 -0.897 -3.533 -0.846*** -0.085
(2.048) (2.167) (3.057) (0.296) (0.492)
Res(VSTOXX|∆CDS),t−1 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.030 0.005 0.046***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.024) (0.004) (0.009)
Endrest 1.736*** 1.658*** 1.763*** 0.165*** -0.147*
(0.111) (0.123) (0.189) (0.015) (0.082)
DumQtrt 1.375*** 0.781*** 1.706*** 0.038 -0.243**
(0.196) (0.217) (0.307) (0.025) (0.112)
Endyeart -0.558**
(0.267)
No. Obs. 236 236 236 236 68
σ2 0.607 0.709 1.490 0.0135 0.064
Loglikelihood -274.9 -293.2 -380.5 172.2 -3.34
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Table 3.9: Frictions - Full Allotment
The table shows regressions of volumes based on weekly averages on the discussed measures of
interbank market frictions for the period after the start of full allotment (Oct 09, 2008 – Nov
30, 2011). Each column represents a separate regression, one for each volume measure. The first
column involves the use of the standing facilities, the second and third the use of the deposit
and lending facility, the fourth the volume traded overnight in the Eonia market and the fifth
volume traded overnight in GC Pooling. Those volume measures, the dependent variables, are
in logs and demeaned. ∆Liq measures the change in outstanding liquidity, ∆ CDS credit risk
and Res(∆CoeffVar|∆CDS) the information about the riskiness of a single bank. Res(VSTOXX|∆CDS)
captures the expected volatility in the stock market. Both ∆ CoeffVar and VSTOXX were both
individually regressed in a first stage regression on ∆ CDS to single out their effect in this re-
gression. Calendar dummies (Endres, DumQtr, One-Year LTRO) are included. Endres captures
the last week of the maintenance period, DumQtr the last week of the quarter, and One-Year
LTRO the period 25 Jun 2009 – 01 Jul 2010. The regressions containing autoregressive terms were
estimated by means of full maximum likelihood. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The
superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Standing fac. Deposit fac. Lending fac. Eonia GC Pooling
Intercept -0.129 -0.147 0.036 0.011 0.026
(0.362) (0.352) (0.206) (0.069) (0.222)
yt−1 0.998*** 1.006*** 0.348*** 0.737*** 0.369***
(0.081) (0.080) (0.078) (0.080) (0.087)
yt−2 -0.348*** -0.337*** 0.067 -0.180* 0.202**
(0.113) (0.112) (0.084) (0.104) (0.091)
yt−3 0.194* 0.174 -0.093 0.158 0.131
(0.115) (0.114) (0.084) (0.101) (0.094)
yt−4 0.259** 0.301*** 0.145* 0.134 0.140
(0.115) (0.115) (0.079) (0.087) (0.086)
yt−5 -0.179** -0.220*** 0.101
(0.080) (0.080) (0.083)
∆ Liqt 0.789** 0.747* -0.231 -0.780*** -1.255***
(0.399) (0.389) (1.870) (0.174) (0.313)
∆ CDSt−1 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.014 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.001) (0.002)
Res(∆CoeffVar|∆CDS),t−1 -0.913 -0.996* 0.200 -0.070 0.740*
(0.608) (0.592) (2.487) (0.261) (0.421)
Res(VSTOXX|∆CDS),t−1 0.010 0.011 0.065*** 0.003 0.005
(0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.003) (0.004)
Endrest 0.460*** 0.463*** -0.063 -0.040* -0.022
(0.048) (0.047) (0.221) (0.021) (0.035)
DumQtrt 0.139 0.138 0.321 -0.106*** -0.092
(0.087) (0.084) (0.376) (0.039) (0.056)
One-Year LTROt 1.097*** 1.124*** -0.125 0.040 -0.251**
(0.261) (0.256) (0.455) (0.088) (0.118)
No. Obs. 164 164 164 164 164
σ2 0.131 0.127 1.55 0.019 0.038
Loglikelihood -67.01 -64.6 -269 93.12 35.17
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Table 3.10: Frictions - Subperiods (before Lehman)
The table shows regressions of volumes based on weekly averages on the discussed measures of
interbank market frictions for the pre-crisis period and the first stage of the crisis. The pre-crisis
period ranges from Mar 17, 2004 – Jun 30, 2007. Each column represents a separate regression, one
for each volume measure. The first column involves the use of the standing facilities, the second
and third the use of the deposit and lending facility, the fourth the volume traded overnight in the
Eonia market and the fifth volume traded overnight in GC Pooling. Those volume measures, the
dependent variables, are in logs and demeaned. Bidag is the difference between the winning average
bid rate in the auction and the one-week Eonia Swap rate, measuring the potential for squeezing.
∆ CDS captures credit risk and Res(∆CoeffVar|∆CDS) the information about the riskiness of a single
bank. Res(VSTOXX|∆CDS) captures the expected volatility in the stock market. Both ∆ CoeffVar
and VSTOXX were both individually regressed in a first stage regression on ∆ CDS to single
out their effect in this regression. Calendar dummies (Endres, DumQtr, Endyear) are included.
Endres captures the last week of the maintenance period, DumQtr the last week of the quarter, and
Endyear the period Dec 21, 2007 - Dec 31, 2007. The regression containing autoregressive terms
was estimated by means of full maximum likelihood. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Pre-Crisis Standing fac. Deposit fac. Lending fac. Eonia GC Pooling
Intercept -0.565*** -0.449*** -0.632*** -0.048
(0.102) (0.106) (0.119) (0.034)
yt−1 0.166* 0.190*** 0.621***
(0.077) (0.080) (0.078)
yt−2 -0.125 0.008 0.012
(0.082) (0.082) (0.099)
yt−3 0.224*** 0.125 0.092
(0.080) (0.082) (0.094)
yt−4 -0.068 -0.024 0.022
(0.081) (0.083) (0.080)
yt−5 0.123
(0.079)
Bidagt−1 0.014 0.027 -0.028 -0.002
(0.039) (0.040) (0.056) (0.005)
∆ CDSt−1 0.049 0.288 -0.299 -0.035
(0.237) (0.261) (0.345) (0.034)
Res(∆CoeffVar|∆CDS),t−1 0.608 -3.128 -2.833 -0.971
(5.021) (5.419) (7.461) (0.709)
Res(VSTOXX|∆CDS),t−1 0.075*** 0.066** 0.058* 0.000
(0.027) (0.029) (0.032) (0.006)
Endrest 1.966*** 1.817*** 2.041*** 0.193***
(0.137) (0.147) (0.234) (0.017)
DumQtrt 1.462*** 0.727*** 1.887*** 0.086***
(0.250) (0.272) (0.380) (0.030)
No. Obs. 172 172 172 172
σ2 0.680 0.767 1.61 0.013
Loglikelihood -211.0 -221.3 -284.9 130.1
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Table 3.11: Frictions - Subperiods (before Lehman) continued
The table shows regressions of volumes based on weekly averages on the discussed measures of
interbank market frictions for the first stage of the crisis. The first stage crisis period ranges from
Aug 09, 2007 – Sep 12, 2008. Each column represents a separate regression, one for each volume
measure. The first column involves the use of the standing facilities, the second and third the use
of the deposit and lending facility, the fourth the volume traded overnight in the Eonia market
and the fifth volume traded overnight in GC Pooling. Those volume measures, the dependent
variables, are in logs and demeaned.Bidag is the difference between the winning average bid rate
in the auction and the one-week Eonia Swap rate, measuring the potential for squeezing. ∆ CDS
captures credit risk and Res(∆CoeffVar|∆CDS) the information about the riskiness of a single bank.
Res(VSTOXX|∆CDS) captures the expected volatility in the stock market. Both ∆ CoeffVar and
VSTOXX were both individually regressed in a first stage regression on ∆ CDS to single out their
effect in this regression. Calendar dummies (Endres, DumQtr, Endyear) are included. Endres
captures the last week of the maintenance period, DumQtr the last week of the quarter, and
Endyear the period Dec 21, 2007 - Dec 31, 2007. The regression containing autoregressive terms
was estimated by means of full maximum likelihood. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
First Stage Crisis Standing fac. Deposit fac. Lending fac. Eonia GC Pooling
Intercept -0.400*** -0.446*** -0.334** -0.028 -0.042
(0.118) (0.161) (0.156) (0.051) (0.105)
yt−1 0.435*** 0.447*** -0.189 0.640*** 0.361***
(0.131) (0.128) (0.140) (0.142) (0.144)
yt−2 0.127 -0.378***
(0.137) (0.144)
Bidagt−1 0.011 0.032 0.021 0.002 0.006
(0.014) (0.020) (0.022) (0.003) (0.006)
∆ CDSt−1 0.013 0.017 0.011 0.004** 0.005
(0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.002) (0.005)
Res(∆CoeffVar|∆CDS),t−1 -3.325** -2.767 -7.886** 0.008 -0.007
(1.574) (2.105) (3.637) (0.367) (0.595)
Res(VSTOXX|∆CDS),t−1 -0.028 -0.002 -0.045 0.003 0.041***
(0.025) (0.034) (0.036) (0.006) (0.010)
Endrest 1.271*** 1.426*** 0.919*** 0.084*** -0.088
(0.141) (0.186) (0.366) (0.027) (0.085)
DumQtrt 1.320*** 1.282*** 1.309** -0.083* -0.361***
(0.236) (0.316) (0.573) (0.044) (0.132)
Endyeart -0.597**
(0.279)
No. Obs. 57 57 57 57 57
σ2 0.223 0.399 1.090 0.009 0.069
Loglikelihood -38.27 -54.77 -83.34 54.24 -4.78
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Table 3.13: Liquidity acquisition
The table shows the regression of the change in the log of total outstanding liquidity
(MRO+LTRO) on a change in credit risk, CDS, for the period following the switch to
full allotment (09 Oct 2008 – 30 Nov 2011). Standard errors are corrected by Newey-West’s
method with lags being determined by the integer closest to the fourth root of the number
of observations (Greene, 2008), resulting in four lags for each regression. The superscripts
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
∆Liq ∆Liq
Intercept -0.0013 0.0013
(0.0030) (0.0036)
∆ CDSt−1 0.0008*** 0.0008***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Res(∆CoeffVar|∆CDS),t−1 -0.0278
(0.0780)
Res(VSTOXX|∆CDS),t−1 0.0003
(0.0002)
Endrest -0.0098
(0.0063)
DumQtrt -0.0336
(0.0352)
One-Year LTROt 0.0109
(0.0131)
No. Obs. 164 164
Adj. R2 0.019 0.034
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Table 3.15: Frictions - Before Lehman - Interaction Term
The table shows regressions based on weekly averages of volumes on the discussed measures of
interbank market frictions for the period before Lehman (Mar 17, 2004 – Sep 12, 2008). Each
column represents a separate regression, one for each volume measure. The first column involves
the use of the standing facilities, the second and third the use of the deposit and lending facility, the
fourth the volume traded overnight in the Eonia market and the fifth volume traded overnight in GC
Pooling. Data on GC Pooling volumes are available from June 01, 2007. All volume measures, the
dependent variables, are in logs and demeaned. Bidag is the difference between the winning average
bid rate in the auction and the one-week Eonia Swap rate, measuring the potential for squeezing.
∆ CDS captures credit risk and Res(∆CoeffVar|∆CDS) the information about the riskiness of a single
bank. Res(VSTOXX|∆CDS) captures the expected volatility in the stock market. Both ∆ CoeffVar
and VSTOXX were both individually regressed in a first stage regression on ∆ CDS to single
out their effect in this regression. Calendar dummies (Endres, DumQtr, Endyear) are included.
Endres captures the last week of the maintenance period, DumQtr the last week of the quarter, and
Endyear the period Dec 21, 2007 – Dec 31, 2007. September is a dummy variable for the month of
September 2008. This is interacted with Res(∆CoeffVar|∆CDS), giving the term IntactCoeffVarSep.
The regression containing autoregressive terms (not displayed here) was estimated by means of full
maximum likelihood. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Standing fac. Deposit fac. Lending fac. Eonia GC Pooling
Intercept -0.506*** -0.440*** -0.539*** -0.043 -0.307***
(0.088) (0.098) (0.107) (0.041) (0.063)
Bidagt−1 0.033*** 0.048*** 0.014 0.002 0.010***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.003) (0.004)
∆ CDSt−1 0.020 0.018 0.021 0.007*** 0.019***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.002) (0.005)
Res(∆CoeffVar|∆CDS),t−1 -0.196 -0.520 -3.904 -0.907*** -0.091
(2.083) (2.230) (3.141) (0.294) (0.485)
IntactCoeffVarSept−1 -5.394 -9.519 6.654 5.907** -0.975
(12.292) (12.668) (19.183) (2.937) (2.420)
Res(VSTOXX|∆CDS),t−1 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.029 0.004 0.048***
(0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.004) (0.008)
Endrest 1.735*** 1.654*** 1.764*** 0.169*** -0.136
(0.111) (0.122) (0.188) (0.015) (0.083)
DumQtrt 1.381*** 0.795*** 1.713*** 0.038 -0.254**
(0.196) (0.217) (0.306) (0.024) (0.111)
Septembert 0.372 0.347 0.297 0.021 0.354*
(0.586) (0.660) (0.859) (0.108) (0.195)
Endyeart -0.632**
(0.273)
No. of AR terms 5 4 4 4 4
No. Obs. 236 236 236 236 68
σ2 0.606 0.708 1.49 0.013 0.061
Loglikelihood -274.7 -292.9 -380.2 174.2 -1.63
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Table 3.16: Before Lehman - Conditioning on CoeffVar
The table shows regressions based on weekly averages of volumes on the discussed measures of
interbank market frictions for the period before Lehman (Mar 17, 2004 – Jun 30, 2007). Each
column represents a separate regression, one for each volume measure. The first column involves
the use of the standing facilities, the second and third the use of the deposit and lending facility, the
fourth the volume traded overnight in the Eonia market and the fifth volume traded overnight in
GC Pooling. The data on GC Pooling volumes starts on 01 June 2007. All volume measures are in
logs and demeaned. Bidag is the difference between the winning average bid rate in the auction and
the one-week Eonia Swap rate, measuring the potential for squeezing. Res(CDS|∆CoeffVar) captures
credit risk and CoeffVar the information about the riskiness of a single bank. Res(VSTOXX|∆CoeffVar)
captures the expected volatility in the stock market. Both ∆ CDS and VSTOXX were individually
regressed in a first stage regression on ∆ CoeffVar to single out their effect in this regression.
Calendar dummies (Endres, DumQtr, Endyear) are included. Endres captures the last week of
the maintenance period, DumQtr the last week of the quarter, and Endyear the period Dec 21,
2007 – Dec 31, 2007. The regression containing autoregressive terms was estimated by means of
full maximum likelihood. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Standing fac. Deposit fac. Lending fac. Eonia GC Pooling
Intercept -0.502*** -0.438*** -0.532*** -0.043 -0.274***
(0.087) (0.097) (0.106) (0.041) (0.076)
yt−1 0.167*** 0.227*** 0.020 0.671*** 0.303**
(0.067) (0.069) (0.066) (0.067) (0.144)
yt−2 -0.117* -0.013 -0.081 0.021 -0.206
(0.068) (0.069) (0.065) (0.086) (0.127)
yt−3 0.211*** 0.135* 0.153*** 0.049 -0.217
(0.068) (0.071) (0.065) (0.080) (0.128)
yt−4 -0.024 0.050 0.044 0.077 0.299**
(0.072) (0.072) (0.068) (0.068) (0.151)
yt−5 0.141**
(0.066)
Bidagt−1 0.034*** 0.048*** 0.014 0.002 0.009*
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.003) (0.005)
Res(∆CDS|∆CoeffVar),t−1 0.007 0.005 0.024 0.008*** 0.007
(0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.002) (0.006)
∆ CoeffVart−1 0.052 -0.615 -2.283 -0.363 0.418
(1.818) (1.921) (2.805) (0.253) (0.416)
Res(VSTOXX|∆CoeffVar),t−1 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.030 0.005 0.046***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.024) (0.004) (0.009)
Endrest 1.736*** 1.658** 1.763*** 0.165*** -0.147*
(0.111) (0.123) (0.189) (0.015) (0.082)
DumQtrt 1.375*** 0.781*** 1.709*** 0.038 -0.243***
(0.196) (0.217) (0.307) (0.025) (0.112)
Endyeart -0.559**
(0.267)
No. Obs. 236 236 236 236 68
σ2 0.607 0.709 1.49 0.0135 0.0639
Loglikelihood -274.9 -293.2 -380.5 172.2 -3.34
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Table 3.17: Full Allotment - Conditioning on CoeffVar
The table shows regressions of volumes based on weekly averages on the discussed measures of
interbank market frictions for the period after the start of full allotment (Oct 09, 2008 – Nov
30, 2011). Each column represents a separate regression, one for each volume measure. The first
column involves the use of the standing facilities, the second and third the use of the deposit and
lending facility, the fourth the volume traded overnight in the Eonia market and the fifth volume
traded overnight in GC Pooling. All volume measures are in logs and demeaned. ∆Liq measures
the change in outstanding liquidity, Res(CDS|∆CoeffVar) credit risk and CoeffVar the information
about the riskiness of a single bank. Res(VSTOXX|∆CoeffVar) captures the expected volatility in the
stock market. Both ∆ CDS and VSTOXX were individually regressed in a first stage regression
on ∆ CoeffVar to single out their effect in this regression. Calendar dummies (Endres, DumQtr,
One-Year LTRO) are included. Endres captures the last week of the maintenance period, DumQtr
the last week of the quarter, and One-Year LTRO the period Jun 25, 2009 – Jul 01, 2010. The
regressions containing autoregressive terms were estimated by means of full maximum likelihood.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Standing fac. Deposit fac. Lending fac. Eonia GC Pooling
Intercept -0.129 -0.147 0.036 0.011 0.026
(0.362) (0.352) (0.206) (0.069) (0.222)
yt−1 0.998*** 1.006*** 0.348*** 0.737*** 0.369***
(0.081) (0.080) (0.078) (0.080) (0.087)
yt−2 -0.348*** -0.337*** 0.067 -0.180* 0.202**
(0.113) (0.112) (0.084) (0.104) (0.091)
yt−3 0.194* 0.174 -0.093 0.158 0.131
(0.115) (0.114) (0.084) (0.101) (0.094)
yt−4 0.259** 0.301*** 0.145 0.134 0.140
(0.115) (0.115) (0.079) (0.087) (0.086)
yt−5 -0.179** -0.220*** 0.101
(0.080) (0.080) (0.083)
∆ Liqt 0.789** 0.747* -0.231* -0.780*** -1.255***
(0.399) (0.389) (1.870) (0.174) (0.313)
Res(∆CDS|∆CoeffVar),t−1 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.001) (0.002)
∆ CoeffVart−1 -0.791 -0.878* -0.173 -0.002 0.921**
(0.542) (0.524) (2.335) (0.222) (0.455)
Res(VSTOXX|∆CoeffVar),t−1 0.010 0.011 0.065*** 0.003 0.005
(0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.003) (0.004)
Endrest 0.460*** 0.463*** -0.063 -0.040* -0.022
(0.048) (0.047) (0.221) (0.021) (0.035)
DumQtrt 0.139 0.138 0.321 -0.106*** -0.092
(0.087) (0.084) (0.376) (0.039) (0.056)
One-Year LTROt 1.097*** 1.124*** -0.125 0.040 -0.251**
(0.261) (0.256) (0.455) (0.088) (0.118)
No. Obs. 164 164 164 164 164
σ2 0.131 0.127 1.55 0.0187 0.0377
Loglikelihood -67.01 -64.61 -268.6 93.12 35.17
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